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Both low river flows from surface water extraction for irrigation and diffuse nitrogen 
pollution are agricultural externalities. Efficient environmental regulation at the 
catchment level requires that the two be considered together. An economic analysis of 
policies to control non-point source nitrogen pollution in the presence of minimum 
river flow controls in a Scottish agricultural catchment was undertaken. A realistic 
nonlinear Bio-Physical Economic model was constructed which related farming 
activities (crop/soil land allocation, nitrogen fertiliser application, livestock 
husbandry, surface water extraction for irrigation etc.) with catchment profitability 
and environmental externalities (low river flow and diffuse nitrogen pollution). 
Numerous economic, managerial and mixed regulatory policies were ranked in terms 
of overall reduction in welfare arising from loss of profitability under regulation. 
The presence of minimum river flow controls in the catchment was found to reduce 
nitrogen pollution. This reduction was sufficient to be considered in the design of 
diffuse pollution policies. However river flow controls did not, for the most part, alter 
the relative ranking of instruments. By themselves, river flow controls were found 
not to be a cost effective means to reduce diffuse nitrogen pollution. 
The effect of varying weather patterns on the relative ranking of polices and the levels 
required to meet the standard was considered. Although the overall efficiency of 
economic controls targeting emissions was established, mixed instrument policies did 
particularly well in 'wet' weather conditions, while economic controls targeting 
nitrogen as an input performed poorly in the representative 'wet' weather conditions. 
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Introduction 
1.1 Chapter Outline 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first briefly introduces the regulatory 
problem, its policy relevance and research objectives. This is followed by an 
explanation of the evolution of environmental policy in the European Union (EU) 
from the perspective of the Ecological Modernisation Theory. The last segment of 
the chapter presents an abridged account of the thesis. 
1.2 The Research Objectives 
The broad remit of this research was to study the use of 'integrated catchment 
management' and 'full cost recovery pricing' in implementing the EU Water 
Framework Directive (WFD) (E.U. Sep 2000). The research focuses on non-point 
pollution control and water abstraction, and models a Scottish catchment as a case 
study. The WFD is the most comprehensive re-working of European legislation on 
water regulation to date, and supersedes/incorporates previous EU water-related 
Directives. In terms of policy implications, three of the directive's main requirements 
are: 
The requirement to achieve good ecological status (discussed later) in all water 
bodies i.e. lakes, rivers, estuaries, coasts etc., unless derogations are sought and 
granted, throughout the EU. 
That 'full cost recovery pricing', be implemented in principle as prioritised in the 
5th 
Environmental Action Programme. This implies evaluating and accounting for 
'environmental and resource costs' (Article 9). Thus agricultural externalities such 
as reduced river flows and diffuse nitrogen, phosphorus and pesticide pollution etc. 
should be priced and internalised accordingly. Adequate water pricing provides an 
incentive for the sustainable use of water resources and thus helps attain 
environmental objectives (Europa 2002). 
1 
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3. The requirement of 'integrated water catchinent management', which stipulates 
the integrated organisation and regulation of water management at the 'catchment' or 
river basin level. The WFD requires that all river basins and coastal waters must be 
assigned to a River Basin District (RBD). Integrated management implies the joint 
management of water quality and water quantity, for instance in the management of 
polluting inputs and water abstraction. 
While the UK is likely to be covered by approximately 14 River Basin Districts, each 
to become a single planning unit, much of the detailed catchment planning will occur 
at the Sub-Basin scale. Sub-Basins will be defined according to need, and so it can 
be reasonably expected that more detailed planning (smaller sub-basins, or groups of 
sub-basins) will take place in areas of greater water stress. The East of Scotland is 
one such area, where rainfall is naturally low, and where the demand for irrigation 
water regularly exceeds availability, resulting in problems of both water availability 
and water quality. 
Low flow rates in rivers and burns, exacerbated by abstraction, are a predicted cause 
of failure (Scottish Executive, 2002). There is evidence to support the need for 
further surface water extraction controls in intensively irrigated Scottish catchments 
(Fox 1999; MLURI 2001). 
The European Environment Agency has recently corroborated that diffuse nutrient 
(nitrate, phosphate) loads from agriculture are responsible for eutrophication of 
coastal and surface waters and nitrate contamination of aquifers (EEA 2002). Nitrate 
levels are seen as an important reason for the failure of some Scottish surface and 
ground waters to reach "good status" as specified under the WED (SEPA, 1999). 
Diffuse pollution from nitrogen, which results in eutrophication, contamination of 
potable water supply and acidification has been widely recognised and partially 
addressed in Scotland (SEPA 1999; Darcy et al. 2000). 
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This research empirically investigated: a) the impact of river flow restrictions on 
agricultural non-point nitrogen pollution control; b) compared the relative efficiency 
of policies to control diffuse nitrogen pollution based on mean and wet weather 
conditions; and c) considered mixed instrument policies which may be more 
appealing to regulators. In addition, the theoretical internalisation of two surface 
water agricultural externalities, i.e. nonpoint source nitrogen pollution and reduced 
river flows from surface water irrigation, is presented. The dual nature of surface 
water diffuse nitrogen pollution as both a positive production and negative 
environmental externality is considered. The West Peffer catchment (Scotland) was 
modelled due to the prevailing reliance of farming on surface water irrigation and 
intensive cultivation. 
Although there is an abundance of literature on nonpoint pollution (Dosi and Tomasi 
1994b; Xepapadeas 1997; Shortle and Horan 2001) and some investigating the use of 
irrigation controls to control diffuse pollution (Pfeiffer and Whittlesey 1978; Stevens 
1988; Dinar and Letey 1991; Weinberg et al. 1993; Booker and Young 1994; Zerki 
and Herruzo 1994; Helfand 1995; Larson et al. 1996; Murillo et al. 2001) there is no 
study to my knowledge, which empirically investigates the effect of imposing 
minimum river flow restrictions on the control of catchment nitrogen pollution. 
Nitrate emissions from farming are a damaging bi-product (exposure may result in 
eutrophication, 'blue baby syndrome or various forms of cancer') or externality of 
intensive agricultural production. Although farmers have a private incentive to apply 
as much nitrogen as is profitable (nitrate emissions have a positive shadow value to 
farming (Chambers and Quiggin 2000) the rest of society would prefer to restrict 
their usage below the privately optimal level. 
Bio-physical economic simulation modelling can, to an extent, a) overcome the 
information asymmetry between the principal/regulator and agent/farmer and b) the 
regulatory inability to observe agricultural pollutant run-off (Weersink et al. 1998), 
thereby converting a non-point pollutant problem into a point one (Shortle and Abler 
1 Chapter 2 discusses the environmental and human impacts of nitrate exposure 
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1997). However, the issue of estimating the external cost of agricultural externalities 
remains contentious and problematic (Xepapadeas 1997) therefore policy relies on 
the use of second-best environmental standards (e.g. maximum ambient pollutant 
concentrations and minimum river flow restrictions). 
This research uses bio-physical economic modelling to assess the relative 
performance of second-best policies to regulate diffuse nitrate pollution at the 
catchment level in the presence of minimum river flow restrictions. A challenge 
facing regulation is to implement the Nitrate Directive (91/616) which sets an upper 
bound (standard) of 11.3 mg nitrogen per litre (or 50 mg/litre nitrate) in drinking 
water - at least cost to catchment farming, given the catchment has to meet specific 
minimum river flow requirements. 
A theoretical hypothesis is developed (chapter 5), which accounts for interaction 
between controls on water abstraction and controls on nutrient use. This interaction 
affects the cost-minimising outcome for achieving target reductions in ambient 
nitrate levels. Essentially, regulators obtain an extra degree of freedom by extending 
controls over water abstraction, rather than just nutrient inputs and land use. 
Introducing twin targets over minimum water flows and ambient nutrient levels (as is 
implicit in the WFD) makes the regulatory problem more interesting and complex. 
The empirical component of this research investigated this inter-action using a 
catchment level bio-physical simulation model. 
1.3 EU Surface Water Ecological and Chemical Protection 
In the European Union historically there has been a dichotomy in pollution control. 
One type of control concentrated at the source, through the application of 
technology; while the other focused on the receiving body's environmental impact, 
i.e. quality standards. Where there is a concentration of pollution sources, source 
controls can result in a cumulative build up of harmful pollution. Similarly quality 
standards can also underestimate the effect of a particular substance on the 
ecosystem, due to the limitations in scientific knowledge regarding dose-response 
relationships and the pollutant transport mechanism. The WFD integrates the two by 
4 
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requiring implementation of all existing technology-driven source based controls, 
besides implementing existing environmental quality standards (Europa 2002). The 
required end result is to ensure overall 'good' environmental status for all waters 
The WFD introduced a general requirement for ecological protection and a minimum 
ambient chemical standard to cover all surface waters. These were termed 'good 
ecological status' and 'good chemical status' respectively. Annex V of the Water 
Framework Proposal defines good ecological status in terms of the quality of the 
biological community as well as the hydrological and chemical characteristics. Due 
to the biological variability within the EU no absolute biological quality standards 
can be set. Instead controls have been specified in terms of conditions occurring if 
there was minimal anthropogenic impact. Procedures which allow identifying such 
conditions (chemical, hydromorphological) for a given body of water are detailed in 
the directive; including a system to ensure consistent compliance between member 
states. Good chemical status is ensured by compliance with numerous quality 
standards for chemical substances detailed in chapter 2. The directive also permits 
renewing these standards and establishing new ones. 
The following chapter segment details the evolution of environmental policy in 
general. After this the Ecological Modernization Theory (EMT) is explained and 
related to the evolution of environmental policy in the EU. 
1.4 Evolution of Environmental Policy 
Neo-classical economics advocates that market failure (lack of clear property rights) 
is the primary source of environmental degradation and government intervention to 
overcome this market failure constitutes an appropriate response. Whereas political 
theorists contend that it is the combined effect of market failure and the 
government's inability to respond effectively (i.e. policy failure) that is to blame for 
environmental deterioration (Panayotou 1992). 
Some argue that the convergence of interest between the bureaucracy and industry 
favours standardized solutions to environmental problems when they occur - even 
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though more efficient proactive solutions are present. Standardised solutions ensure 
the regulatory (governmental) costs of policy design and implementation are 
reduced. Similarly to industry (polluters) such remedial controls are straight forward 
and relatively easy to accommodate. Consequently policy veers towards standardized 
solutions and not economically efficient, proactive, or innovative policies. 
Additionally it is believed that the 'invisible' impact of policies are often ignored 
(Gouldson and Murphy 1996). Thus it is technological, cultural, and institutional 
inertia which prevents the adoption of proactive environmental policies (Skou-
Andersen 1994; Janicke and Weidner 1995). 
It is argued that general environmental policy has not evolved from strategic thinking 
(proactive) but rather short term reactive approaches to ecological crisis or failure 
(Janicke and Weidner 1995). Popular typology views environmental policy passing 
through the following stages, a) primary stage: pollution issues avoided by moving 
either the source or receptor to separate cause and effect, b) secondary stage: 
dispersing pollution sources to ensure the effects become less apparent and/or 
externalised to the region surrounding the source, and c) tertiary stage: the 
installation of control technologies which contain at sources coupled with subsequent 
treatment (Skou-Andersen 1994). 
1.5 Ecological Modernisation Theory (EMT) 
EMT is both a normative and prescriptive theory which argues that 'economic 
growth and the resolution of ecological problems, can in principle, be reconciled' 
(Hajer 1996). It contends that the ecological crisis facing the world can only be 
resolved by further industrialisation (Spaargaren and Mol 1992). EMT regards 
environmental issues not as a crisis but as an opportunity; since is it assumes 
industrial innovation (technological change) in a market economy encouraged by an 
'enabling state' will ensure environmental conservation (Blowers 1997). EMT 
promotes integration of environmental considerations in other policy areas and 
exploration of innovative policy measures. It also advocates 'cleaner' (not clean) 
technologies which improve both environmental and economic performance. 
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'It assumes that the existing political institutions can internalise ecological concerns 
or can at least give birth to new supranational forms of management.. .'(Hajer 1996). 
As EMT does not require radical regulatory reforms nor criticise capitalism, it is 
widely hailed by governmental and organised industry (polluters). 
1.6 EMT and the European Union 
Some have argued that the European Union's statements of principle and intent 
match the four central themes of EMT, in that: 
The European Parliament Resolution on Environmental Technologies 
(CEC 1980) acknowledges the possible contribution of the environmental 
technology industry to future employment and economic development. 
Similarly, the EU White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment 
(CEC 1993) links the environment with the economy and suggests resolving 
employment, environment and economic problems simultaneously. 
The Maastricht Treaty specifically addresses the need to integrate 
environmental policy into other areas of policy. Whereas the 5th 
Environmental Action Programme (EAP) sets out further details on such 
integration. 
The 5 1 EAP also advocates a broader range of innovative policy measures, 
such as information provision, education, voluntary measures, financial 
support etc. The above mentioned White Paper called for eco-taxation which 
would reduce tax on under-utilised labour resources and increasing tax on 
over-exploited environmental resources. 
The same paper also called for promoting a 'cleaner technology base'. 
Similarly the Communication on Economic Growth and the Environment 
(CEC 1994) reiterates the need for research and development in cleaner 
efficient technologies. 
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Thus, it can be argued that the EU is following a version of the EMT, at least in 
theory if not in name (Gouldson and Murphy 1996). 
The rest of this chapter presents a chapter by chapter outline of the thesis. 
1.7 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 consists of three main parts; the first explains basic facts about nitrogen 
the element, nitrogen fertilisers, and the soil nitrogen cycle with special emphasis on 
soil nitrogen losses. The second part lists the human and environmental effects of 
nitrogen water pollution, while the final segment details the policy response in the 
UK as a result of EU regulation. This includes a discussion on the nitrate sensitive 
area scheme (NSA), nitrate vulnerable zones (NVZ), the common agricultural policy 
(CAP) and its reforms, the water framework directive (WFD) and nitrate politics. 
Chapter 3 details theoretical issues concerning NPS pollution control and its control 
through economic and non-economic regulation. The chapter begins with an 
explanation of the properties of NPS agricultural pollutants which make its 
regulation difficult. An explanation of first and second-best cost-effective economic 
solutions is presented followed by a detailed discussion of both performance 
(ambient and liability rules) and design (expected runoff, input and technology) 
based controls. The relative benefits and disadvantages of all are debated. Marketable 
pollution permits and the possibility of point-nonpoint trading are discussed 
separately. Other practical concerns in the control of NPS pollutants are considered, 
including the issue of property rights, the polluter pays principle and subsidies. The 
chapter concludes with an analysis of non-economic approaches such as education, 
and regulatory standards. 
Chapter 4 reviews numerous empirical studies of NPS pollution control (nitrate, 
phosphorus, sediment and pesticides) including some that investigate non-economic 
controls. Cost-effectiveness of different control policies in each study is ranked, 
along with their modelling assumptions and analytical methodology. Conventionally, 
such studies are divided into aggregate (regional) and disaggregate (catchment or 
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watershed). Particular emphasis is placed on research investigating: a) disaggregate 
catchment scale studies; b) the interaction between control policies targeting both 
water quality and quantity (surface and/or groundwater extraction); and c) the impact 
controlling one NPS pollutant may have on the generation of another NPS pollutant. 
Chapter 5 examines the theoretical internalisation of both water quality and quantity 
externalities. The two externalities considered are diffuse nitrate pollution and low 
river flows from surface water extraction. It derives the optimal corrective taxes in a 
first-best and second-best world and investigates complimentary interaction between 
controls on both. Nonpoint source nitrate pollution is considered both as a negative 
environmental externality as well as a positive production externality to downstream 
surface water irrigators. 
Chapter 6 introduces the West Peffer catchment (Scotland), which was modelled for 
the purposes of this research. The chapter states the characteristic catchment soil 
types, land use and rainfall distribution. It also explains how the crop production, 
nitrate leaching, animal husbandry, potato growth (irrigation), and economic 
modelling were performed. All associated data sources and modelling assumptions 
are listed. 
Finally chapter 7 presents the results, the cost-effective ranking of the control 
instruments analysed and their possible policy implications. Chapter 8 states the 
main limitations of this study as well as possible directions for future research and 
improvement. The chapter concludes with a synopsis of the research undertaken and 
its main conclusions. 
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First, this chapter will outline the basic facts about nitrogen fertilisers and the soil 
nitrogen cycle, i.e. natural processes that add and remove nitrogen from the soil. This 
is followed by a discussion of the health hazards of nitrate pollution to the ecosystem 
i.e., humans, ecology and environment. Once the detrimental impact of diffuse 
nitrogen pollution is established the rest of the chapter discusses the European 
Union's (EU) policy response - with emphasis on the UK and in particular Scotland. 
Finally the chapter concludes with a brief discussion on the politics of nitrate 
pollution. 
2.2 Nitrogen Facts 
Nitrogen (L. nitrum, Gr. Nitron) was discovered by chemist and physician Daniel 
Rutherford in 1772. Nitrogen as a gas is colourless, odourless, and generally 
considered an inert element (named azote, meaning without life). 
Carbon, Oxygen, Hydrogen and Nitrogen make up 96% of all living matter 
(Campbell 1993). Nitrogen is an essential component of amino-acids which are the 
building blocks of proteins (nucleic acids, chlorophyll, and enzymes). Without 
adequate nitrogen, plant growth is restricted and characteristic symptoms of nitrogen 
deficiency include yellowing and death of leaves, and stunted growth, and low yield 
(however too much can delay fruiting). 
Although Nitrogen constitutes 80% of the Earth's atmosphere, it is chemically inert 
and cannot be used directly by most living organisms. N fixing bacteria through a 
unique process of nitrogen fixation can convert N from its gaseous form (N2 ) into 
compounds suitable for uptake by living organisms. Under undisturbed natural 
conditions, inorganic N usually constitutes between I to 2% of total soil nitrogen. In 
an attempt to overcome this limiting factor to production, i.e. the slow biological 
10 
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fixation of N, man has resorted to chemical synthesis (requiring high temperature and 
pressure) which requires the annual expenditure of immense amounts of energy. It is 
estimated that about 40% of the world's protein needs are derived from atmospheric 
nitrogen fixed by the Haber-Bosch process and its successors, to produce ammonia 
(IFA 2002). 
2.3 Nitrogen Fertilisers 
As Inorganic nitrogen fertilizers are concentrated their transportation costs are 
considerably lower than bulky organic manures. Artificial fertilisers are often 
convenient to apply and usually the nitrogen contained in them is immediately 
available for plant uptake. However, some nitrogen fertilizers have been specially 
treated by the fertilizer manufacturer to slowly release nitrogen into the soil. These 
"slow-release" fertilizers reduce the need and cost of frequent fertilizer applications. 
Nitrogen fertilizers are also mixed with fertilizer materials containing phosphorus 
and potassium to produce a fertilizer blend. Common disadvantages of inorganic 
fertilizers are often associated with poor management such as applying too much. 
Over application of nitrogen fertilizer increases the risk of salt injury to the plant and 
the potential for the nitrogen from fertilizer leaching out of the root zone and 
polluting ground and surface water. 
In comparison organic nitrogen fertilizers often have relatively low nitrogen content 
and are often required in larger quantities. They also contribute organic matter to the 
soil which improves the soil's physical, biological and chemical properties making it 
conducive to plant growth. In addition, many organic fertilizers contain all the plant 
nutrients needed for plant growth including micronutrients such as iron, zinc, and 
manganese. Organic fertilizers are often inexpensive and can draw upon locally-
available waste materials such as animal manure or yard waste. Disadvantages of 
some organic fertilizers include odour, difficulties in transporting, applying and 
incorporating bulky organic materials, unsightliness, and the risk of nitrogen 
immobilization in materials having low nitrogen content. As an approximate rule of 
thumb, around 50% of the organic nitrogen applied to the soil will be available for 
plants to use the first season after application (Lord et al. 1999). 
11 



















-. -1i - 	 ..-. 	 - 	 I 	 .' •• j'_ 	 . 
Chapter 2: Nitrate Pollution 
If farmers were to stop using fertilizer now, crop yields would drop significantly over 
a couple of years. Many countries which today use substantial amounts of fertilizers 
and export agricultural produce, would barely be in a position to feed their own 
population (Mengel 1992). The demand for fertilizer N cannot be completely 
covered by rotation with nitrogen-fixing leguminous species (such as clover or 
soybean) unless more than 40% of arable land was cultivated with leguminous 
species; thus, a substantial proportion of arable land would be used to produce N 
naturally. This would be more expensive than industrial production (Mengel 1992) 
and undoubtedly the price of agricultural produce would increase. Tables 2.1, 2.2, 
and 2.3 are figures on the world nitrogen fertilizer production (1997/98), world 
fertilizer consumption trend and world fertilizer consumption (1998/99) respectively 
(IFA 2002). In table 2.2 and 2.3 P205 and K 20 refer to phosphorus and potassium 
oxides respectively. 
Table 2.1: Nitroaen fertilizer nroduction 199719R 
Region Million Tonnes Nutrients 
China 19.94 
India 10.08 
North America 14.97 
West and Central Europe 13.57 
FSU 7.99 
Middle East 5.61 
Others 12.77 
World 84.93 
Table 2.2: World Fertilizer Consumntinn TrneI 
Year N K 20 Total 
(milliontonnes nutrients)  
1920/21 neg. 1.73 neg. 1.73 
1930/31 1.30 2.77 1.39 5.46 
1960/61 10.83 10.73 8.48 30.04 
1970/71 31.75 21.11 16.29 69.15 
1980/81 60.78 32.04 24.39 117.21 
1990/91 77.56 36.07 24.61 138.24 
1998/99 82.18 32.88 21.87 136.93 
12 
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Table 2.3: World fertilizer consumøtion. 1998/99 
Region N P205 K 20 Total 
(million tonnes nutrients)  
Developing Asia 42.77 15.66 6.87 65.30 
North America 12.87 4.52 4.81 22.20 
Latin America 4.71 3.47 3.08 11.26 
West Europe 9.96 3.50 4.11 17.57 
Central Europe and FSU* 4.71 1.29 1.50 7.50 
Others 7.16 4.44 1.50 1 	13.10 
FSU: tormer Soviet Union 
2.4 The Nitrogen Cycle 
The nitrogen cycle in the soil can be broken up into those processes which contribute 
to the N available for crop uptake (soil nitrogen additions) and those which remove it 
from the soil (soil nitrogen losses). The soil nitrogen cycle is summarised 
diagrammatically in figure 2. 1. 
2.4.1 Soil Nitrogen Additions 
Based on relative overall contribution, nitrogen inputs can be categorised into a) 
primary nitrogen sources such as inorganic (artificial fertilisers) and organic fertiliser 
(manure and crop residue), and b) secondary inputs such as atmospheric precipitation 
and biological fixation. 
Nitrogen fixation: Nitrogen fixation is the conversion of dinitrogen (N,) from the air 
to ammonium NH and is carried out by nitrogen fixing bacteria which can be 
divided into two groups: a) non-symbiotic or free-living blue-green bacteria such as 
lichens and mosses; and b) symbiotic ones (genus Rhizobium) which live in the roots 
of leguminous plants (Leguminosae) such as peas, beans and clover where they form 
characteristic nodules. Healthy clover can fix more than 100kg N /ha/year. Biological 
fixation was central to maintenance of soil fertility by crop rotation, once widely 
practised in the UK (Hopkins 2000). Estimates of the amount of nitrogen fixation in 
the UK vary between 0.2 Mt and 0.4 Mt (The-Royal-Society 1983). 
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Atmospheric precipitation: Atmospheric precipitation of nitrogen (rainfall carrying 
the dry deposition of N to earth) and lightening discharges also add N to soil. It is 
estimated that up to 40kg N per hectare can come from the atmosphere. (Heathwaite 
et al. 1993). 
AmmoniJIcation: The organic matter in soil consists of crop residue called 'humus' 
and microbial biomass which together make up the darker topsoil. The N content of 
plants (previous crops) and animals is decomposed by micro-organisms, which attack 
proteins and nucleic acids liberating ammonium (ammonification) (Pitcairn 1994). A 
part of N released is assimilated by the microbes themselves (immobilisation) - 
which in due course will be released when the microbe dies. However this process 
results in a net release of N and is referred to mineralization, because organic N is 
converted to inorganic form (NH ammonium). Rates of ammonification depend on 
the size of the relevant microbial population, soil conditions, especially upon 
moisture content, temperature, acidity and the soil C: N ratio. Both ammonification 
and immobilisation take place simultaneously and which process dominates depends 
on soil characteristics and properties. 
Nitrification: Two main mechanisms result in the microbial production of 
N01 (nitrification). The common autotrophic nitrification involves oxidation of 
NH to NO in two stages via NO is carried out by bacteria Nitrosomonas and 
Nitrobacter. The second mechanism is carried out by heterotrophic micro-organisms 
when organic N is transformed to NO. In general, nitrification is low in acidic soils, 
in nutrient poor soils, in soils with a high C: N ratio and /or low NHavailability 
and at low temperatures. 
Both Ammonification and Nitrification are normally termed soil transformation 
however as they both contribute towards converting Nitrogen into forms which can 
be assimilated by plants they are have been grouped as 'additions'. 
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2.4.2 Soil Nitrogen Losses 
Nitrogen losses from the soil come under the process of assimilation, denitrification, 
volatilisation, run-off and leaching. 
Assimilation: Assimilation refers to the process of plant N uptake. Nitrogen is 
essential for life as it is necessary component of amino-acids which are the 
fundamental units of structural and enzymatic proteins. Plants are able to assimilate 
inorganic N (principally NH and NO) and incorporate these into organic N 
compounds. 
Denitrification: Denitrification is the microbiological conversion of NO3  to gaseous 
N such as, dinitrogen and nitrous oxide. It is the main process by which fixed N is 
returned to the atmosphere and is carried out by a host of organisms, but only under 
certain environmental conditions. It uses NO3  as a substrate and requires anaerobic 
conditions and a source of energy for the organisms. The amount of nitrous oxide 
emitted from soils globally is twice that amount produced by burning fossil fuels 
(Addiscott et al. 1991). The proportion of nitrous oxide to nitrogen gas emissions 
depends on soil properties. In general strongly acid soils usually emit only nitrous 
oxide while non-acidic soils in temperate regions mainly produce nitrogen gas unless 
there is a large amount of nitrates in the soil, as is the case after the application of 
fertiliser. 
Volatilisation: Surface volatilization of N occurs when urea forms of N break down 
forms ammonia gases and where there is little soil water to absorb it. This condition 
occurs when urea is placed in the field but not in direct contact with the soil or when 
farm manure is allowed to decompose on the soil surface. The rate of surface 
volatilization depends on moisture level, temperature and the surface pH of the soil. 
The more alkaline a soil is and the more moist its surface, the greater the loss through 
volatilisation. The quantitative significance of volatilisation is uncertain (THS 1983). 
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Run-off: Run-off is defined as the movement of water across the soil surface into 
water channels. Clays are most likely to lose nitrates as run-off, although the 
cumulative amount of run-off and leachate lost may be the same (Conway and Pretty 
1991). 
Leaching: Leaching is the process whereby water containing dissolved soil materials 
infiltrates the soil profile. Leaching losses of N occur when soils have more 
incoming water (rain or irrigation) than the soil can hold. As water moves through 
the soil, the nitrate NO3  in soil solution moves along with the water. Ammonium 
NHforms of N have a positive charge and are held by the negative sites on the 
clay in the soil; therefore, NHforms of N leach very little. In sands where there is 
very little clay, ammonium forms of N can leach. Coarse-textured sands and some 
'muck soils' are the only soils where ammonium leaching may be significant. 
Overall leaching is comprised of mainly of NO and is greatest in light soils and 
soils with coarse structure i.e. higher infiltration. Leaching occurs throughout the 
year although in the UK leaching rates are greatest in winter when soil moisture is at 
field capacity and precipitation exceeds evapotranspiration (THS 1983). The leached 
nitrogen in the soil may either find its way down into an underground aquifer or any 
period of time (ranging from months to years depending on catchment specific 
geology) or like run-off make its way through field drainage ditches to surface water. 
Nitrogen leaching depends primarily on the weather, i.e. precipitation and 
evaporation, and varies for every crop/soil combination. The weather determines the 
crop's ability to utilise the available nitrogen for growth and hence also determines 
the amount left over for leaching. Of this 'potential leachate' the actual leachate and 
run-off depends on the water movement down and across through the soil 
respectively. This is turn varies for every crop/soil combination and is primarily a 
function of precipitation, potential evaporation and physical features such as slope 
etc. It is no surprise that the leaching pattern follows the seasonal distribution of 
rainfall, with the greatest losses occurring in late autumn and over winter where there 
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is little plant uptake (i.e. growth) and plentiful rainfall. Leaching and run-off are both 
affected by the type, frequency, timing and method of fertiliser application 
The direct contribution of fertilisers to nitrate leaching is surprisingly a controversial 
issue in the literature (even if not evident in the formulation of policies). There is 
definitely a positive correlation between the increased consumption of fertiliser and 
nitrate leaching (Davies and Sylvester-Bradley 1995). It is argued that N fertilisers 
increase soil organic matter which is subsequently broken down by microbes 
resulting in nitrate leaching (Addiscott et al. 1991). 
On average only about 2% of N fertiliser is left in the soil as nitrates after plant 
assimilation and that the nitrate leaching in autumn is the consequence of mineralised 
soil organic matter (Burt and Haycock 1993). In autumn the soil moisture content 
and temperatures favour microbial activity and the breaking down of crop and root 
residue or humus. Thus even the most 'judicious' use of nitrogen fertilisers 
contribute indirectly to nitrate leaching (Johnston 1994). 
Leaching to groundwater is a complicated dynamic process which may take anything 
from a couple of months to even centuries depending on the physical and chemical 
properties of catchment geology (i.e. intervening rock layers). In fact elevated nitrate 
levels in boreholes in the South of England are attributed to the ploughing up of 
permanent pastures during the Second World War for cereal production (Hanley 
1991). 
2.5 Health Effects 
The discovery of nitrates and pesticides in ground water during the 1970s dispelled 
the commonly held view that ground water was protected from agro-chemicals by 
layers of rock, soil and clay. This initiated what would become intense public interest 
in environmental protection and agricultural pollution because not only is water 
essential but its purity is a gauge of the quality of life (Braden and Segerson 1993). 
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A USA Environmental Protection Agency publication (EPA 1991) states "Only two 
substances for which standards have been set pose an immediate threat to health 
whenever they are exceeded: bacteria and nitrate." 
Nitrate is a normal component of the human diet, with an average daily intake from 
all sources approximated at 75 mg. About 5% of the nitrate ingested by adults is 
converted (reduced) to nitrite by bacteria in saliva; this conversion continues inside 
the alimentary tract. A high pH (non-acidic) of gastric fluids favours the growth of 
nitrate-reducing bacteria. Nitrites in the stomach can react with food proteins to form 
N-nitroso compounds, which are carcinogenic in rats. The evidence for humans is 
not conclusive as various world-wide epidemiological studies have produced 
conflicting results (Croll and Hayes 1988). Nitrate concentrations in UK drinking 
waters do not pose a significant risk of stomach cancer (ORiordan and Bentham 
1993). However it is interesting to note that in the United States, where the drinking 
water nitrate standard is considerably more stringent than its EU counterpart (US 10 
mg/litre; EU 50 mg/litre), the environmental research authorities have suggested 
nitrates in foods and water as possible sources of cancer in recent reports (NRC 
1995; Environmental-Working-Group 1996)2.  
Human babies are extremely susceptible to acute nitrate poisoning because they have 
more nitrite forming bacteria in their digestive system. Nitrite reacts with 
haemoglobin (the oxygen carrying iron-containing blood protein) to form 
methemoglobin (incapable of transporting oxygen and naturally founds at low levels 
0.5 - 2% of blood). The most obvious symptom of nitrate poisoning is a bluish 
coloration of the skin due to lack of oxygen in the blood, a symptom termed cyanosis 
(10% methemoglobin in blood). As the oxygen level in the blood diminishes, the 
baby is suffocated, this condition occurs at 50 -60 % methemoglobin level in their 
blood and is termed nethemoglobineniia or 'blue baby syndrome'. Infants under the 
age of 6 months are most susceptible as they have relatively non-acidic stomachs 
which favour bacterial growth. The last death from methemoglobinemia in the UK 
was in 1950 and last reported case in 1972 (Addiscott et al. 1991). Although 3,000 
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cases have been reported world wide since 1945 the condition is believed non-
existent in Western Europe (House-of-Lords 1989a). 
On a cautionary note US Environmental working group report concludes that the 
incidence of methemoglobinemia is under reported and the potential link between 
nitrate exposure and stomach cancer needs to be reconsidered (Cook et al. 1996). The 
same report potentially links the long term impact of nitrate ingestion with a variety 
of conditions such as birth defects, thyroid hypertrophy, hypertension, and 15 kinds 
of cancer (including non-Hodgkin lymphoma (NCI 1996)). Very recently, research 
by Glasgow University has linked gullet cancer with nitrates in fruit and vegetables 
(McKie 2002). Gullet cancer, which is more common than stomach cancer, kills 
more than 3,000 people in the UK every year and there has been a threefold increase 
over the past 20 years. 
2.6 Environmental Effects 
Eutrophication is the enrichment of water by nutrients (such as nitrate or phosphate) 
which results in a disturbance in the balance of organisms due to an accelerated 
growth of algae and higher forms of plant life. When plants and algae die their 
remains sink and are consumed by aerobic bacteria. This results in a reduction of the 
level of dissolved oxygen. Eventually, often near the bottom of a lake, virtually no 
oxygen remains (anoxic) and aerobic species die. Under these conditions anaerobic 
bacteria flourish. Anaerobic bacteria often produce toxic foul-smelling compounds 
such as hydrogen sulphide (H2S), thioalcolohs (RSH) and ammonia (NH3). 
Eutrophication is a natural process that occurs to all lakes over time as the 
weathering of rocks and soils from the surrounding catchment area leads to an 
accumulation of nutrients in the water and associated sediments. Young lakes (and 
man made reservoirs) usually have low levels of nutrients and correspondingly low 
levels of biological activity (oligotropic). Old lakes usually have high levels of 
nutrients and correspondingly high levels of biological activity (eutrophic). The 
2 
 Interestingly, the intensity of fertiliser consumption in the EC is illustrated by the fact that North 
America which has a much larger land base than the EC consumes less fertiliser (Liapis 1994) 
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natural time scale from oligotrophic to eutrophic is of the order of thousands of 
years. However, a high rate of input of nutrients (from human activities) can increase 
the rate of aging significantly resulting in eutrophic conditions developing after only 
a few decades. 
Algal growth depends on temperature, convectional currents and nutrient supply - 
which are often the limiting factor (House-of-Lords 1989a). However these nutrients 
are provided by human activities such as run-off and leaching of inorganic fertiliser 
and manure (containing nitrates, phosphates and ammonia), run-off from erosion 
(following mining, construction work or poor land use) discharge of detergents 
(containing phosphates) discharge of partially treated or untreated sewage 
(containing nitrates and phosphates). Although both phosphorus and nitrogen are 
essential to algal growth, normally the former is the 'limiting nutrient' in freshwaters 
and the latter in marine waters (House-of-Lords 1989a). 
A eutrophic aquatic ecosystem may (DEFRA 2002b): 
Become unsuitable habitat for fish and invertebrates with reduced species 
diversity of both the aquatic habitat and other species higher in the food 
chain. Normally there is a change in dominant biota (e.g. carp replace trout 
and blue-green algae replace normal algae) and an overall increase in plant 
and animal biomass. 
Become too low in oxygen (anoxic conditions) for species such as fish and 
shellfish. 
Damage the quality of areas of high wildlife conservation value, such as Sites 
of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs). 
Increase 	the growth 	of 	rooted plants 	(e.g. reeds), 	water 	turbidity, 
sedimentation and frequency of algal blooms. Toxic algal blooms (e.g. 
benthic algae) which poison fish and shellfish, making them unsafe for 
people to eat and damage the fishing industry (however there is no well 
established link between nutrient enrichment and the incidences of shellfish 
toxicity in marine waters). Local livestock and wildlife may be at risk and 
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blooms in recreational waters can result in closure of the areas, with impacts 
on tourism. 
5. Produce so much vegetation that navigation or recreational use of waters 
becomes impossible. 
Applying excessively high levels of nitrates has been related to changes in the 
species composition of grasslands (Skinner et al. 1997). This is because grass species 
differ in their nutrient requirement and their ability to uptake ions. The Rothamsted 
Experimental Station investigated the impact of applying high levels of ammonium 
sulphate and found it to acidify the soil resulting in grass dominated low-diversity 
swards (Smith 1987). Nitrate fertiliser is also responsible for the dominance of 
sweet-grass reed across grazed wetlands in Cambridge and the weakening of reed 
stems in the Norfolk Broads (House-of-Lords 1989b). 
Regarding the impact of nitrates on animal husbandry, high nitrate concentrations in 
water and feed lead to reduced vitality and increased stillbirth, low birth weight, and 
slow weight gain in livestock (NRC 1972). One estimate of losses to Norwegian 
Salmon and Trout farmers from eutrophication in the Baltic Sea is $200 million 
(Saul] 1990). There are numerous reviews of CVM cost benefit analyses which 
attempt to calculate the external cost of nitrate pollution in rivers (Hanley, N and 
Spash, C. 1993). 
2.7 Diffuse Pollution 
Diffuse or Nonpoint source pollution is that without a single point of origin or not 
introduced into a receiving body (e.g. stream) from a specific outlet or discrete 
source (EEA 2002). Diffuse agricultural pollution is Scotland's second most 
significant cause of ground and surface water pollution after sewage. By 2010 it will 
be the most significant cause and admittedly the most difficult to address (Henton 
March 2000). The total 'external' environmental cost of agriculture was estimated at 
£2.3 billion in 1996 across the UK (Pretty 2000). Significant costs were attributed to 
contamination of drinking water with pesticides (fl20 mlyear), nitrate (±16 m), 
Cr'ptosporidiuni (23 m) and phosphate and soil (f 55 m). 
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Other sources of water pollution from agriculture include pathogens draining into 
water courses (which impacts on bathing waters), soil erosion (which affects water 
habitats and quality) farm tips, on-farm burial of carcasses and emissions of 
ammonia from intensive livestock units. Downstream agricultural processing plants 
such as soil seed crushing or vegetable washing plant have the potential to cause 
pollution as well (Henton March 2000). 
2.8 Policy Response 
The problem of diffuse or 'nonpoint source' nitrogen pollution is complicated 
because it a) overlaps different disciplines b) is influenced by stochastic natural 
processes, and c) nitrate policy has significant socio-political consequences i.e. 
numerous conflicting and influential interest groups promote their perspective. In 
short it involves complex interactions across bio-physical economic and social 
systems (Watson et al. 1996) which makes constructing a policy all the more 
difficult. 
The problem of diffuse pollution from nitrogen has been widely recognised and 
partially addressed in the Scotland (SEPA 1999; Darcy et al. 2000). The United 
Kingdom's diffuse nitrogen pollution control policy has been driven primarily by 
European Union requirements. The following is an outline of various schemes, 
policies and directives in response to nitrate pollution. 
2.8.1 Nitrate Sensitive Areas 
A Nitrate Sensitive Area (NSA) is an area where nitrate concentrations in sources of 
public drinking water exceed, or at the risk of exceeding, the limit of 50mg/1 laid 
down under the 1980 EC (European Community) Drinking Water Directive 
(80/778/EEC) - which came into effect in 1985 in the UK. The NSA scheme aimed 
to reduce or stabilise high and/or rising nitrate levels through voluntary compensated 
agricultural measures going beyond good agricultural practice (DEFRA 1999b). The 
NSA scheme involved whole or part-fields being entered for a five year period. It 
was available in 32 areas of England (10 pilot areas introduced in 1990 and 22 
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further areas in 1994) and covered 35,000 ha of eligible land. The scheme attracted 
25,000 ha of land (71 %) of the designated area. An NSA scheme was not introduced 
in Scotland. Some details of the NSA scheme options available to farmers are 
presented in table 2.4. 
The scheme was monitored by collecting data on cropping and husbandry practices 
for each field and using a computer model (NITCAT and MANNER) to estimate N 
leaching. This was accompanied by actual leaching measurement of representative 
fields (soil water sampling) and borehole concentrations. 
225 farmers in the eligible scheme area were interviewed (ENTEC 1988) in a 
comprehensive study commissioned by MAFF. The report concludes that the scheme 
has 'contributed significantly' to nitrate reduction, however: 
'Around 44% of participants sampled were unaware oftheirfarm practices which 
contributed most to nitrate leaching. The majority of those who were aware stated 
they would not continue with the changes that the NSA scheme required if they were 
no longer constrained.., the scheme has not altered farmer's attitudes to the extent 
that would make a compensated scheme unnecessarv'(ENTEC 1988). 
2.9.2 Nitrate Vulnerable Zones 
The NSA measures were quite separate from the mandatory and uncompensated 
measures introduced under the EC Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC), which came into 
force in Dec 1998. The NVZ measures, which restrict the quantity and timing of 
applications of nitrogen fertilisers and livestock manures, equate to Good 
Agricultural Practice and are therefore uncompensated (DEFRA 1999b). 
There are currently two NVZs in Scotland. The first was designated at Balmalcolm 
in Fife during 1996 initial directive implementation, while the second, the Ythan 
Estuary in North East Scotland, was declared an NVZ by the Scottish Executive on 
advice from the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) in 2000. SEPA 
believes high levels of macrophyte growth and changes to fauna in the Ythan estuary 
are attributable to excessively high nitrate concentrations (Scottish-Executive 1999). 
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The Nitrate Directive requires that an Action Programme of appropriate measures 
should be drawn up and made compulsory in the NVZs. Member States retain some 
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Table 2.4: NSA Scheme Options 
There are a total of nine options available within the NSA scheme under three main 
classifications as follows (ENTEC 1988): 
Premium Arable Scheme - Involves the conversion of arable land to extensive 
grass under one of the following management system: 
Option A 
Unfertilised, ungrazed grassland 
Option B 
Unfertilised, ungrazed grassland with species-rich seed mixture 
Option C 
Unfertilised grassland with optional grazing 
Option D 
Grassland with optional grazing and the application of up to 150kg/ha of nitrogen 
fertiliser per year (kg of nutrient) 
Option E 
Grassland with woodland 
Setaside Option 
Unfertilised, ungrazed grassland that can count towards meeting setaside obligations 
under the Arable Area Payment Scheme (AAPS) 
Premium Grass - Involves the extensification of existing intensively managed 
grassland. To be eligible the grassland must have been receiving more than 250kg/ha 
per year of inorganic nitrogen in each of the previous three years. 
Basic Scheme - allows a continuation under conditions designed to reduce nitrate 
leaching. 
Option A 
Low nitrogen Arable Cropping - Restricted rotation, i.e. potatoes or vegetable 
brassica crops not to be grown. Nitrogen is limited to the lower of either the economic 
optimum or 150 kg/N/ha in an one year 
Option B 
Low nitrogen Arable Cropping - Standard Notation. Nitrogen is limited to four years 
out of the five to the lower of the economic optimum or 150 kg N/ha in any year. In 
one year out of the five the Nitrogen limited is raised to 200kg N/ha. 
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discretion over the content of Action Programmes, but, as required by the Directive, 
there are certain types of agricultural controls that all Action Programmes must 
contain. In order of impact, the main points are as follows: 
Farmers in the NVZs will be required to limit their applications of manure. The 
limit will be set initially at 210kg of total nitrogen per hectare and later reduced to 
170kg. 
Farmers will have to ensure that they have adequate manure storage capacity to 
allow them to observe closed periods for the application of manure. 
Farmers will have to limit their applications of inorganic fertilisers to levels which 
are consistent with the nitrogen requirement of the crop, after allowance for nitrogen 
from residues in the soil and from other sources. 
Farmers will be required to keep fertiliser and manure records, including the 
timing and level of applications. 
The Scottish Executive has initiated the designation of further NVZs (in 
Aberdeenshire, Banff and Buchan, parts of Strathmore, Fife, Mid and East Lothian 
and parts of the Borders) by issuing a public consultation paper (Scottish-Executive 
2002). The consultation states the proposed designation of approximately 18% of 
Scotland as NVZs. This is based on research by the British Geological Survey 
commissioned report (Ball and MacDonald 2001) which determines the groundwater 
nitrate vulnerable zones for Scotland utilising an estimation of the risk of nitrate 
leaching from land classification (Lilly et al. 2001). The report also categorised 
surface water catchments for the vulnerable zones and validated the risk 
methodology by comparing the results with actual concentration measurements by 
SEPA, Water Authorities data, Private Water Supplies data and miscellaneous 
datasets. 
Furthermore the above mentioned consultation paper states the Scottish Executive 
will increase the designated areas (by including the Black Isle, Coastal Easter Ross, 
Nairn, Moray, parts of Strathmore, Falkirk and West Lothian) if actual data 
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(currently being gathered) can support the risk analysis. Clearly non-point nitrogen 
pollution is a major and topical concern in Scotland. 
2.10 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
The Nitrate Directive can also be viewed as a result of the greening process of CAP, 
initiated by the MacSharry reform of 1992 and reinforced by Agenda 2000. Greening 
can be defined as the process by which modem environmental symbols have become 
prominent in social discourse and policy rhetoric. Whereas environmentalism is the 
greening of institutions and their practices in terms of incorporating environmental 
considerations in political and economic decisions, educational and scientific 
research institutions and geopolitics (Buttel 1993). In the nineties there was a lot of 
work on the greening of agricultural policy (Winter 1996; Clark et al. 1997; 
Robinson 1997). 
The Treaty of Rome established the foundations of the Common Market in 1957 
which were later developed in the Stresa conference (1958). In the six member states 
at the time there was considerable state intervention, particularly regarding what was 
produced, price setting, marketing products and farm structures. If agricultural 
produce was to be included in the free movement of goods while maintaining State 
intervention in the agriculture sector, national intervention mechanisms incompatible 
with free mobility had to be either removed or transferred to Community level. The 
CAP was successful in the sense that the Community was soon able to overcome the 
food shortages of the 1950s, achieved self-sufficiency and later generating cyclical 
and structural surpluses. This was achieved by alignment of prices in the community 
above the world price through a system of guaranteed price support (e.g. intervention 
buying), import taxation, export rebates, community preference measures etc. It must 
be noted that there was no explicit reference to environmental considerations. It was 
generally thought that farming practices did not damage the countryside and 
agriculture was the mainstay of rural life. In fact a naively romantic and idealised 
view of farming pervaded (Lowe et al. 1997). 
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2.11 CAP Reforms 
A recent DEFRA commissioned report investigating the environmental effects of 
CAP (JNCC 2002) has attributed the following agricultural changes to CAP: 
I. Intensification: High guaranteed prices encouraged farmers to raise yields by 
increasing their use of fertilisers, pesticides and higher stocking densities. This has 
led to a decrease in the area of semi-natural habitats, reduction in the populations of 
associated wildlife species, and less landscape diversity. The amount of utilised 
agricultural land has been increased by removing hedges, walls, farm ponds etc. 
Similarly the use of larger machinery has damaged soil structure and functionality. 
Marginal isation: Land of poor agricultural quality has traditionally been under 
mixed and low-productivity livestock systems. However under the CAP the poor 
financial reward to such enterprises has resulted in either intensification or the 
pursuit of some other economic activity. Farmers even resorted to moorland, 
heatherland, and wetland reclamation with the eventual loss of semi-natural 
vegetation and its biodiversity. 
Specialisation: Through market interventions such as subsidies and quotas the 
CAP has encouraged specialisation of livestock enterprises (dairy farming) and 
particular crops (e.g. cereals, oilseeds and peas/beans). 	This encouraged 
monocultures and the phasing out of mixed farming systems which have negatively 
impacted biodiversity and landscape character. 
Abandonment: Land with poor infrastructure, low economic productivity, 
declining populations, and low agricultural productivity has seen the abandonment of 
farmed land. Although this is more prevalent in southern member states and France, 
parts of the UK the switch from farming to forestry is an example of land 
abandonment. It must be noted that this may actually favour the environment, as 
forestry confers some wildlife benefits and generates less nonpoint source pollution 
than cropping. 
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Additionally since agricultural support is reflected in land value, farmers face rising 
land prices and rents. Thus increasing the opportunity cost of uncultivated and 
unimproved land and providing incentives for further reclamation, drainage, and 
intensification (Potter 1998). 
Realisation of the above along with the fact that CAP was responsible for: a) rising 
budgetary costs; b) build up and storage cost of vast food surplus stocks; c) farmers 
benefiting at the expense tax payers and consumers; d) price support is an inefficient 
way of supporting farm incomes; e) declining farm incomes; and f) CAP's severe 
criticism for lowering world prices at GATT negotiations and the effect on the EC's 
external trade relations led to the CAP reform settlement (a watered down version of 
the MacSharry proposals) in 1992. 
Support prices of cereals, oilseed rape and protein crops were gradually reduced by 
29%, and in compensation farmers received direct payments per hectare sown under 
the Arabic Area Payment Scheme (AAPS) provided a certain small proportion of 
land is setaside. Payment rates vary for different crops and reflect historic yield. In 
1996/97 payments ranged from £236 per ha (for cereals in the Less Favourable Areas 
(LFA)) to about £480 per ha (for oilseeds on non-LFA land). Expenditure under the 
AAPS in Scotland in 1997 was around £143 million (Scottish-Executive 1998). 
Similarly the price of beef was gradually reduced by 15% and compensation in the 
form of direct aid to producers was offered in the form of the Beef Special Premium 
Scheme (BSPS) and the Suckler Cow Premium Scheme (SCPS) based on stocking 
density. There are some limits on the extensification premium in the form of 
individual producer quotas and Scottish regional ceilings. Scottish expenditure in 
1997 for BSPS was £28.1 million and £58.1 for SCPS (Scottish-Executive 1998). A 
Sheep Annual Premium (SAP) was also introduced. It should be noted that figures 
for 1997/98 have been quoted because the empirical modelling for this research was 
calibrated to the market prices in this period. 
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More interestingly, Agri-Environmental regulations (EEC No: 2078/92) were agreed 
upon as an accompanying measure to the 1992 reforms to encourage environmentally 
friendly farming. The Scottish programme incorporated the existing Environmentally 
Sensitive Area (ESA) scheme (see below) and the new Habitats, Heather Moorland, 
Organic aid and the Set-Aside Access schemes. Given the above pressures to reform 
CAP it must be remembered that the emergence of agri-environmental policy should 
not be attributed to purely environmental considerations (Baldock and Lowe 1996). 
2.12 Environmentally Sensitive Areas 
Environmental considerations and the emerging issue of sustainability had earlier 
resulted in the first Environmental Action Programme (EAP) in 1972 which stated 
that economic growth was not an aim in itself. Henceforth, environmental provisions 
were included in subsequent regulations. Article 19 of EC regulation 797/85 laid the 
foundations of Environmentally Sensitive Area (ESA) scheme (introduced in 1986) 
considered the first European agri-environmental policy measure (Lowe and Whitby 
1997). Within an ESA, farmers and crofters are eligible to receive support payments 
which encourage traditional land management practices, and also to care for and 
enhance features of national and cultural heritage interest. There is provision for 
improvement for public access to enjoy the countryside. Participation in the scheme 
is voluntary and for a fixed time period. Payments to farmers depend on the forgone 
income and hence vary considerably, reflecting agricultural conditions and the 
particulars of the agreement drawn up. ESA agreements are flexible and offer higher 
payment rates per hectare provided farmers accept greater restrictions or agree to 
more stringent environmental considerations. As farmers are induced to engage in 
proactive environmental conservation (Crabtree and Chalmers 1994) ESAs actually 
recognise farming can provide environmental goods besides food. 
Ten areas of Scotland, where traditional agricultural practices have been an 
important factor in maintaining land for its particular conservation, landscape, 
natural or cultural heritage interests, have been classed ESAs. These include very 
extensive areas, for example the two ESAs in the Southern Uplands together cover 
over half a million hectares. Across Scotland they measure in total 1.4 million 
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hectares or 19% of agricultural land (Scottish-Executive 1998). In comparison there 
are 22 ESA designated areas in England covering 1.2 million hectares of land (EU 
2002). A contingent valuation (CVM) and stated preference (SP) study attempted to 
quantify in monetary terms the conservation benefits of two ESAs in Scotland and 
concluded 'for both of the ESAs the money value of benefits is large.... the most 
conservative estimate of benefits outweigh the costs' (Wynn 1999). 
2.13 Agenda 2000 CAP Reforms 
Given the enlargement of the EU (hence the prospect of growing surpluses) and the 
pressures of the next round of the World Trade Organisation (formerly GAIT) 
further reform of CAP under the Agenda 2000 has been imposed. These include 
further reductions in beef, dairy and cereal support prices with an increase in direct 
compensation payments. Compulsory setaside would be abolished, however 
compensated voluntary setaside would continue and 'member states would have 
flexibility to subject area aid for crops and setaside to environmental considerations' 
(Scottish-Executive 1998). There is notably greater emphasis on targeted agri-
environmental considerations (even in Rural Development Regulation (RDR)) and 
especially horizontal measures (Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1259/1999 
) such as cross-compliance (Scottish-Parliment 1999). In effect it stipulates that all 
future regimes and direct aid schemes under the first pillar of CAP must be 
developed in compliance with environmental standards. There have been numerous 
public consultations on the proposed reforms (DEFRA 1999a). In response there are 
proposals for a Scotland Agri-environmental Scheme (to replace the current ESA and 
Country Side Premium Scheme) which will offer payments to farmers who choose to 
practice conservation (Scottish-Parliment 1999). 
Although the 1992 and Agenda 2000 CAP reforms have partially redressed the 
environmental impact of agriculture, little progress has been made in correcting past 
damage from artificially high prices for cereals sustained by the CAP (JNCC 2002). 
Similarly, even though the 1992 reforms and the introduction of the Arable Area 
Payment Scheme (AAPS) moderated the rate of loss of unimproved grassland to 
cereal production, the AAPS has effectively frozen the arable area and discourages 
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reverting even marginal arable land to grassland through agri-environmental schemes 
(JNCC 2002). 
2.14 EU Water Policy - Water Framework Directive 
Concurrent with the evolution of Agricultural policy, there has been development of 
EU water policy. The first EC water directive was the Surface Water for Drinking 
Directive (75/440) which came into effect with the First Action Programme on the 
Environment. This was followed by the Surface Water Directive (75/464), the 
Groundwater Directive (80/68) and the Drinking Water Directive (80/778). The 
emphasis of these directives has shifted from the monitoring and regulation of point 
sources to nonpoint diffuse pollution (Ward 1998). 
These disjointed directives have been revised and unified under the Water 
Framework Directive (WFD) 2000/60/EC (EU 2000). One purpose of the WFD is to 
give EU water policy a coherent and integrated approach. The European 
Environment Agency (EEA 1998) confirms that diffuse nutrient loads from 
agriculture are responsible for eutrophication of coastal water and nitrate 
contamination of aquifers (EEA 1999); and indeed nitrate in EX rivers has changed 
little since 1980. The WFD encompasses and supersedes the 11 existing EU water-
related Directives3. In terms of policy implications the directive's two tenants 
require: 
Full Cost Recovery Pricing. Member states are obliged under the WFD to 
implement the principle of 'full cost recovery pricing', as prioritised in the 
Environmental Action Programme. This implies evaluating and accounting for 
'environmental and resource costs' (Article 9), i.e. agricultural externalities such as 
reduced river flows, diffuse nitrogen and pesticide pollution etc. 
Integrated Water Catchment Management. This implies the organisation and 
regulation of water management at the 'catchment' or river basin level. River basins 
Inter a/ic: the Bathing waters, Drinking Waters, Urban Waste Water, Nitrates and Habitat Directive. 
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Figure 2.2: Integration of Separate EU Directives into the WFD 
Water Quality Standards from Previous EU Directives: 
Surface Water (75/440) 
Dangerous Substances (76/464) 
Shellfish Water (79/869) 
Drinking Water (80/778) 
Groundwater (80/68) 
Fish Water (78/659) 





Emission Limit Values from 
Directives: 
Urban Waste Water (91/271) 
Integrated Pollution Control (96/61) 
Nitrate (91/776) 
Plant Protection Products (91/41) 




Sewage Sludge (86/278) 
Environment Impact Assessment 
(85/37) 
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comprise not only the surface run-off through streams and rivers to the sea, but the 
total area of land and sea together with associated ground and coastal waters 
The WFD, which must be transposed into national law no later than 2003, requires 
that all river basins and coastal waters must be assigned to a River Basin District 
(RBD4) and an overseeing competent authority designated. In Scotland it is proposed 
that this responsibility is bestowed on SEPA. Many stakeholders and respondents to 
public consultations have stressed the need for sub-basin (i.e. catchment level) 
planning as the key to integrated management (Scottish-Executive 2002) 
While the UK is likely to be covered by approximately 14 River Basin Districts, each 
to become a single planning unit, much of the detail of catchment planning will be 
carried out at the Sub-Basin scale. Sub-Basins will be defined according to need, and 
so it can be reasonably expected that more detailed planning (smaller Sub-Basins or 
groups of Sub-Basins) will take place in areas of greater water stress. The East of 
Scotland is one such area, where rainfall and runoff are naturally low, and where the 
demand for irrigation water regularly exceeds availability, resulting in the use of 
artificial storages, dry stream problems and the creation of legislation targeted on 
managing these problems. 
It is argued that delayed implementation would impose an administrative and 
scientific burden on the regulator between 2009 and 2012 only leaving three years by 
which in 2015 the environmental standards have to be met, thus creating 'significant 
uncertainty amongst those that might be the subject of regulation ' (Scottish-
Executive 2002). It concludes that in the interest of both business and regulators the 
Scottish Executive should phase in the controls over an extended period from as 
early as 2005. 
2.15 Nitrate Politics 
The fundamental unit for applying the Directive's provisions 
35 
Chapter 2: Nitrate Pollution 
The complexity and disputes surrounding the Nitrate issue ranging from whether 
nitrogen pollution can be attributable to fertiliser use alone, uncertainty regarding the 
impact of nitrates on human and environmental health, the complexity of 
informational problems associated with nonpoint source (NPS) pollution etc., have 
all contributed to the delay and/or absence of effective nonpoint source policy 
formulation. Other cited explanations include a) agriculture was for many years more 
or less deliberately exonerated from stringent environmental regulation, and b) the 
relevance and widespread nature of NPS has only recently been fully comprehended 
(Dosi and Tomasi 1994a). 
Until the late 1980's and early 1990s some still questioned whether the problem of 
diffuse nitrogen pollution was exaggerated and that the EU limit of 50 mg/litre was 
excessively low. Some authors at the time report fertiliser manufacturers denying the 
contribution of inorganic fertilisers to diffuse nitrogen pollution by arguing leaching 
is a highly variable natural process (Seymour et al. 1992). However currently the 
European Fertilisers Manufacturers Association (EFMA) website lists reasons why 
environmental taxation of nitrogen is inefficient and why the Code of Best 
Agricultural Practice, detailing nutrient budgets, fertiliser plans, rates, timing and 
type, is both "both environmentally and economically sustainable" (EFMA 1997). 
The National farmers union (NFU) has to publish research (questionnaires) on arable 
farming and their contribution to protecting the environment (NFU 2002), while also 
questioning the scientific validation of the procedure by which NVZs have been 
designated in Scotland (NFU-Scotland 2002) and proposing their own NVZ action 
plans. 
There has been a gradual realisation of environmental concerns through education 
and the involvement of NGOs, Environmental pressure groups (such as WWF, 
Greenpeace etc.) and education through schooling. Likewise environmental groups, 
such as Greenpeace, which were previously against the use of economic incentives to 
control toxic discharges, now advocate the use of high taxation to phase out all 
nitrogen and pesticides (Clunies-Ross 1993). 
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In the late seventies and early eighties nitrate pollution was treated symptomatically 
i.e. it was considered a problem of the water industry and not of agriculture. Water 
treatment technologies and not prevention at the source was the conventional 
consensus. The change in attitude and policy came about because a) water industry 
privatisation led to a public debate and lobbying by environmental pressure groups 
which succeeded in the making the public aware of their exposure to the toxicity of 
nitrates (Maloney and Richardson 1994), b) change in EU agricultural policy in the 
aftermath of excessive surpluses and spiralling budgets (reasons for CAP reform) c) 
the gradual integration of environmental considerations in overall EU agricultural 
and water policy expressed as 'integrated water catchment management', d) 
sustained migration of 'environmentally concerned' people to the countryside has 
brought the issue of agricultural pollution to public attention (Ward etal. 1995). 
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Chapter 3 
NPS Concepts, Controls and Caveats 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the 'difficult' nature of diffuse agricultural 
pollution and its policy control measures, utilising both economic and non-economic 
instruments. There is considerable emphasis on the theoretical basis of economic 
controls and their efficiency. Some empirical works are mentioned in passing but the 
bulk of relevant empirical research is discussed in the next chapter. Non-economic 
approaches (regulatory standards and education), which do not provide a direct price 
incentive and are uniformly applied to all polluters irrespective of their contribution 
to pollution, are discussed at the end. 
The fact that a great number of people contribute to agricultural pollution makes 
finding a practical and politically acceptable solution all the more difficult. 
Aggressive policies risk alienating important voters including 'family farmers' who 
have been traditionally venerated and supported as a matter of public policy, and 
whose historic land use rights have been accorded considerable deference (Braden 
and Lovejoy 1990). There is also the issue of public perception and recognition of 
agricultural NPS as a real and threatening environmental concern. Many agricultural 
NIPS pollution problems are overshadowed by less pervasive environmental 
concerns, e.g. oil spills etc. (Braden and Lovejoy 1990). Some of the objectives 
sought through litigation are not always 'compelling', e.g. decreasing turbidity of 
streams and lakes, extending reservoir lives, improving diversity of aquatic biota, 
and enhancing the quality of recreational activities are not as 'dramatic' or health-
threatening as accidental discharge of toxic chemicals, hazardous waste dumps, 
urban smog etc. 
Public policies inevitably reconcile public expectation of 'good environment' with 
historic 'farming rights'. The irony is that increasingly the public does not want to 
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pay for subsidies or inflated agricultural prices nor does it want to pick on 'family 
farmers' who are the alleged caretakers of their rustic ideal. Expectations about the 
proper balance are constantly changing, and formulated amid uncertainty concerning 
the value and cost of the policy outcome (Braden and Lovejoy 1990). The resistance 
to change is considerable. The conflict and difference of opinion over rights and 
environmental impact will have to be considerable before any meaningful change is 
undertaken. 
3.2 Nonpoint Source Pollution 
Agricultural nitrate pollution is an example of an environmental externality. An 
externality exists, 'whenever the welfare of some agent, either a firm or household, 
depends directly on his or her activities and on the activities under the control of 
some other agent as well' (Tietenberg 1992). Externalities5 can be both 
beneficial/positive (external economy) and detrimental/negative (external 
diseconomy). 
Nonpoint source (NPS) or diffuse pollution is a stochastic and difficult process to 
understand. Thus before a theoretical discussion of control measures can be 
discussed its defined characteristics need to be explained: 
a) Observability 
Nitrogen water pollution is termed "nonpoint source" pollution because nitrate 
emissions (runoff, drainage, and leaching) from each farm (field or site) are diffuse. 
The problem is widespread and not confined to a few, easily identifiable producers. 
Runoff, by definition, does not originate from a single point, but leaves each site in 
so many places that accurate monitoring would be impractical or prohibitively 
expensive (Braden and Segerson 1993). Additionally pollutants running off one 
farmer's field may have originated from another farmer's fields further upslope, thus 
making it impossible to assign responsibility or enforce accountability (Braden and 
Lovejoy 1990). 
An unrelated externality termed pecuniary, arises when the external effect is transmitted through 
higher prices. 
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Variability 
The inability to observe loadings would not be as troublesome if there were a strong 
undisputed correlation between ambient water quality and some observable aspect of 
production. However such correlations are unlikely, and where they can be 
established (e.g. input application procedure) they are unlikely to hold up across a 
range of conditions (Ribaudo et al. 1999). For example, an increase in river ambient 
nitrate concentration cannot be solely attributed to a farmer's inability to take 
appropriate measures because it may be a result of factors beyond his control e.g. 
high rainfall. 
Thus the volume and concentration of runoff leaving a field depends not only on 
measurable factors, such as technology and inputs  used but also stochastic factors 
such as rainfall, wind, and temperature which are difficult to predict (Shortle and 
Abler 1997). Therefore ideally, policies should specify not only the ambient or 
emission target but also the frequency at which the standard (or goal) should be 
achieved (Shortle 1990b). 
Spatial/Geographic Heterogeneity 
NPS also varies by location due to differences in hydrologic characteristics, soil 
heterogeneity, land forms and other spatial characteristics. Efficiency requires 
accurate fate transport modelling i.e., site specific information. This is unlikely to be 
available or prohibitively complicated and/or expensive (Miltz et al. 1988) 
Time lags 
The time taken for NPS pollutants to move from the source to the receiving water 
body varies considerably from days (nitrate run-off to a nearby stream) to many 
decades (nitrate leaching to groundwater aquifers). This depends on local site 
6 Inputs are defined as those items used in production which can be applied in varying amounts (e.g. 
organic and inorganic fertiliser, pesticides, irrigation water etc.). Whereas, technology or management 
practices are defined as specific production methods e.g. conservation tillage, type and timing of 
fertiliser application, crop rotation, type of irrigation etc. 
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specific conditions and the properties of underlying rocks and geographical 
structures. This complicates policy formulation because the observed ambient levels 
which prompt regulation may be the result of past management practices or polluters 
no longer operating. Similarly, assessing the impact of remedial regulation may take 
decades before policy effectiveness can be determined. 
d) Transboundary Effects 
Many NPS pollutants, including nitrates, have long half lives and retain their toxicity 
far from where they originate. For example, nitrates entering the Gulf of Mexico via 
the Mississippi River have been traced to nitrate applications to corn crops in 
Minnesota, Iowa and Illinois (Goolsby and Battaglin 1993). 
Given the above complexities the ability of the regulator entrusted with the daunting 
task of containing NPS pollution will invariably depend on how well the NPS 
process is comprehended. 
3.3 NPS Process 
The relationship between agricultural production and environmental impact on the 
receiving water body is complex and involves biological, physical and economic 
links. Efficient policy formulation depends on how well the following processes 
from input use to impact are understood and modelled: 
1) Pollutant generation: The first link is the generation of nitrates which can 
potentially leach. This involves the nitrogen crop production function and the 
ability to relate the application of nitrogen to a particular crop/soil 
combination and predict the uptake, utilisation (plant growth) and soil 
nitrogen (N) transformations of biomass given the existing crop rotation. 
Notably the ability to accurately model other potentially limiting crop growth 
factors such as the availability and timing of water and sunlight are important 
in determining N uptake. 
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Pollutant transport process: The second link involves production practices 
and the movement of pollutants off a field. This is determined by rainfall, soil 
characteristics, distance to receiving water body, slope, chemical practices 
(method and timing of applications), irrigation type, crop management, 
agrichemical properties, conservation practices such as riparian buffers and 
constructed wetlands etc. 
Environmental impact: This link involves the impact of discharged 
agricultural pollutants on the quality of receiving waters. Quality is expressed 
as bio-physical measures such as temperature, turbidity, pH, biochemical 
oxygen demand (BOD), ambient pollution concentration, fish populations, 
algae levels, zooplankton and bacterial concentrations, suspended particulates 
etc. 
Economic Valuation: This relates how changes in water quality from ambient 
pollution translate into economic impacts (both use and nonuse). Changes in 
biological characteristic and physical appearance can have detrimental effects 
on anglers and people who use the water and its surrounding habitat for 
recreational use, including environmentalists who value the water body's 
ecology; similarly the treatment cost of municipal water use may rise. The 
value of service provided would, among other things, depend on overall 
demand by different users, regional population, income, and treatment costs. 
Pollutant transport can take the form of a) runoff, which is the transport of pollutants 
over the soil surface by rainwater, melting snow or irrigation water that does not soak 
into the soil (nutrients may be dissolved (nitrate) or adsorbed to eroded soil particles 
(phosphate)), b) through deep drainage ditches along field boundaries, c) run-in, 
which is the movement of chemicals directly into groundwater though sinkholes, 
fractured or porous bedrock, or poorly constructed wells, or d) leaching, which is the 
movement of pollutants through the soil by any source of water. 
3.4 Efficiency Considerations 
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First-best Solution 
Ideally an efficient solution maximises expected net economic benefits - the net 
private benefits (NPB) of production minus the expected net economic cost of 
pollution assuming perfect information. NPB of production may include benefits to 
consumers and owners to factors of production (NPS policies may change input and 
output prices), but for simplicity here they only refer to aggregate profits. Decisions 
must also be made regarding damage expectation because it is impossible to predict 
the damages due to the natural variability in pollutant generation and transport, i.e. 
an ex ante solution as opposed to actual or realised outcome. The first-best optimal 
solution requires: 
Efficient input use: the marginal net private benefit (MNPB) of using each 
input at every site must equal the expected marginal external damage from 
the use of that input. Thus the marginal input use will only result in a pareto-
efficient outcome if it results in an equal increase in NPB and expected 
damage. 
Efficient land use: A site (or field) should only be used for production if the 
profits exceed the expected social cost or external damage from pollution. 
Marginal acreage refers to sites with profits equal to (or smallest positive 
difference between) their expected contribution to damages in the efficient 
solution. Sites with a positive (negative) difference between profits and its 
expected damage are defined as infra-marginal (extra-marginal). Efficiency 
is only attained if infra-marginal and marginal land is under cultivation, 
extra-marginal land should be 'setaside' or take out of production i.e. 
forestry, grassland. 
Efficient technology use: for each site technologies should be adopted such 
that the incremental impact of each technology (relative to the next best 
alternative) on expected net social benefits is greater than or equal to the 
incremental impact on expected damages. 
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The above three efficiency conditions imply that a socially acceptable level of water 
quality may require using fewer polluting inputs, retiring land or even abandoning 
conventional management practices. 
Cost-Effective Solution 
Damages from NPS pollution (or the external costs) are often largely unquantifiable, 
poorly understood and liable to legal challenges. Damage estimation would require 
valuation techniques such as travel cost or contingent valuation (Ribaudo and 
Hellerstein 1992; Crutchfield et al. 1997) but such exercises have been criticised as 
time consuming, costly and unreliable. Thus reducing expected damages may not be 
a measurable policy objective (Baumol and Oates 1988). Instead policy makers rely 
on reliable measurable proxies for expected damages including physical (ambient 
water concentration, expected runoff), and production related performance (input use 
or technology) indicators. These benchmarks act as socially desirable standards7 ; the 
notion of social optimality is replaced by cost-effectiveness or 'efficiency without 
optimality' (Baumol and Oates 1988). Due to the natural variability of NPS 
pollutants ambient and runoff targets/standards should be defined in terms of a 
likelihood of occurrence (Shortle 1990a). 
Environmental policy is cost-effective if it achieves some measurable objective 
(standard) at least resource cost. However the efficiency conditions binding on first-
best solutions are required under a cost-effective policy i.e. a) reduction (increase) in 
the use of inputs which increase (mitigate) emissions, b) adoption of appropriate 
technologies, c) and appropriate land use decisions at the extensive margin. Better 
goals are those which are more correlated with emissions and those which limit or 
have negligible pollution-increasing substitution effects. 
Cost-effective policy solutions will generally differ from the first-best solution 
(Horan et al. 1998) as the only consideration is the cost of achieving the 
Policy objectives are specified in terms of a reduction in nitrogen fertiliser application rate (e.g. 30% 
reduction in catchment N use) or mandatory use of a particular tillage technology. Such specification 
exercises greater direct control because it is set deterministically and is easily verifiable. 
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predetermined environmental goal - benefits cannot be quantifiable. It is possible that 
a cost-effective policy meets the mean ambient water standard at least cost. However 
this method, while reducing the mean, may unintentionally increase the variability of 
emissions and increase damages (Shortle 1990a). Without the ability to measure 
damages it might not be possible to recognize when such situations arise. 
Second-best Solution 
Technically cost-effective policies are termed 'second best', however keeping with 
the convenient distinction used by some US department of Agriculture reports 
(Ribaudo et al. 1999) cost-effective policies after consideration of transaction costs 
can be termed second-best. Transaction costs vary for every instrument and include 
the costs of obtaining information, designing, administrating and enforcing a policy. 
Given these considerations a second-best policy is one which achieves the 
environmental standard at least cost. 
The natural dichotomy of policies to control diffuse pollution comprises of economic 
and non-economnic controls. Excluding political considerations, all policies should be 
judged on their 1) incentives, 2) relative complexity, 3) informational requirements 
(both principallregulator and agent/farmer), 4) adaptability to changing economic 
and environmental conditions, and 5) operational transaction costs (i.e. 
administrative and enforcement costs) (Ribaudo et al. 1999). In this thesis the terms 
farm, firm, agent, polluter and site are used interchangeably unless stated otherwise. 
3.5 Economic Incentives 
Agricultural NIPS pollution occurs at levels greater than the social optimum because 
of market failure, i.e. the market's inability to relay the social costs of pollution to 
producers. Economic incentive-based instruments create prices for the externalities 
by using taxes or subsidies (quantity rationing through marketable pollution permits 
(MPPs) effectively operates as a tax). Taxing expected emissions forces producers to 
'buy' expected emissions from society and thus consider the social cost of pollution. 
The main benefits of economic incentive based policies are: 
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Producers are usually free to use whatever strategy is most profitable to their 
site specific conditions 
Farm strategies can adapt to any change in relative prices of inputs and 
outputs or if new technologies become available 
Abatement costs are likely to be lower with incentives than under command 
and control policies because producers can utilise site-specific knowledge to 
their advantage in reducing compliance costs. Regulators normally have 
limited farm specific information. 
Economic controls provide incentives to develop (possibly market) new 
approaches to reducing pollution abatement costs. 
Two distinct economic approaches to correcting externalities exist. The first 
Pigouvian approach (Pigou 1920) involves a regulator who attempts to correct the 
divergence between private and social costs of the externality. The second Coasian 
approach (Coase 1960) advocates free negotiation between affected parties, 
irrespective of the initial property right allocation, in order to internalise or resolve 
the externality. Unfortunately the Coasian approach is normally not an option when 
the transaction costs of negotiation are considered (Pearce and Turner 1990; 
Tietenberg 1992). Agricultural emissions in particular are normally characterised by 
numerous producers which render a Coasian bargaining solution infeasible8. This 
Ph.D. does not consider the Coasian approach. 
Under ideal Pigouvian taxation, the authorities have complete information and can 
determine the marginal social cost, marginal eternality cost, and marginal net 
private benefit functions. With perfect information it is easy to levy a charge that 
brings private costs in line with social external cost; Pigou defined the optimal tax 
equal to the marginal external cost at the optimal level of pollution  (Pigou 1920). An 
intuitive explanation is obvious: for as long as the tax exceeds the marginal 
abatement cost, a cost minimising producer will opt for reduced emissions. An 
efficient solution would have the abatement costs at the margin equalised at all 
Detailed criticism of the Coasian approach is abundant in the literature (Varian 1993; Maki 1998). 
A diagrammatic explanation of pigouvian taxation can be found in most elementary environmental 
and natural resource economic textbooks, e.g. (Pearce and Turner 1990; Hanley etal. 1997) 
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sources, implying that high abatement cost sources reduce emissions by less than low 
abatement cost sources (Baumol and Oates 1988). 
A mathematic treatment10 of the first-best solution is presented. The formal proof of 
a tax's optimality does not require 'perfect competition', all it requires is that 
producers minimise the private costs of producing at which ever level of output it 
selects and has no monopsony power. 
3.5.1 First-best Efficiency Conditions 
Polluting emissions from the ith nonpoint source or 'land parcel/field/site' 
(i = I.....n) are given by ri = 	 , where ri are nonpoint emissions, 
a1 represents site characteristics (e.g. soil type and topography), v1 represents 
stochastic environmental variables (e.g. rainfall), Oi represents parameters of 
pollution processes unique to site i. Discontinuous choices are represented by a 
scalar, A, which is referred to as the technology in use. The (m x 1) vector of inputs 
used on the ith land parcel is denoted by x. 
Ambient pollution concentrations a are a function of non point emissions, watershed 
characteristics yi, natural background pollutant levels , transport parameters 6, and 
stochastic variables '; therefore a = a(r1.....r 	
3a 
, , 	and - _> 0 for all 1. All 
ari 
polluters are assumed to be profit inaxilnising, risk neutral and to have no influence 
on input or output prices. The change in producer's quasi-rents (profits less fixed 
costs) is an appropriate measure of the costs of pollution control. The ith nonpoint 
source's expected profit function for any input choice j is)r(x0 ). This is like a 
restricted profit function where the restrictions apply to inputs affecting nonpoint 
emissions. The social cost of pollution, D, is an increasing convex function of the 
H) 
 In the main text and appendix of this chapter the mathematical notation is. unless stated otherwise, 
'standard' and similar to that used extensively in the literature (Shortie and Dunn 1986; Shortie and 
Abler 1997; Shortie et al. 1998; Ribaudo et al. 1999; Shortle and Horan 2001) 
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aD 	2 
ambient pollution concentration, i.e. D=D(a), and —>0,------~:0. It is also 
Ja - 
assumed that society is risk neutral. 
The objective function restricted on technology is: 
11 J(A)= Xi (x j A j )—E{D(a)} 	 (EQ- 3.1) 
i=1 
The necessary conditions for a maximum are: 
Incremental impact of input usage: 
---=--E 	----- =0 Vi,j 	 (EQ-3.2) 
axii 	Jx1,, 	a ari axii 




The external damage of employing extra land in cultivation must be considered in 
achieving the social optimum. Condition eq-3.2 equates marginal net private benefits 
from the use of input xij with expected marginal external damages from its use, thus 
ensuring pareto optimality. Thus the optimal pigouvian tax, tjj would equal 
azi 	Daa 
t•• =—=E 	 Vt,j 
' 	 3a Jr Jx11 
(EQ-3.4) 
In eq-3.3, AD(a)=D(a(,...,,W))—D(a(,,,...,i, 1 ,W)), i.e., the difference in 
damages with and without site n. If the nth site is optimal then the addition of another 
site will have a negative incremental impact. 
Finally the optimal technology vector, A*, is determined by solving for an efficient 
allocation for each possible value of A and comparing expected net benefits. 
Technology A* is more efficient than technology A when J(A*) - J(A') ~! J(A'). 
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The optimal technology satisfies: 
J(A*)_J(A')~!OVA' 	 (EQ- 3.5) 
this reduces to: 
(xj(Aj),(Aj*)_ i(xj(A;),A)~ E{D(a(rl* 
—ED(a(rj ..... 
(EQ-3.6) 
where 	= rj (xi (A[A,aj, vi, 9j). Technology choice will be inefficient if its 
impact on the externality is ignored. 
The inability to attain a first-best solution and the adoption of exogenously 
determined environmental standards instead (second-best solution) has been 
presented earlier. To reiterate, this is because in reality estimating the marginal net 
private benefit" and especially marginal external cost is problematic and 
contentious, not withstanding the multitude of economic valuation techniques 
(Hanley and Spash 1993). For a discussion on the theoretical issues regarding 
pigouvian taxation e.g. the entry/exit condition, incentives provided, and the prices 
versus quantity debate see the endnot&. 
Economic instruments in practice are divided into performance-based incentives i.e. 
those based on the results of farmers actions (runoff, measured ambient levels or 
environmental damage) and design-based incentives i.e. those based on farmer's 
actions (inputs and technology use)12. Ideally bases closely correlated to water 
quality (runoff and ambient levels) are preferred to those which are indirectly related, 
such as output (Braden and Segerson 1993). However information and transaction 
costs along with moral hazard issues may force the regulator to target other bases13. 
1 1 Adverse selection and moral hazard are prevalent and incentives to shirk on abatement. Adverse 
selection is the inability of regulators to identify producer costs and how they vary, while moral 
hazard exists when the authority cannot observe the actions of a producer. 
12 Another dichotomy is ex ante policies, i.e. those which target choices before the polluting activity 
occurs, and ex post, i.e. those which come into effect once damages have occurred (Segerson 1996). 
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3.6 Performance-Based Incentives 
The most logical tax/subsidy bases to target are the outcomes of producer decisions 
i.e. run-off (loadings '4) or ambient concentration. In theory a corrective tax/subsidy 
on run-off leaving a site is akin to a price control on a point source discharge. 
However runoff cannot be monitored at reasonable cost given the current technology 
- rendering it an infeasible option at present. This leaves incentives based on ambient 
levels. 
3.6.1 Ambient Taxation 
Research on ambient incentive schemes approach the NPS problem as a moral 
hazard or "environmental shirking" issue. Assuming firm's input decisions are costly 
to monitor, their relationship with ambient levels uncertain and emissions are 
unobservable implies there is considerable uncertainty about the polluter's efforts to 
make socially desirable decisions. 
Given the inability to effectively monitor producer efforts in the case of nonpoint 
pollution, Segerson (Segerson 1988) proposed an innovative tax based on overall 
ambient pollution concentration. She combined penalties and rewards for exceeding 
a specific level of total ambient concentration in a river catchment. The charge 
comprises a per unit tax based on the deviation from an exogenously determined 
ambient standard and a lump sum penalty for not meeting the standard. Firm specific 
taxes (subsides) are charged (paid) when the ambient pollution levels rises above 
(falls below) an exogenously determined target. The tax portion can be written as 
ta + ki where tj is the ambient tax rate for firm i and k, denotes a firm-specific lump 
sum tax or subsidy (the derivation of a cost-effective ambient tax is presented in 
appendix 3.]). Assuming profit maximisation, firm i will choose its inputs to 
maximise the following after tax profits: 
(EQ-3.7) 
13 Choosing a base for point sources is not an issue as end of pipe discharges are directly related to 
water quality and easily observable at relatively low costs (Baumol and Oates 1988). 
4  Loadings refer to the actual pollutant entering the stream, i.e. what remains of the runoff generated 
at the field/site by the time it enters the river 
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Where E, represents a firm's expectation over all uncertain and stochastic variables. 
This expectations operator also extends over the ambient impacts of all other firms' 
choices as each firm's tax depends on the overall ambient level (Cabe and Herriges 
1992). In reality, E (one farmer's expectation) may differ from the next farmers E 
(where i# I) and also from the regulator's expectation, denoted by E. Assuming 
Nash conjectures, (i.e. firm believe their input decisions are independent of other 
firm's decision) then firm i 's profit maximising conditions for input use (interior 
solution) are: 
	
= E, t __L 	Vi, I 	 (EQ - 3.8) 
 ax ii axii 
Implying each firm equates its marginal profits from the use of an additional input 
with the expected marginal impact the input will have on the firm's tax. The first-




- 	a 	x11 	
Vi 	 (EQ - 3.9) — * 
E — 
The advantage of this system is that it does not require continual monitoring of 
individual emissions, as the liability of each polluter is tied to aggregate emissions in 
the waterway - not his own contribution. The polluters are told of a particular 
ambient toxic concentration which they must satisfy. If they fail to keep levels below 
the target each polluter faces the full brunt of the damage. Thus if there are n 
polluters and the environmental damage is Lx, the regulatory authority collects a total 
of £nx. In paying the full marginal damage of the total ambient pollution, there is no 
incentive to free-ride on other producer's actions. As more money is collected in 
taxes from polluters than the actual damages this is not budget balancing. 
Note the above is only the first-best tax when E, = E Vi and in 1, and is state- 
independent because it does not depend on the realised values of random variables; it 
depends on the expectation over all possible values. However, if E, = E Vi and 
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in > 1, it can be proved that a state independent tax cannot be first-best (Horan et al. 
1998) for the same reason that estimated emission taxation cannot be first best. 
Horan (Horan et al. 1998) identified two ex ante efficient taxes for nonpoint polluters 
under less restrictive conditions than Segerson. Firstly, a linear state-dependent tax 
rate of the form t = aDYaa applied uniformly across polluters. This tax is 
conditional on the realisation of all random variables and hence has no expectation 
operator. As only the realised values of stochastic processes determine t, therefore t 
is a random variable when firms make their decisions. Thus they face E(ta)as 
opposed to tE(a). Their second tax is a nonlinear function of ambient levels 
orE(D(a)), i.e. each firm pays an amount equalling total damages. As with a linear 
tax, the nonlinear tax is state-dependent and applied uniformly across all firms 
(Shortle et al. 1998). 
By themselves, ambient incentives do not provide incentives for optimal entry or exit 
and require additional lump sum 15  instruments. A lump sum incentive would take the 
form of a tax on producers who cultivate extra-marginal fields or a subsidy to 
producers who voluntarily retire extra-marginal acreage. Under the tax if they do not 
produce they are not subject to taxation. Production on land under infra-marginal or 
marginal land is not subject to lump-sum tax or subsidy - unless their decision to 
produce is influenced by the ambient tax. A lump-sum rebate can reduce their tax 
burden without compromising cost-effectiveness. Producers are free to change their 
decisions in the face of changing environmental or economic conditions and also 
utilise any private information to reduce their compliance costs. 
Ambient-based incentives are seemingly advantageous because ambient 
concentrations (instrument base) are closely related to the external damage and 
because ambient levels can be monitored without having to observe the action of 
15  A lump sum instrument is a fixed tax or subsidy which is usually used to influence discrete choices 
or to determine the distributional impact of policies. For example a lump sum subsidy may be made 
contingent on the adoption of conservation tillage. Those lump sums which are not contingent on 
particular actions are not applied to a base and therefore do not influence marginal incentives. 
52 
Chapter 3: NPS Concepts, Controls and Caveats 
each producers. The incentive base depends on group performance. However 
ambient-based incentives can only be designed to achieve a cost-effective outcome 
under highly restrictive and unreal assumptions, i.e. all producers are risk neutral 
and they all share the same expectation about the stochastic nonpoint process. Risk-
averse producers will not like the onus of risk associated with predicting stochastic 
nonpoint processes (Horan et al. 1998). Second-best ambient-based incentives can be 
devised given risk aversion and heterogeneous expectations about the nonpoint 
process. Potentially high transaction costs may lead to uniform second-best taxation 
across all producers. 
The information requirement on producers and their expectations (Ei = E Vi) is not 
realistic by any stretch of the imagination; catchment farmers must be able to 
evaluate how their actions and the actions of other farms interact and affect the 
incentive base, i.e. ambient nitrate level. Similarly the regulatory authority needs to 
know each producer's belief structure about the inherently stochastic nonpoint 
process if it wants to evaluate the impact of a tax. Thus if there is asymmetric 
information regarding the profit and environmental types of firms (i.e., E1 :i-~ E, 
and E # E1 Vi # 1) then incentives designed on the assumption of identical 
expectation will not be efficient. Outlines of numerous ambient taxation problems 
given the requirement for site specific information on complex pollutant fate & 
transport systems, are present in the literature (Cabe and Herriges 1992). More 
importantly the polluter's prior belief about the transport system is instrumental in 
determining whether a firm believes its effluents will alter ambient concentrations 
and hence their compliance. That is to say if the producer doesn't believe his 
production will impact on ambient concentrations, his actions will not change in the 
presence of a tax. 
Another problem is that current ambient conditions may be more a function of past 
decisions than present ones, e.g. nitrates can take years to move from fields to 
aquifers (Kim et al. 1993). Secondly, monitoring ambient levels can be highly costly 
and subject to considerable error especially in the case of groundwater. There are 
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also numerous political and legal limitations as farms which do abate at a private cost 
may be penalised due to environmental shirking on the part of others. Conversely, 
individuals can free ride on the abatement efforts of others and even be rewarded 
although they took no such effort themselves (Xepapadeas 1999). 
Given the above it has been suggested (Weersink et al. 1998) that ambient taxation 
may be best suited to small catchments in which agriculture is the only pollutant 
source, farms are relatively homogeneous, water quality is readily monitored, and 
there are short time lags between actions and water quality impacts. 
Numerous versions of the ambient charge are found in the literature (Hanley et al. 
1997). Some have suggested that regulators can develop charge adjustment 
procedures that achieve ambient standards at multiple receptors at minimum costs16, 
by using a Wairasian tatonnementt7 process an equilibrium vector of ambient and 
emission charges that are both cost-effective and environmentally friendly can be 
found (Ei-moliev et al. 1996). Even in the absence of pollution control costs data, the 
regulator can use observations of excess pollution to adjust ambient charges in a 
stepwise way by monitoring responses to various charge levels and with the help of a 
data bank on transfer matrixes, calculate actual concentrations and optimal ambient 
standards. 
In the 'learning stage', polluters are made to register expected emissions 
corresponding to charges. In the next stage, the agency verifies actual emissions, 
reserving the right to penalise discrepancies between expected and actual emissions, 
and administer charges accordingly. A gross oversimplification in this analysis is the 
assumption that polluters do not give erroneous strategic information (responses'8) to 
influence charges. 
IS  Baumol & Oates proposed an iterative adjustment of emission charges in successive steps (directed 
by difference between actual and target emissions) would lead to the target level at minimal costs 
(Baumol and Oates 1988). Others such as Bohm & Russel believe the least cost claim is suspect 
(Bohm and Russell 1985). 
17 Where an auctioneer discovers the equilibrium price before agents act and thus 'false' emission 
adjustment at non-equilibrium prices can be avoided. 
8  Exaggerate their emission control in the learning phase in order to obtain lower fees in the 
implementation phase 
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Whereas in the presence of typical 'adverse selection', a firm is shown to have an 
unbounded incentive to over-report marginal clean up costs, work by Bulckaen 
(Bulckaen 1997) has shown that this result needs to be revised if firms are to behave 
'consistently', with its own reports i.e. if the regluator requires firms to pay charges 
based on reported marginal clean-up costs. 
3.6.2 Liability Rules 
Individuals damaged monetarily or otherwise by the activity of polluters may be 
given the right to sue for damages19. Liability rules are essentially performance based 
incentives which are imposed after the damage is realised (Shavell 1987). Liability 
rules hold polluters liable for the environmental damage they impose. Although they 
are imposed ex post they effectively serve as an ex ante incentive to farms/firms as 
they will likely weigh the benefits of generating pollution against the penalties they 
may expect as a result of their actions. Liability rules may be divided into strict 
liability, where polluters are held absolutely liable for any damages, and a negligence 
rule where they are only liable if they failed to act with 'due care'(Segerson 1995). 
With NPS where multiple polluters are exist by definition, the principle of 'joint and 
several liability' dictates that damages be divided according to the court's choosing, 
unless there is some legal precedent. If one producer is held responsible for damages 
then he may later sue other responsible parties to share the burden (Miceli and 
Segerson 1991). If a victim(s) has no way of protecting himself (themselves) from 
the pollutant, and only the polluter influences damages then the situation is termed 
unilateral care. 
This approach undoubtedly favours polluters. It relies on concerned individuals or 
organisations to prove ecological damages (possibly involving estimations of 
intangible uses) present scientific results, and face the financial costs of litigation, 
before any liability is awarded, if any. 
9 
 Which if successful may serve as a precedent for future actions 
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Under strict liability rules producers are uncertain whether they will be held liable for 
environmental damages. This is because ambient pollution is determined by the 
collective actions of all producers in a catchment, and because there is considerable 
uncertainty regarding pollutant transport and the ability to assign responsibility. 
Consequently each producer will have site-specific expectations about stochastic 
weather processes, other uncertain environmental factors, and most importantly 
being sued and then found guilty. 
In theory strict liability can attain efficient NPS pollution control. Each polluter 
expects to pay the total expected damages from pollution, plus or minus a lump sum 
component that distributes payments across polluters - so that total payments equal 
total damages. It requires that the rule be site-specific and so account for each 
producer's belief about the NPS process and the probability of being sued/proven 
guilty. This incentive mechanism still requires lump sum transfers to producers 
operating on extra marginal land to ensure optimal entry and exit. 
If the victim(s) can somehow protect himself (themselves) then the situation is 
termed bilateral care (Segerson 1995), e.g. where victims are able to purchase a 
filtration system to protect themselves from groundwater contamination. Thus if 
victims can take precautions that producers cannot take for them (Wetzstein and 
Center 1992), then it is possible that victims may sub-optimally protect themselves if 
they believe they can sue and collect damages. It is possible to derive a modified 
strict libility rules based on victim precaution requirements (Wetzstein and Center 
1992). The nature of NPS pollution (inability to identify polluters, levy responsibility 
or measure damages) makes the liklihood of a producer being sued and held liable 
very slim under a strict liability rule. 
3.6.2.1 Negligence Rules 
Under negligence based liability a producer is guilty if he/she failed to operate under 
'standards of due care', where due care is either specified as performance based 
outcome (e.g. ambient levels) or producer's decisions (usage of polluting inputs and 
technology). A negligence rule is more appropriate to NPS pollution because it is not 
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necessary to prove an individual producer's contribution to total damages. Polluters 
may be held collectively responsible and liable for damages if ambient levels 
exceeded the standard. Such a negligence rule does not correct optimal entry and exit 
through lump sum transfers, because it only applies to producers operating at the 
time the damages occurred. Additionally producing at suboptimal levels to avoid 
liability could result in extra-marginal land being cultivated, resulting in inefficient 
land allocation (Miceli and Segerson 1993). 
Where a liability rule is based on producer decisions farms are held liable if 
suboptimal technology (relatively more polluting) is used, and if more polluting 
inputs and/or less pollution mitigating inputs are used than are optimal. This is fairer 
as only those farmers not using acceptable production practices would be held 
responsible. However there are considerable transaction costs (monitoring and 
administrative) in ensuring compliance. 
In the US, both Federal and State regulators hold producers liable for damages only 
if they fail to use legal chemicals in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions 
and codes of practice. Such negligence rules are grounded in the belief that producers 
have a the 'right to farm' as long as they comply with acceptable practices (Ribaudo 
et al. 1999). 
The informational requirements of liability rules are considerably prohibitive i.e. 
producers must have 'realistic' beliefs about their collective effects on ambient 
levels, and the profit functions of all sites (including other producer's decisions). 
Additionally the regulator needs to monitor the practices and input decisions of all 
producers on all sites and estimate the NPS generation and transport mechanism to 
identify 'optimal' practices which define 'due care'. 
In addition actual litigation itself may be prohibitively expensive and put people off 
(Shavell 1987). Due to their high transaction costs, liability rules are best suited to 
the control of hazardous materials or for infrequent occurrences such as accidental 
toxic spills (Shortle and Abler 1997). 
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3.6.2.2 Non-compliance Fees 
Non-compliance fees are another type of liability rules which provide incentives to 
follow some prescribed mandate or technological restriction by raising the cost of 
misbehaviour. Xepapadeas tried to circumvent the problem of moral hazard 
(identifying the excessively polluting culprit) and constructed a combination of fines 
and subsidies that would provide an incentive not to violate the prescribed standard 
(Xepapadeas 1991). His model is again drawn on work pioneered by Holmstrom and 
so is an improved modification of Segerson's ambient charges (Holmstrom 1982). 
If ambient concentration of pollutants at designated receptor sites exceeds target 
standards, the regulator selects one pollutant at randoin and fines him. A portion of 
the fine minus the environmental damage from non-compliance, is redistributed 
among the other polluters. If properly designed it significantly raises the expected 
cost of shirking. It does not require monitoring of individual polluters, their pollution 
abatement efforts or costs, and so in this respect it is an improvement on 
taxes/subsidies. Like ambient charges it requires monitoring at receptor sites only; 
unlike such charges it's budget balancing and does not require that punitive fines 
exceed the damage from non-compliance. 
Later work demonstrated the caveat that random penalties will only work if all 
producers are risk-averse (Herriges et al. 1994). The reason being that balanced 
budgets create a interdependence among producers - one producer's loss is another's 
gain. As fines are raised there are two contradicting incentives in play - because a 
producer's incentives will be motivated by his own expected penalty and on the 
expected penalty suffered by others, which is in effect, a benefit to him. Only risk 
averse producers will be more afraid of losing profits than about receiving profits. So 
for polluter decisions to match social objectives, the scheme requires risk averse 
producers who will magnify the expected fraction of marginal costs enough to offset 
the full marginal benefits of shirking. For an extended mathematical model and 
explanation refer to source (Xepapadeas 1991). 
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The political unattractiveness of random fines is apparent. A variation is the 
environmental rank-order tournament, where polluters are ranked ordinally on the 
basis of their abatement efforts and technologies (Govindasamy et al. 1994). 
Deviations from prescribed ambient levels are blamed on the lowest rank polluters. 
Thus the fine is not randomly allotted, and rather falls squarely on those most likely 
to have over polluted. Alternatively, regulators might reward the highest ranking 
producers if the ambient concentration was better than prescribed standards. Potential 
problems may arise if the regulator's rankings are biased due to incorrect modelling 
of fate-transport systems. Incentives may also exist for the higher ranked firms to 
pollute, knowing well that they will not be charged for misconduct and in fact 
receive a benefit from the redistribution of the fine levied on lower ranked polluters. 
A mathematical proof can be found at the original source, however some textbooks 
provide a simplified version (Hanley et al. 1997). 
3.7 Design Based Incentives 
Design-based incentives target variable input use and technology, both of which are 
further removed from the damages than aforementioned performance incentive 
bases. Design-based incentives are subdivided into expected emission-based and 
input or technology-based incentives. 
3.7.1 Expected Runoff Based Incentives 
Expected runoff may actually be estimated ex ante using biophysical-economic 
simulation models. These models attempt to predict farming production and pollution 
control decisions. Farming decision variables such as technology and input 
management need to be monitored to estimate runoff. The incentive-base (expected 
runoff) is actually designed based as it depends explicitly on inputs and technology. 
This requires that farmers understand how their production decision effect expected 
runoff in the eyes of the regulator - an educational burden on the agency. 
Heterogeneous expectations about runoff generation among farmers do not matter 
(unlike with ambient taxation) because tax incentives are based solely on the 
regulator's expectation. 
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Ideally a runoff estimate should provide producers with information about the impact 
of their choices on expected damages from pollution. As runoff is subject to natural 
variability choices made to achieve a particular mean runoff do not correspond to a 
unique level of expected damage (two separate input decisions may result in the same 
mean emission but with different variance, and hence different damage). Thus runoff 
based incentives based on unbiased emission estimates do not generally provide 
enough information to producers about the external cost of their decision (Ribaudo et 
al. 1999). 
Initial research in NPS economics assumed perfect information regarding firm 
production, control costs and emission estimates from monitoring input use (Griffin 
and Bromley 1982). By assuming emission estimates are perfect substitutes for 
measure emissions, i.e. no forecasting error, and that emissions were not stochastic 
they were able to construct first-best taxes and standards. How the regulator derives a 
cost-effective solution based on a mean run-off target is derived in Appendix B. 
Later work by Shortle and Dunn (Shortle and Dunn 1986) investigated solutions 
under the realistic assumptions that biophysical simulation models do not eliminate 
all the uncertainty regarding emission generation , i.e. the process is stochastic. They 
demonstrated that a first-best allocation could not be obtained using a tax on an 
unbiased emission estimator except under highly restrictive conditions. 
Let t, be a firm-specific tax applied to estimated emissions from the ith site (how t, 
is derived by the regulator is shown in appendix 3.3). To enable the polluters to 
compute their tax liability the regulator announces the relationship E(r,), where E is 
the agency's expectations operator. After tax profits for each site is given by 
ir (xi )—tE(i)and the first order necessary condition for input use (for an interior 
solution) are: 
3r 
—f-- =0 Vi,j 	 (EQ-3.l0) 
axii 	ixjj 
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comparing eq-3.10 with eq-3.2 implies the following condition (after some 









A charge on estimated emissions only provides firms with an incentive to control 
mean emissions. However, choices which reduce E(r)do not necessarily reduce 
E(D)when D is nonlinear (Shortle and Dunn 1986; Shortle 1990a). Only when a 
single input influences emissions (i.e. m=l) or when the covariance between 
marginal damages and marginal emissions is zero 20  for each input for each firm 
(i.e. D = I E(i)) do the input decisions that cost-effectively reduce mean emissions 
also cost-effectively reduce expected damages (Horan et al. 1998). 
A first-best outcome would necessarily have to account for other relevant moments 
(i.e. variance, covariance) of a firm's impacts on ambient levels other than the mean. 
In reality political, legal or transaction costs may prevent the regulator from 
implementing site-specific incentives. These transaction costs pertain to the 
informational requirement of designing site-specific taxes, i.e. trying to induce 
producers to truthfully report their private information. In practice farmers retain 
private information about land production practices, land productivity and other site-
specific characteristics which affect runoff or economic returns. Producers are likely 
not to share this information as they fear it might be used against them in the design 
of environmental policy. 
Hence the adoption of a single incentive rate applied uniformly to each site. A 
second-best charge on a nonpoint emissions proxy would maximise social expected 
61 
Chapter 3: NIPS Concepts, Controls and Caveats 
net benefits subject to firm responses to the tax. For simplicity, assume identical 
firms21, (subscript i dropped); the optimal uniform tax will be: 
	
n ( 	 ( D* a* r* 1 * 
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solutions to the second-best problem described above. Interestingly, since icj should 
In 
be interpreted as a weight (as I K1  = I), the numerator of eq-3.12 is the expected 
1=1 
marginal social cost of input use averaged across all inputs; while the denominator is 
the expected marginal contribution of input use in emissions production again 
averaged across all inputs. Now as the second-best tax, t is uniform across all inputs 
it does not give farms incentives enough to adjust consumption of each input based 
on its marginal environmental risk effect. The environmental risk-effects are 
represented as the two covariance terms, which results in the following conclusions: 




sign as 	*); implying that if increased loadings increase the variance of 
ir 
20 	JD 
a * T *  
coy - 	=0 
dr 
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ambient pollution and hence damages, then average risk is increased and t is 
larger. 
2) If damages are convex in loadings, then the covariance term 
D* a* r* 
i 	
. 	var(r) 
coy ---, 	s of the same sign as 	. Therefore, increased 
ia r x1 ix1  
input use increases the variance of nonpoint emissions and hence damages 
(averaged across all inputs), thus risk is increased and so must the tax t, , all 
other things being equal (Shortle and Horan 2001). 
Overall administrative cost would be high because the regulator has to monitor input 
use and technology for all sites and because authorities have to provide farmers with 
run-off relationships for each site. The instrument is 'fairly flexible' (Ribaudo et al. 
1999) as producers may utilise any private knowledge to reduce costs (input 
consumption). However farmers only have incentives to use managerial practices 
which can be modelled and are recognised to decrease loadings by the regulator. As 
in the case of ambient taxation, the implementation of a cost-effective tax schedule 
may result in a suboptimal entry and exit. This may be corrected by providing lump 
sum incentives to producers who produce on marginal and extra-marginal sites. 
3.7.2 Input and Technology-based Incentives 
There is considerable evidence that input-based incentives can bring about resource 
allocation changes. Agricultural firms respond to changes in the cost of inputs, 
increasing the use of those that become relatively cheap, while conserving on those 
that become relatively expensive (Shaumway 1995). In fact there is evidence that in 
the long run, input price responsiveness is even greater, as technologies are 
developed to further conserve the use of expensive inputs in favour of relatively 
cheaper ones (Haymi and Ruttan 1985). 
Ideally the first-best input tax/subsidy must target all inputs and technology choices; 
thus the site-specific incentive rate for each polluting input should equal the expected 
social cost of a marginal increase in the use of an input (Shortle and Abler 1997). 
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Therefore inputs which decrease pollution (e.g. a nitrogen inhibitor), i.e. whose 
social cost of marginal input use is negative, should be subsidised. This result was 
derived by the seminal work of Griffin and Bromley, assuming perfect knowledge of 
production and polluting relationships, i.e. non-stochastic (Griffin and Bromley 
1982; Stevens 1988). 
Latter research demonstrated the viability of input tax/subsidy schedules even in the 
presence of stochastic and impe,fectly estimated emissions. Suppose the input tax 
III 
rate on input j of firm i is t1  thus expected profits after tax are .7r (Xi )— 	t11 x jj 
j=1 
Assuming the farmers choose inputs to maximise after-tax profits, the optimal 
marginal input taxes are (after considerable manipulation (Shortle et al. 1998; Shortle 
and Horan 2001)): 
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In theory the optimal tax rate for inputj for each site i (or firm/farm) equals expected 
marginal damages, times the expected marginal increase in ambient pollution levels 
from each firm's emissions, times the expected marginal increase in emissions for 
increased use of input j, plus "two covariance terms that act as risk premiums or 
rewards" (Shortle and Horan 2001). The risk terms signs depend on the properties of 
the emission function and can be interpreted as those in EQ 3.12. Such a tax will not 
however guarantee cost-effective entry/exit, i.e. optimal number of producers and 
sites, and extra lump sum incentives are required (Shortle et al. 1998). The design of 
such incentives can be found in appendix 3.3. Overall under a cost-effective input 
based tax/subsidy farmers will have an incentive to utilise their private knowledge to 
further reduce costs, and alter decisions as economic and environmental conditions 
change. 
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3.7.2.1 Technology 
The use of per unit input based incentives will not necessarily create incentives 
necessary to induce producers to adopt the efficient technology. Essentially linear 
instruments only account for the marginal impacts of each producer's choices, 
whereas production technology has a non-marginal impact on damages. Thus if a 
suboptimal technology is used, then input use may also be suboptimal since all 
production decisions are interdependent. Lump sum incentives contingent on 
technology choices (tax on sub-optimal adoption, subsidy on optimal adoption) can 
produce optimal adoption. Alternatively a cost-sharing approach can be used to 
induce optimal technology adoption in the presence of adjustment costs. Most 
farmers are reluctant to adopt new technology due to the costs of obtaining 
information, management and capital constraints and risk perceptions 22  (Nowak 
1987). 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) offers farmers incentives to 
adopt conservation practices under the Water Quality Incentive Program 23  (WQIP) 
and the Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP). These include payments 
to encourage non-structural management practices, such as conservation tillage 
technology. The payments offset any private losses, increased risk of uncertain yield, 
and other short-term adoption constraints (Ribaudo et al. 1999). However research 
has questioned the effectiveness of past incentive schemes in the US, as farmer are 
concerned with 'practice profitability', rather than short-term subsidies (Norris and 
Batie 1987). They concluded that either subsidies were either not high enough or not 
offered on enough land. 
Theoretically an optimal uniform input incentive equals the average of the expected 
marginal social costs created by the input use at each site, and adjustments to account 
for the average marginal impacts of input substitution on expected social costs and 
22  (Nowak 1987) identifies 15 constraints to adopting optimal technology. 
2.' WQIP schemes offered incentives to undertake the following conservation measures: waste 
management systems, conservation cover, conservation tillage, split fertiliser applications, legume 
crediting, manure crediting filter strips, strip cropping, nutrient management, critical area planting, 
record keeping, pasture and hay land management and planned grazing systems among others 
(Higgins 1995). 
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profit levels (Shortle et al. 1998). These adjustments are required to counter 
substitution distortions and undesirable changes in the input mix (Eiswerth 1991). 
Thus the regulator would have to consider the likely management response to 
input/technology incentives, and pre-empt any detrimental substitutions by offering 
economic incentives or other measures to counter any detrimental characteristics of 
alternatives (Eiswerth 1991). 
Although producers require no extra information or training, the regulator must have 
information about production, cost and runoff functions. More accurate information 
will result in more efficient corrective instruments. Although first-best instruments 
require perfect site-specific information24, practical considerations (transaction costs, 
cost of gathering information, political and legal feasibility) would probably result in 
second-best solutions which only target a few important input and technology 
choices. 
3.7.2.2 Cross-Compliance Mechanism 
As was demonstrated in chapter 2, agriculture in the developed world receives 
immense financial support through direct subsidies and prices supports. Instead of 
offering farmer incentives and further subsidies to implement alternative agricultural 
practices (input and technology use), the regulator can withhold these subsidies 
unless farmers comply with polluting reducing measures. Thus cross-compliance ties 
the receipt of benefits from unrelated subsidy packages to some level of 
environmental measures e.g. implementation of specified technology or management 
practices. 
The effectiveness of cross-compliance measures is limited because; 1) producers will 
only agree if the expected package benefits exceed the cost of implementing the 
environmental measures; 2) environmental benefit will only accrue to the extent to 
which those receiving program benefits (farmers) are contributing to water quality 
problems; and 3) Generally the benefits of compliance measures vary with economic 
24 
 Some management practices, such as the rate of nitrogen application, are difficult to measure 
without intensive, obtrusive and costly monitoring. 
Chapter 3: NPS Concepts, Controls and Caveats 
conditions (budgetary constraints and reduction in price supports) including 
fluctuations in world prices. 
Whether cross-compliance is cost-effective depends on policy design, i.e. the extent 
to which compliance is based on performance. Generally cost-effective pollution 
abatement does not occur as programme incentives are unlikely to be distributed in a 
way which reflects contributions to water damages. 
38 Marketable Pollution Permits 
The converse of taxation is a system of quantity rationing through marketable 
pollution permits (MPP)25, which specify a predetermined total level of emissions in 
a region. Rather than having some central authority establish a tax net, monitor 
performance, collect bills & create an adversarial relationship with polluters, MPPs 
rely on market mechanism and interaction between polluters. In legally selling the 
right to pollute, scarcity creates demand and supply forces that provide the incentive 
to trade. Since most pollution problems stem from externalities or ill-defined 
property rights, MPP allocate these rights and make them tradable. 
Commentators (Hahn and Noll 1990) have established the following prerequisites for 
efficient MPP functioning: that the number of permits be fixed to enable permit price 
stabilising; least possible regulatory interference; that transaction costs be minimised; 
permits be storable to keep their worth in times of thin trading; penalties for violating 
permits be greater than permit price, therefore coercing the producers into market 
compliance; that producers be allowed to benefit from any profits from market 
transactions; and permits should only be expropriated in extreme circumstances to 
ensure reliability. 
In an ideal world the regulator would presumably set permit quantity where marginal 
benefits and costs of pollution control cross, thereby ensuring the socially optimal 
reductions. However more realistically total permits are set with regard to an 
arbitrary target reduction in pollution (or standard). Under uncertainty however, 
25  Introduced by Crocker 1966 & Dales 1968. 
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depending on the relative slopes of curves, where the marginal benefit curve is steep 
(slight variation in emissions can potentially result in great damage), the permit 
performs better than taxes, but in the other extreme where the MB curve is flat, an 
emission tax is preferable. There are numerous discussions on regulatory possibilities 
under slope uncertainty and the best strategy (Baumol and Oates 1988; Hanley et al. 
1997). 
Permits are issued either freely, being allotted depending upon current emissions 
(grandfathering26) or are auctioned 27. The initial allocation does not change the 
outcome as much as it alters the distribution of wealth. With auctioning, firms with 
high MAC would be willing to pay more than firms with low costs, and once markets 
are established high MACs to be buyers and low MACs to be sellers28. In essence 
each firm will compare its MAC schedule with the current market price and if price 
falls it will purchase more; so in effect the MAC curve for a firm is its demand curve 
for permits. In equilibrium, the market settles where each firm purchases permits at 
the level where it's MAC equals permit price or the cost-minimising solution. The 
efficiency of MPPs was first established by Montgomery in 1972. However 
Tietenberg's proof is somewhat more lucid (Montgomery 1972; Tietenberg 1994). 
There is no doubt that permit schemes offer superior incentives to innovate, in 
comparison to technological standards, simply because lowering abatement costs 
enables firms to spend less on permits (Downing and White 1986; Milliman and 
Prince 1989). 
Suppose a is the ambient nitrate levels in the controlled catchment, given by: 
a = 
a + 
(r - e) 
	
(EQ-3.14) 
26  If grandfathered there will be no resource transfer from the polluters en bloc , whereas this will be 
the case with auctions. Another strategy involves an allotment followed by an auction. 
27  Montgomery 1972, proved formally that the least-cost outcome is independent of the initial 
allocation of permits, however this depends on the circumstances i.e. transaction & information costs. 
28  Assuming of course, that initial allocation is not optimal i.e. the least-cost one. 
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where a are emissions from other natural sources, ri are uncontrolled emissions 
from i = 1.. .n polluting firms, 0, are emission abatement by firm i, which costs the 
firm C, in control costs: 
c, = c, (o f ) 
where, C(6i )is a continuous, twice differentiable function, with C'>O and C> 
O.The regulatory standard is set at a0 . The agency's problem is to 
Min c(0) 	 (EQ-3.15) 
subject to: 
17 
a+(1—)!~a0 , O ~!O 	 (EQ-3.16) 
The Lagrangian is 
—a—( -o)=o 	 (EQ-3.17) 
Differentiating with respect to 0, yields the following Kuhn- Tucker conditions for 
an optimum 	' (01 -2>-o; Oi[Ci(0_2=o; a+(,-0j)a0; 
17 
~!O; 2~!o 	 (EQ-3.18) 
The above shows that X is that shadow price of the pollution constraint. All firms' 
marginal abatement costs, given as 	, must equal X. For a permit market to 
17 




the permitted level of emissions. Under this emission permit system (EPS), 
dischargers will trade at a 1:1 rate. Suppose each firm is allotted an initial allocation 
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of er where = E* and the price of p is initially arbitrarily set. Now each firm's 
problem is to 
Min C(8)+p( - Oi — e,q) 	 (EQ-3.19) 
Oi 






In comparing these with the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, it is obvious that the least cost 
solution will be if price p is equal to 2, which will be the case in a competitive 
market. 
3.8.1 MPPs and Non-point Pollution 
Given NPS emissions as such cannot be directly measured 29 some proxy for their use 
i.e. estimated emissions from inputs & production process, must be controlled. A 
MPP system in nitrate inputs could be established. An interesting study modelled the 
use of MPPs for nitrate pollution the River Tyne (Northern England) catchment, and 
determined reductions in farm profits from two policies: a MPP system of estimated 
emissions (depending on land types and cropping patterns etc.) and MPP in nitrate 
inputs (Moxey and White 1994). As expected, since it is difficult to establish a 
simple relationship between nitrate use and ambient concentration because of 
varying transfer coefficients, profits under a transferable pollution permit based on 
inputs were less. But the administrative costs 30 associated with a market of estimated 
emissions would be greater if for each farm estimate emission were predicted. 
Alternatively, the amount of permits necessary to authorise a particular land use on 
some land type could be determined from estimated emissions. Once established the 
regulator would not have to repeat this every time trade took place (Pan & Hodge 
1994). Although this is less efficient than an economic instrument, costs are reduced 
29 
Nonpoint loadings are inherently stochastic because of their dependence on weather-related factors 
such as rainfall. (Shortle & Dunn 1986). Additionally their measurement is further complicated as 
emissions may take a long time to accumulate and reach surface waters. 
° 
Including the cost of litigation, and disputes concerning emission estimates (English 1993) 
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as only monitoring land use and permit holding is required, and transaction costs 
would be lower. 
3.8.2 MPP Permit Types 
Ambient permits (APS) refer, not to source emissions, but to their effects at receptor 
points, thus effectively creating separate markets at each receptor point31. In theory a 
source whose emissions are 'more damaging to a particular receptor will have to 
purchase commensurably more emission entitlements from another source whose 
discharges contribute less per unit to pollutant concentrations at the receptor 
point.'(Baumol and Oates 1988). So each polluting firm must assemble a portfolio of 
permits from each affected receptor site, implying possibly high transaction costs. 
Complications arise when fluctuations in environmental factors or changing spatial 
patterns of emissions generate 'hot spots', which do not coincide with designated hot 
spots. The nature and occurrence of hot spots depends on the type of water pollutant 
and how uniformly it mixes. To cover hot-spots, an APS would require a fine mesh 
of receptor points. However this is a costly solution which would further increases 
transaction costs. Potentially high transaction cost from trading in separate receptor 
markets and few traders might result in imperfect competition. Besides this, total 
emissions may rise, if one polluter sells permits allowing a fixed impact at a receptor 
point. Now the purchasing polluter may be located in such a way that he may 
actually increase emissions and yet the impact on the receptor would remain the 
same as before the trade. The possibility that APS can actually augment the increase 
in long-range transport of pollutants has been brought to attention (Atkinson and 
Tietenberg 1987a). 
A simplified alternative is to divide the region into zones, and allow a one-for-one 
emission entitlement trading (EPS). Each source would be assigned to a zone and 
since polluters with somewhat varying dispersion coefficients are aggregated into the 
31 
 Receptor points need not be fixed, and can be easily redefined to coincide with hot spots; nor do 
they have to be the points where actual pollution is monitored, as receptor are only reference points, 
and so regulators might determine receptor concentration based on some dispersion model etc. 
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same zone achieving a least cost solution is difficult. This is because one-for one 
trade ignores differences in the concentrations contributed by their respective 
emissions, i.e. 'the price of emissions to each polluter will not correspond accurately 
to the shadow price of the binding pollution constraint' (Baumol and Oates 1988). 
The validity of this objection depends on whether the dispersion characteristics of 
emission within a zone vary. 
In addition EPS requires the regulating authority to determine how many permits be 
assigned to each zone. The prerequisite for doing so involves a water model, source 
specific abatement costs and an emissions inventory so that the cost minimisation 
problem can be solved. The inability to do so properly, for whatever reason, would 
mean subsequent readjustment, or entering a market to purchase or confiscate 
permits. All of which are destabilising factors for polluters. To conclude, regulators 
face the persistent problem of periodic adjustments given new entrants, economics 
swings etc. 
An ingenious compromise, termed the pollution offset, allows the transfers of permits 
subject to the restriction that the transfer does not result in a violation of the 
environmental quality standard at any receptor point (Krupnick et al. 1983). The rate 
at which emissions from one source can substitute for emissions from the other, 
whilst ensuring no change in pollutant concentration at the receptor is the ratio of the 
sources' transfer coefficients. Of course, ruling out one-for-one trading, if X 
discharges twice as much pollutant at a receptor than Y, then for X to double 
emissions effecting the receptor he must purchase two of Y's permits. Thus like an 
APS, mutually beneficial trades result in the least-cost solution32, independent of the 
initial permit allocation. The authorities need not know the abatement cost functions 
and nor do they need to solve the cost-minimisation problem to determine initial 
allocation of permits (any allocation will suffice). However they obviously need to 
know the dispersion characteristics of emissions, in order to be able to declare 
official "exchange rates". Another benefit stems from lower transaction costs, as 
32  Baumol & Oates demonstrate the coincidence of the trading equilibrium with the least cost solution 
with the aid of simple diagram. 
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firms need not trade in a multitude of separate markets for each receptor site, rather 
they purchase directly from other sources 
Pollution offsets are further divided into the non-degradation offset which further 
restricts by disallowing all trade that would increase total emissions (Atkinson and 
Tietenberg 1982); or the modified offset which allows trades so long as neither the 
pre-trade quality level nor the target level, which ever is stricter is not violated 
(McGartland and Gates 1985). In latter work Atkinson and Tietenberg, conclude that 
there is no all-pervasive conclusion on the relative-effectiveness of either variants, 
however, they discredit the simple offset system (Atkinson and Tietenberg 1987a). 
3.8.3 MPP and Market Structure 
A potential problem may arise if there are only a few polluters (farmers) in a 
catchment, or if one is large enough to dictate permit price through its behaviour. 
This market imperfection will distort the ability of MPPs to be the least cost solution. 
By exerting monopoly power 33  a firm/farm can restrict the number of permits in the 
market and force up the price. Hence when it does sell, the cost of freeing up permits 
for sale is not given by its marginal abatement schedule. A formal analysis of firms 
and market behaviour under imperfect competition can be found in the literature 
(Hahn 1984; Misiolek and Elder 1989). 
At the other extreme one firm/farm with monopsonistic power can reduce the price it 
pays for purchase, by buying fewer permits. This of course depends on market 
regulations and firm's MAC schedule. Thus, in buying too few, compared to the 
competitive outcome this firm will spend too much on abatement34. It is possible that 
un-competitive behaviour may be motivated by an attempt to increase permit prices 
for competitors, actual or potential (Misiolek and Elder 1989). Exclusionary 
behaviour may motive firms to distort permit price in order to prevent new entrants. 
Obviously such leverage is exerted by large firms with low MACs. In the case of a 
33 
The extent of which depends on the price elasticity of demand (determines the permit price rise as 
more become available) and the slope of the MAC schedule (determines price of freeing up permits 
for sale). 
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monopsonist exclusionary behaviour will counter act cost-minimising behaviour and 
the distortion will not be severe, because a monopsonist is likely to exert influence 
by buying too few permits. However where a polluter exerts monopolistic influence 
i.e. by not selling permits, exclusionary behaviour will worsen the distortion. 
3.8.4 MPP and Multiple Pollutants 
In reality there are nonnally several agricultural pollutants (nitrogen, phosphorus, 
sediments) in waterways which jointly contribute to general habitat deterioration or 
fish mortality. If pollutants interact linearly, then there will be no significant 
alteration to theory. If two pollutants in acting together exert a greater influence than 
a linear sum of the two, synergism is said to hold35. Under a MPP system with linear 
damage functions from multiple pollutants, trading across firms would still result in 
the least cost outcome provided permits were traded off at a rate equal to their 
relative contributions to the environmental quality indicator (Hahn 1989a). 
It has been also proven that where the damage function is non-linear and synergistic, 
permit trading alone does not represent the least cost outcome (Zylicz 1993). In fact a 
hybrid system of taxes and permits achieves the least cost solution only if the 
damage function is quadratic. When this is the case taxes will have to be firm 
specific and depend on emissions from that firm and their interaction with other 
pollutants. To the regulatory authority this is clearly a cumbersome and complicated 
procedure. Unfortunately such solutions do not apply when there are other non-linear 
forms. 
3.8.5 MPP Problems 
It is tempting to conclude that more use should be made of permits in dealing with 
agricultural water pollution. However in practice this has not been the case (Hanley 
et al. 1990). Where water bodies are concerned complex trading rules regarding non-
uniformly mixed pollutants, non-linear synergistic interactions between pollutants, 
stochastic influences, high transaction costs, too few participating parties (lack of 
35 
One such work studied the effect of a point source of cyanide on fish in the presence of other heavy 
metals (Beavis and Walker 1979). 
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market structure) and public perception (Hanley et al. 1990) can contribute to 
practical difficulties36. 
Permits have been simulated assuming multilateral, simultaneous, and perfect 
information (Krupnick 1986). Unfortunately in practice most trades 37  are bilateral, 
sequential, and often occur in the absence of information on the minimum 
compensation demanded (supply) or the maximum willingness to pay (demand 
price). The ramification of these restrictions (Atkinson and Tietenberg 1987b); and 
the implication of sequential trading (Klaasen and Frosund 1993) has been discussed 
in the literature. The following possible explanations for low levels of trading have 
been given (Munro 1995): management prefers abatement to permits, despite the 
associated profit loss; the belief that permit allocation in the next round depends on 
current holding, hence reluctance to sell; high transaction costs; and firms are 
unwilling to sell permits to their rivals. 
Transaction costs arising from search & information; bargaining & decision; and 
monitoring/enforcement (usually borne by the regulating agency) can in some cases 
reduce trading and increase abatement costs. There is considerable empirical 
evidence on transaction costs in the literature (Atkinson and Tietenberg 1987b; Hahn 
and Hester 1989). 
In considering the transaction costs from brokerage services, insurance fees etc. 
Stavins concludes that 'it is possible that in some circumstances the total cost of 
compliance (including transaction costs) of a tradable per/nit system could exceed 
(depending on initial allocation of permits) the costs of a uniform performance 
standard', (Stavins 1995). 
Another implication of his analysis is that initial allocation of permits affects the 
final equilibrium when marginal transaction costs are non-constant. This implies that 
36 
Other issues include whether trade can be limited to polluters only or may environmental groups 
purchase and retire permits as a means of reducing pollutants. 
37 There are numerous types of transactions ranging from temporary rentals and long-term leases to 
permanent transfers. 
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when transaction costs are present and prohibitive, operating an efficient market 
means distributing permits initially so that the sum of control costs and transaction 
costs are minimised. He attributes the poor popularity of ambient or concentration 
permit trading, exposure trading (Roumasset and Smith 1990) and risk trading to 
higher transaction costs; and advocates that government should take on brokerage 
responsibilities. 
3.8.6 MPP Point-Nonpoint Trading 
An interesting concept is the proposal allowing trade between point and non-point 
sources. Point-nonpoint trading would allow point sources to sponsor nonpoint 
source controls, rather than have them install further controls of their own. If 
nonpoint source loadings are significant and the marginal costs of their control are 
lower than for additional point source controls, ambient water quality could be 
achieved at significantly lower costs. Nor does it lessen incentives to innovate and 
invest in control technologies, rather the opposite. 
In acknowledging that agriculture is the single largest contributor of nonpoint source 
pollution research in the US investigated the feasibility & potential for 
point/nonpoint trading in coastal watershed (Crutchfield et al. 1994). The research 
concluded that although sound in theory, successful implementation of market-based 
approaches depends in part on whether practical circumstances support the 
functioning of such a market. 
Point/nonpoint trading is a 'bubble' concept applied to watershed management. A 
'bubble' sums loadings for all area sources and allows adjustment of the level of 
control applied to each source so long as total loadings do not exceed a target level. 
In America, where there has been some limited application, PS-NPS trading has 
allowed granting publicly owned treatment plants and industrial point sources the 
option of bringing agricultural and urban NPSs under control rather than requiring 
more advanced treatment technologies at point sources. Normally the permit base is 
point source polluters trading emission allowances for allowances based on a) 
expected runoff by nonpoint or b) input use by nonpoint sources. 
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It is probable that there is a limit to such trading (some optimal trading ratio38, 
subject to ecological constraints) for not all agricultural run-off and industrial 
pollutants discharged are similar in effect. A model to determine the optimal trading 
ratio found it was dependent on the relative costs of enforcing point versus nonpoint 
reductions and on the uncertainty associated with nonpoint loadings (Malik et al. 
1993). This uncertainty does not imply a lower bound for the optimal trading ratio. 
The effect of uncertainty depends on source of uncertainty and on the curvature of 
the damage function. The effect of stochastic nonpoint loadings can be opposite to 
that of imperfect information about the effectiveness of nonpoint source controls. In 
both cases, the direction of the effect depends on whether the damage function is 
concave or convex in nonpoint loadings. Thus uncertainty does not imply that the 
trading ratio will be greater than one. But for all this to be calculated the regulator 
needs to know the damage function, and abatement costs to determine expected 
marginal enforcement costs. It must be noted that these results were for two sources 
only, one can imagine the complexity of allowing multiple, heterogeneous point and 
nonpoint sources with growth and stock effects of pollutants. 
In fact there are numerous difficulties with NPS controls which make PS payments to 
induce farmers to adopt conservative practices insufficient to ensure compliance or 
that targets are met. Firstly loadings cannot be monitored or measured directly at 
source (some input proxy 39  is employed), since nutrients, sediments and other 
chemicals enter water streams over a dispersed area. Secondly, there are imperfect 
relationships between loadings and farm-level decisions dealing with input use, land 
management, and their fate- transport mechanisms. A third complicating factor is the 
random nature of episodic events i.e. wind, rainfall, and temperature. So regulating 
officials find it difficult to determine whether failure to meet water quality goals is 
Trading ratio specifies the rate at which nonpoint source abatement can be substituted for point 
source abatement. Nonpoint allowances are generally not 1:1, due to the random nature of nonpoint 
loadings and the heterogeneous nature of NPS contributions to pollution (Ribaudo et al. 1999). A 
uniform trading ratio equal to the price of an point-source emission allowance relative to the price of 
an expected runoff allowance defines the number of point emissions allowances that must be traded 
for one unit of expected runoff. 
31) Proxies include quasi-fixed inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides, irrigation water, management 
practices, and conservation investments etc. 
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due to failure of individual sources to correctly implement control strategies or due 
to undesirable states of nature. To make matters worse, enforcement cannot be based 
on attainment of ambient water quality targets, because it often takes several years of 
monitoring to detect and attribute water quality changes to NPs controls; and 
monitoring in short term has to focus on land use practices. 
Because of the aforementioned reasons PS would generally sponsor a larger 
reduction via the NPs than the reduction they aim to avoid. Another consideration is 
the number of participants, as too few participants would lead to inefficiencies. 
Again, as under any kind of permit trading, single or a few large PS acting together 
would could behave as a monopsonist and purchase less NPS pollutant reduction 
than is socially optimal40. Actually the reverse is troublesome as well, as too many 
participants would raise the co-ordinating and bargaining costs. Where transaction 
costs are significant, the potential benefits are limited. Similarly significant NPS 
loading must exist because the objective of PS is to avoid abatement technology 
upgrades, which are often discrete or 'lumpy' because of capital requirements. 
When trading point-source emissions with nonpoint variable production inputs, the 
efficient trading ratio is defined as the marginal rate of substitution of emissions for 
input use such that expected damages and pre-permit profits are held constant 
(Shortle and Abler 1997). Ideally with n farm sites and rn inputs influencing diffuse, 
n x m markets (trading ratios) are required to achieve efficiency. However given 
transaction costs of monitoring, administrating markets and enforcing permit 
compliance second-best allocation could be obtained by allowing trading at uniform 
rates and by limiting the number of tradable inputs41. Price uniformity will however 
reduce the cost-effectiveness of pollution control because it eliminates potential 
gains from different treatment of polluters according to their relative ambient impact. 
Trading ratios in excess of one implies high nonpoint control cost relative to point 
source control and thus a marginal preference for point source reductions. The 
40 
Here regulatory officials would have to intervene by adjusting the substitution rate, or trading ratio. 
41 
 Which inputs are traded would depend upon: the nature of any resulting substitution effects, 
monitoring/enforcement costs, correlation with environmental quality (Ribaudo et al. 1999). 
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reverse is true of ratios less than one. The magnitude of an optimal trading ratio 
cannot be determined a priori. It is a site-specific empirical issue involving a) relative 
marginal impact of point and nonpoint sources, b) heterogeneity of sources, c) degree 
of environmental impacts, d) transaction costs of each type of emission control, and 
most importantly, f) correlation between environmental and cost relationships 
(Shortie 1987; Malik et al. 1993). The trading ratio will be negative for inputs which 
reduce emissions, and the regulator might define minimum required input use, as a 
firm might tend to under use such inputs (Shortie and Horan 2001). 
There are three major differences between E-I (point emissions for NPS inputs) and 
E-EL (point emissions for NPS loadings) trading, 1) E-EL trading conveys more site-
specific information to producers about the environmental impacts of their choices, 
2) E-I trading allows for differential targeting of inputs (Shortie and Horan 2001), 3) 
theoretically, transaction costs aside, E-I systems are more efficient because they are 
better at managing the natural variability of NPS loads (Shortie and Abler 1997). It is 
noteworthy to remember input substitution i.e. the regulator must be aware that 
although permit trading may require an increase in pollution-reducing inputs it may 
also result in increased demand for pollution-increasing inputs and further 
environmental damage (Shortie and Horan 2001). 
Pollution trading has gained popularity in the US as a cost-effective approach than 
the traditional 'command and control' approach. Point/Nonpoint trading programmes 
have been set up in several US water bodies notably Dillion and Cherry Creek 
Reservoirs in Colorado, and Tar-Pamlico basin in Carolina with varying success 
(Hogg and Holloway 1991; Malik et al. 1994). Most of them permit point-source 
polluters purchase emission allowances from NPS farmers through the installation of 
best-management practices (BMP's) and the development of nutrient management 
plans. No markets currently exist for trading allowances based on nonpoint inputs. 
3.9 Other NPS Issues 
The following section will briefly outline the other important diffuse pollution issues 
such as mixed instruments, non-uniformly mixed pollutants, dynamic NPS pollution, 
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stock and multiple pollutants and product taxation. It must be remembered that this 
section refers to NPS pollutants in general not specifically diffuse nitrate pollution; 
the chemical and physical properties of NPS pollutants vary considerably. 
3.9.1 Mixed Instruments 
Economic instruments applied to a single compliance base are efficient in a first-best 
world under highly restrictive and unrealistic conditions. Numerous authors have 
considered the use of mixed instrument incentives to address the informational 
challenges in NPS control (Braden and Segerson 1993). 
One proposal involved mixing input taxes with liability rules in a bid to overcome 
the real world implementation problems of each if implemented separately (Braden 
and Segerson 1993). However the authors warn that a prior it is not possible to 
predict whether the combination of two instruments is more efficient than if either 
was implemented on its own. In an investigation of a combined product and emission 
tax it was concluded that the policy mix is optimal when a) fixed costs of emission 
monitoring were low, and b) the presence of initially low marginal costs which 
increase with the monitoring effort. 
Similarly it has also been demonstrated that a combination of input and ambient 
taxes can give a first-best solution even when polluters are risk averse, something 
which cannot be achieved with ambient taxes alone (Horan et al. 1998). Xepapadeas 
investigated an ingenious method to circumvent high emission monitoring costs by 
combining emission and ambient taxes to a policy which would lead polluters to 
reveal all or part of their emissions (Xepapadeas 1995). 
The result is similar with that of earlier work which investigated the complimentary 
interaction between ex post negligence liability and ex ante regulation i.e. pigouvian 
taxation (Kolstad et al. 1990). The research demonstrated that given uncertainty a 
policy mix of the two is likely to be more efficient than the exclusive use of one. 
This efficiency gain is especially so if the injured party's marginal cost of 
precautionary measures is significant at the social optimum or if there is considerable 
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uncertainty in setting the legal safety standard. If this is the case then an efficient 
outcome can be expected provided a pigouvian tax is levied alongside a less 
precautionary safety standard which is below what would be used if the liability rule 
was used alone. Later research considered and confirmed efficiency gains in 
employing the same two tax instruments (ambient and pigouvian) jointly when co-
operation between producers is likely (Millock and Salanie 1997). 
3.92 Non-Uniformly Mixed Pollutants 
Obviously the assumption that NPS emissions from all sources are uniformly mixed 
together i.e. emissions from one source have the same marginal impact on ambient 
quality as those from other sources, is not realistic. The fact that some pollutants 
have short natural half lives 42  is another factor determining impact. Factors such as 
seasonal flow fluctuations, rainfall, temperature, etc. all contribute to this difference. 
So the same quantity and concentration of pollutants discharged closer to a 
monitoring point will have a significantly greater impact or technical coefficient43  
than one discharged further upstream. Although a single tax would achieve the 
desired reduction, it would not be at a minimum cost (Tietenberg 1994). Thus for 
mixed pollutants tax rates should vary depending on their marginal impacts on 
ambient water quality i.e. transfer coefficients. 
One could either calculate taxes on the basis of transfer coefficients for the most 
polluted monitoring point or have separate tax rates for each monitoring point, which 
are then adjusted for each firm according to its transfer coefficient at the receptor site 
(Tietenberg 1973). To illustrate, suppose a source B whose transfer coefficient is 
twice that of another A (be it for spatial location differences or whatever); the 
effluent tax paid by B must be twice as that paid by A to ensure that the marginal 
abatement cost of B would be twice that of A's. But, note, the damage reduction per 
dollar spent in reducing emissions would be equalised across the two sources44. 
42  I.e. they undergo natural degradation and re-aeration, depending on the river's assimilative capacity 
and the distance between discharge and monitoring point etc., 
° For a detailed account of environmental modelling and the construction of a transfer coefficient 
matrix consult 0' Neil et al. (O'Neil et al. 1983). 
44  Thus for every firm there is a unique shadow price or tax rate at each monitoring point. 
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This theoretical idea has no place and would be "administratively difficult at best and 
politically unfeasible at worst" (Tietenberg 1974);he goes on to outline a location-
determined or zonal tax system where the administrator divides a territory into 
separate zones depending on relative impact i.e. grouping together sources whose 
emissions have similar effects on ambient quality levels. Here tax rates vary across 
zones but not within them. A similar zonal treatment with marketable pollution 
permits has been investigated (Moxey and White 1994). Details of this study along 
with other issues, such as site-specific information (targeted policies) are discussed 
in detail in the following chapter on empirical works. 
3.9.3 Dynamic Non-point Pollution 
So far the discussion has involved introducing a static charge to remedy the moral 
hazard problems associated with imperfect monitoring. However such schemes 
ignore the effects of 'a dynamic process of pollutant accumulation on individual 
behaviour when it is imposed, through some incentive scheme, as a restriction on the 
dischargers' profit-maximisation problem' (Xepapadeas 1991; Xepapadeas 1992b). 
This leads to sub-optimal inefficiencies in the long run, as water quality at each point 
in time depends on pollutant stock. Xepapadeas designed an inter-temporal incentive 
scheme to induce dischargers to comply with a socially desirable long run 
equilibrium. The charge depends on the pollutant's shadow cost, natural decay rate, 
the discount rate & the parameters associated with the model's information 
structures. Obviously when firms follow feedback strategies i.e., when they condition 
emissions on the currently observed pollutant levels, the required charged is higher 
than when open-loop strategies are followed. 
3.9.4 Stock & Multiple pollutants 
Often ground water is affected by stock pollutants, i.e. those which accumulate 
through time with continued emissions and which might undergo a natural rate of 
decay. Initial economics work on stock pollution was pioneered as early as 1972 
(Plourde 1972). A later study modelled the build up of aldicarb in Long Island (US) 
where it had been banned for twelve years (Conrad and Oslon 1992). They used an 
equation to construct a possible time path for stock pollutants, something which must 
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be done to levy an efficient tax; they estimated the social value of damage and 
concluded the build up was a result of setting the application of aldicarb limit too 
high. 
Most economic research only considers single pollutants, and not their combined 
effects. In practice, unfortunately, undesirable environmental effects are normally 
brought about by the joint presence of interacting toxins. A study of economic 
incentives to control the accumulation of green house gases involved setting tax rates 
for each contributing pollutant and assumed a finite assimilative capacity in each 
time period (Michaelis 1992). The research concluded that relative tax rates between 
pollutants depend on their relative damage and dispersion co-efficients, and that for 
efficiency taxes must grow at the discount rate, adjusted for the decay rate of 
pollutants. In accordance, tax rates should rise over time as scarce overall 
assimilative capacity diminishes. 
3.9.5 Product Tax 
A product tax lowers the price for polluting activities, and should in theory reduce 
the profit maximising fertiliser application. The first order conditions for profit 
maximisation show that the marginal product equal the ratio of input to output prices, 
thus halving the product price should have the same effect in theory as doubling 
fertiliser price, provided the cultivated area and product mix do not change. However 
in reality crops differ with respect to product prices and nitrogen requirements 
(Sumelius 1994a). 
In comparison with taxes and subsidies, product taxes do not discriminate between 
polluting and non polluting industries. Additionally it must be remembered that most 
economic incentives normally encourage investment and research in less polluting 
technologies, this is not the case with product taxation. Product taxation would also 
be fraught with political problems. 
The following section on property rights and the polluter pays principle will form a 
basis for discussing subsidies in the next section. 
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3.10 Property Rights and the Polluter Pays Principle 
The choice of instalment in practice is determined by factors other than efficiency, 
such as political feasibility and ethical considerations. A subsidy (i.e. opposite of 
taxation whereby polluters are paid to reduce emissions) to farmers to reduce 
pollution implicitly affirms their right to pollute and the view that the public must 
pay for non-contaminated water. The alternative view that polluters must 'pay' for 
their toxic discharges to the environment is supported by levies. The polluter pays 
principle (PPP) has been the regulatory policy shaping point source discharges 
(Ribaudo et al. 1999). Interestingly if society does own the environment then the 
extra burden on polluters under pigouvian taxation i.e. the difference between the 
total tax burden and the total external costs can be considered the environmental 
renl 5 (Spulber 1985; Spulber 1989). 
Existing property rights of farmers in developed countries allows them to grow what 
they choose, within bounds, in any amount. This is the result of the prioritisation of 
food production over the environment, in earlier times when environmental 
degradation was not threatening (Bromley and Hodge 1990). Such entitlements are 
not cast-iron and subject to change as society's perceptions and priorities evolve 
(Segerson 1996). 
The polluter pays principle 46  (PPP) was incorporated in EC law in 1987, although 
there are references to it in the first EC Action Programme on the Environment in 
1973. The political and social considerations which have prevented the 
implementation of the PPP in agriculture are numerous (Baldock and Lowe 1996; 
Tobey and Smets 1996). The meaning of the word 'polluter' has also changed over 
time and it has come to mean someone who directly or indirectly damages the 
45 Economic rent is the return on a commodity in excess of the minimum required to bring forth its 
services, or the excess return to an input, i.e. the difference between payment for resource use and the 
lowest the owner would have been willing to accept. 
46 The polluter pays principle was established by the OECD, i.e. those who use society's 
environmental resources must compensate the owners (public) for any degradation. It was first widely 
discussed and brought to the publics attention at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development held in Rio de Janeiro of Brazil in June 1992. The principle was endorsed by all the 
attending representatives of the countries and nations. However it has taken a long time for countries 
to implement it. 
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environment. Over the years there have been numerous disputes regarding the PPP's 
practical interpretation such as the relative role of regulation versus economic 
instruments in implementation; and whether polluters have to pay the full control 
costs and/or restoration measures. These have largely arisen due to the flexibility 
granted to member states in interpreting directives. 
Recent consultations and the Commission's 2000 Environmental Liability White 
Paper (COM(2000)66) refers to the possibility introducing an EU liability regime for 
environmental damage. In fact the clearest signal yet has been the proposed sixth 
Environmental Action Programme (COM(2001)31) - Environmental 2010: Our 
Future, Our Choice - proposes the following commitment: 
To promote the polluter pays principle, through the use of market based 
instruments, including the use of emissions trading, environmental taxes, charges 
and subsidies, to internalise the negative as well as the positive impacts on the 
environment'. - (proposed Article 3(3)). 
Such a proposal will integrate environmental considerations in 'sectoral decision 
making' (proposed article 6) especially both future agricultural and water policies. 
3.11 Subsidies 
In a departure from the stick or rod tax approach, subsidies reward firms for better 
environmental practices i.e. decrease the cost of pollution mitigation. The choice of 
taxation over subsidies (under the PPP) is not just a normative decision, as subsidies 
are fraught with economic distortions. Although in violation of the polluter pays 
principle, in the short run subsidies and taxes are equal. Essentially under a subsidy 
producers select output to maximise net profits where the marginal benefit i.e. price, 
equals the marginal private cost and the marginal opportunity cost of lost subsidy. 
Every unit of output results in a lost unit of the subsidy47. Undoubtedly there is an 
incentive to reduce an individual's output to the socially optimum. 
However, subsidy payments are made relative to a specified benchmark, e.g. a 
subsidy on fertiliser use might be based on a reduction in fertiliser application from a 
specific level. The specification of such benchmarks may create perverse incentives, 
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as establishing site-specific or catchment level benchmarks at current discharge 
levels would penalise farms which have already committed themselves to pollution 
abatement (Baumol and Oates 1988). 
Nonetheless subsidies encourage entry by new firms and raise overall output. 
Subsidies inevitably sustain firms that are inefficient and unprofitable, those that 
would have exited in the absence of financial support (Lewis 1994). In essence this is 
an information rent as the regulatory authority cannot differentiate between high and 
low profitable industries. If the correct number of firms is desired then in the long 
run firms should pay not only the marginal damage but also the total cost arising 
from waste emissions (Spulber 1985). However it is possible to conceive of subsidies 
as not affecting entry/exit decisions (Segerson 1990), e.g. subsidies paid to particular 
land parcels, such as filter strips, may be capitalised into land values in the long run. 
Remember, excessive entries are not possible because the area of land next to 
waterways is fixed. 
Another issue with subsidies is their use with abating inputs, such as the use of 
leakage reducing crops. As an abating input subsidy creates an incentive to use more 
of it, normal first order conditions do not apply. It has been shown that when an 
abating input enters the production function, optimality cannot be derived by 
imposing negative or positive taxes on that input (Weinberg 1991). Some have 
attempted to justify subsidies by arguing they mitigate the economic impact of 
environmental regulation by helping firms meet compliance costs. Given the current 
production subsidies and price supports to farmers in the UK subsidising agricultural 
emissions would merely add to the tax payer's burden. 
47 
For a formal proof consult Hanley et al, 1997. 
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3.12 Non-Economic Approaches 
The term 'non-economic' approach is used to group both farmer education and 
regulatory standards i.e. approaches which require or mandate that producers behave 
in a specific manner. Neither education nor regulatory standards directly use the 
price incentive to induce producers to account for externalities. 
3.12.1 Education 
Education refers to providing farmers knowledge about how their production 
decisions affect the environment (pollution generation relationships) and about new 
less polluting technologies (which use polluting inputs efficiently) and management 
(Bosh et al. 1995). 
Education is often considered a 'win-win' solution, as it encourages producers to 
adopt practices (nutrient, tillage, irrigation water management (Ervin 1995)) which 
not only increase production but also water quality. It is popular because: 
It is less costly to implement than a cost-sharing program (Ribaudo et al. 1999). 
The infra-structure for implementing an information dissemination program is 
normally present in most farming communities. 
It is a benign form of intervention, i.e. not mandatory and relies on farmer's 
good-will. 
Generally it keeps with the public's predominantly environmental friendly idea 
of farming. 
If education is to be a cost-effective NPS pollution control measure then utility 
maximisation requires that alternative practices be more profitable than conventional 
practices, or that producers value cleaner water enough to potentially lower profits. 
Additionally, altruism or stewardship motives will only result in change if producers 
believe there is an environmental problem and that their actions contribute to it. 
However, surveys suggest that most farmer do not admit this (Lichtenberg and 
Lessley 1992). 
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Evidence suggests that in the adoption of new practices through education producers 
are mainly concerned with net returns and not altruistic concerns for the local 
environment (Abler and Shortle 1991). Essentially by providing education the 
regulator attempts to bring about voluntary control measures. In a study of voluntary 
nitrogen fertiliser extensification in Finland the authors concluded that the majority 
of farmers were unable to save in production costs by reducing fertiliser expenditure 
as marginal returns are significantly higher than marginal costs (Sumelius 1994b). 
Generally economists are sceptical of using moral suasion alone to control 
environmental externalities. 
Given the reduction of price supports under the CAP reforms and trade liberalisation, 
it is unlikely that farmers will adopt costly or risky pollution control measures for 
altruistic reasons alone. 
3.12.2 Regulatory Standards 
Legal mandates requiring farmers to behave in a specified manner i.e. regarding 
input use or a particular technology are referred to command and control measures 
(CAC) or regulatory standards. These can be applied to either producer actions 
(design) or the outcome of their actions (performance)48. 
3.12.2.1 Performance Standards 
CAC performance bases need to be stated in terms of the moments of the 
performance base (mean, variance etc.) or the probability of attainment (e.g. ambient 
levels should not exceed the standard more than 90% of the time) because the 
performance bases (runoff, ambient concentrations or damages) cannot be controlled 
deterministically (Ribaudo et al. 1999). Performance based CAC measures have 
several disadvantages: 
a) Given that the bases are stated as moments of the pollutants distribution or 
probability of attainment monitoring would have to occur over a period of time to 
determine the sample distribution of the base. 
48 The choice of CAC base for point sources is clearly emissions as they can be easily monitored 
(Baumol and Oates 1988). 
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The required monitoring timeframe may be significant, e.g. the movement of 
nitrates to groundwater can take numerous decades. Thus it may take years to 
before the regulator can verify compliance 
The informational requirements are immense and unrealistic, i.e. polluter must 
understand how their input and technology choice and those of others determines 
runoff and contribution to ambient levels. 
All polluters must have identical expectations about random processes 
The above limitations make performance based CAC measures unrealistic policy 
tools. 
3.12.2.2 Design standards 
Design standards can be formulated to place restrictions on expected runoff, inputs 
and technology. Here expected runoff is calculated by monitoring farmers input and 
technology decisions and then feeding them into a biophysical simulation model 
tailored to the catchment. This allows producers to use any private knowledge they 
might have about input and technology use, so long as it can be captured by the 
simulation model. Under such a system a cost-effective solution is attainable 49  and 
optimal entry/exit in achieved by setting the standard such that there are more 
economic benefits in retiring extra-marginal land. However the following caveats 
apply: 
An expected runoff standard will only be effective if farmers comprehend how 
their production and pollution abatement decisions influence their emissions in 
the eyes of the regulator, i.e. they must have the same emission generation 
expectations as the regulator. 
CAC incentives based on expected runoff are subject to efficient outcomes under 
restrictive conditions (Ribaudo et al. 1999) just like economic measures on the 
same base. 
There may be legal problems with basing standards on the regulator agencies 
expectation of runoff and not actual runoff. 
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d) High transaction costs in reality (associated with monitoring and enforcement) 
may lead to the imposition of a uniform standard (ignoring site specific marginal 
impacts or land heterogeneity) resulting to a significant loss in efficiency. 
3.12.2.3 Technology-based Effluent Standards 
A technology-based effluent standard (TBES), or a design standard, is an 
effluent/emission standard set at the level of emissions that a source would produce if 
it were employing a particular type of abatement technology. Farms can control 
emissions by altering their choice of tillage, irrigation technology, management 
practices etc. Besides achieving a desired emission any combination of the 
previously mentioned will alter the cost functions of firms, indeed this may constitute 
heavy investment and hence affect the firm structure, profits, employment and 
competitive edge. 
For each category of polluting source the regulating authority sets standards after 
considering costs and emissions from a representative farm employing the 
technology. The criterion in considering each technological option 50  is either the 
best practicable technology, or a more stringent best available technology. As is 
apparent the word 'practicable', is open to interpretation and the authority's 
discretion, i.e. prone to political or pressure group influence. This lack of 
transparency allows the agency to set standards, a time consuming and expensive 
procedure, depending on their interpretation of available, practicable & economic 
feasibility. Even if complex regulatory TBES could be easily set, they are efficiency 
considerations as most standards are set by reference to available technology and not 
to ambient water quality. Applying uniform standards irrespective of the spatial 
location of urban population density or sensitive ecosystem is not efficient as 
potential damage is variable. In other words the reduced emissions are not worth the 
cost, as when implemented, complying sources will not have the same marginal 
Proof of an efficient and cost-effective solution of under command and control measures can be 
found in literature (Hanley et al. 1997; Ribaudo et al. 1999). 
50  Each technological option refers to a particular collection of technical management, input operation 
procedures etc. 
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abatement costs. Additionally TBESs effectively reduce incentives to innovate, as 
the emission standard is linked to a particular technology 
Other difficulties remain as there is a difference between initial and continued 
compliance. The fact that a farm has installed certain technology or stated its 
commitment to follow certain procedures equipment does not necessarily mean that 
this management intiative will be efficiently implemented in the future. Depending 
on the size of operating costs there may exist incentives to renege. The important 
point is that neither design nor performance standards achieve cost efficiency when 
marginal abatement costs vary across firms, except by chance. 
A technology and input based CAC measure is relatively simple to introduce, the 
regulator simply mandates the technology and input levels which yield the greatest 
level of expected net benefits for society. The regulator should set controls which 
account for input substitution 51  and prevent production on extra-marginal land. Again 
transaction cost considerations will result in a uniform standard with poorer 
allocative efficiency than site-specific standards. As with uniform taxation, uniform 
standards result in low abatement cost farms using more polluting generating inputs 
and less polluting abating inputs than is efficient. The opposite is true of firms with 
high pollution abatement costs. Thus the disadvantages of using CAC measures 
include: 
Unlike under uniform taxation, marginal per acre profits are not equated 
across farms under uniform standards. 
They are not self-adjusting under changing economic or environmental 
conditions. The regulator must alter the standard as required. 
As they do not provide an incentive to use the socially optimum amount of 
inputs and technology, farmer decisions must be monitored at all times to 
ensure compliance. This can be extremely costly. 
51 placing mandatory controls on easily observed inputs may result in substitution distortions and even 
result in more pollution generation (Eiswerth 1991). 
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d) They leave producers with little freedom regarding their production and 
pollution control choices, thus limiting their ability to utilise their unique site-
specific knowledge. 
In general CAC control measures are inflexible as they limit the ability of farmers to 
use their knowledge and do not provide incentives to comply with the socially 
optimal outcomes. 
3.13 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the characteristics of NPS nitrate pollution as an economic 
externality. It also stated the NPS pollution policy first-best efficiency and second-
best cost-effective conditions to ensure optimal regulation. The relative performance 
of economic (performance and design based instruments) and non-economic 
approaches (education) to regulating NPS nitrate pollution and their subcategories 
have been discussed. The major characteristics of each regulatory policy was detailed 
and debated on the basis of its 1) relative efficiency, 2) informational requirements, 
3) relative complexity, 4) potential administrative and enforcement costs (i.e. 
transaction costs), and their 5) flexibility relative to changes in the economic and 
environmental conditions. 
Performance based measures are generally infeasible at present because of the 
difficulty of observing nonpoint-source emissions and the information requirements 
placed on producers. Overall it can be concluded that it is the characteristics of NPS 
pollution (i.e. heterogeneous, stochastic etc.) and the practical considerations of 
second-best policies (due to transaction costs and political feasibility etc.) which 
favour the adoption of multiple instrument regulation policy. 
Given the numerous instruments available and the site specific nature of NPS nitrate 
pollution it is apparent that the choice of regulatory policy should only be decided 
after an empirical analysis of the catchment. The next chapter details empirical 
studies to regulate NPS pollution in the economic literature at both the farm and 
catchment level. 
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Appendix 52 3.1 
Cost-Effective Solution Based on Mean Ambient Standard 
The regulator's problem can be written as: 
Max J=2rj(xj,Ai) 	 (EQ-6) 
xjj, Ai , n 	i=1 
subject to: 
E{a}!!~ a0 	 (EQ-7) 
where a0 is an exogenously specified ambient standard, and the Lagrangian is: 
L=(x, Ai ) + 2[ao —E{a}] 	 (EQ-8) 
where 2 is the Lagrangian multiplier. Assuming an interior solution the first-order 
conditions with respect to input use and number of sites are: 
Vi,j 	(EQ-9) 
X,j 	iXjj 	IL 	xjIj 
AL 
= ir, —2E{Aa}= 0 	 (EQ-b) 
An 
where Aa = a(r1 ..., r, ,w)- a(ri ..., ' -1 , W). The shadow value A is the value of the 
optimal tax/subsidy rate when producers and regulator have the same expectations 
regarding the nonpoint process. Finally the optimal technology vector,A*, is 
determined by solving for an optimal allocation for each possible value of A and 
comparing aggregate profits. The optimal technology vector satisfies the condition: 
52 Note: The notation in this appendix leads on from the first-best solution listed in the main text of 
chapter 3. 
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L(A*)_L(A)~! OVA 	 (EQ-li) 
this implies that the following must hold: 
_2E{a(ri ,..., I, ri., *I,,.. *,W)l 
	
Vi, VA (EQ-12) 
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Appendix53 3.2 
Cost-Effective Solution Based on Mean Runoff Standards 
The Lagrangian corresponding to the maximisation of eq-i subject to 
E{rj!5 rj0Vi is: 
L = JTi (x1 , Ai ) +1 2[, - E{i }] 	 (EQ- 13) 
where, rj0 is an exogenously specified runoff standard and A1 is the Lagrangian 
multiplier for the ith runoff constraint. Assuming an interior solution the first-order 




	 (EQ- 15) 
The shadow values Ai equal the optimal tax/subsidy rates when farmers and 
regulators have the same expectation about the NPS process. EQ -14, is a condition 
which implies the same conditionality as EQ - 2, however marginal costs are 
expressed as a constraint as opposed to actual damages. Similarly, constraint EQ -15 
reduces to a zero profit condition for the marginal site. 
As with an ambient standard the following two conditions regarding the optimal 
technology vector, A*,  are determined by solving for an optimal allocation for each 
possible value of A and comparing aggregate profits. 
53 
Note: The notion in this appendix leads on from the first-best solution listed in the main text of 
chapter 3. 
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L(A*)_L(A)~! OVA 	 (EQ- 16) 
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Appendix54 3.3 
Cost-Effective Solution based on Input Use 
Input standards may be defined in terms of either site-specific input use or aggregate 
input use within a catchment. The former case is considered. Let zi denote the 
(rn _i) vector of inputs for which there are standards, and let yi  be the (Im — mjxi) 
vector of inputs for which there are no regulator restrictions (i.e. standards). Thus the 
inputs on which standards apply are defined as: 
	
Zj 	Vi,j 	 (EQ— 18) 
where 	is the standard limit on thejth input on the ith site. These standards may be 
either stated in absolute terms or as probabilistic constraints. The Lagrangian which 
corresponds to the maximisation of EQ - 6 subject to EQ - 18 will be: 
n 	 n 171 
2,1[z0 — z] 	(EQ— 19) 
i—I 	 i—lj=1 
where 	is the Lagrangian multiplier for the jUi input constraint for the ith site. 
Assuming an interior solution, the first order solutions with respect to input use and 




Note: The notion in this appendix leads on from the first-best solution listed in the main text of 
chapter 3. 




—=----=O vi, j 	 (EQ-21) 
ay1 vjj 
AL 
—r,1 —2,1 [o—E}]O 	 (EQ-22) 
An 
the shadow values Aij represent the optimal incentive rates for input use which 
should result in social welfare maximisation. EQ -20, is a conditions which implies 
the same conditionality as EQ - 2, however marginal costs are expressed as a 
constraint as opposed to actual damages. 
,Ti(xi(A*)A*)—zi (xi (A')A' )> 
[,Iij (A*~ij (A*)- Aij (Ai ) A; )i,vA; 
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Empirical Studies of NPS Pollution Control 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews empirical studies of NPS pollution control. The previous 
chapter outlined various theoretical economic and non-economic instruments to 
control diffuse pollution. However it should be apparent that in practice no one 
policy can be deemed most cost-effective without considering the site-specific 
physical and informational characteristics of the polluted control area. 
Given the information asymmetry between regulators and farmers and the presence 
of transaction costs the possibility of an ex ante efficient solution is virtually 
impossible (Smith and Tomasi 1995) and the choice of a second-best solution is quite 
clearly an empirical issue (Dunn and Shortle 1988; Helfand and House 1995). 
Some commentators (Constanza et al. 1995) have argued that there are three 
necessary criteria to judge an integrated modelling framework, i.e. realism, precision 
and generality. The first two considerations relate to simulating system behaviour in 
a qualitatively and quantitatively precise way respectively, while the generality refers 
to the range of system behaviour. More importantly they argue that no single model 
can maximise all these goals concurrently as there are fundamental trade-offs 
involved in modelling these criteria. Thus such trade-off in objectives must be clearly 
defined as they determine the modelling approach. Most empirical works trade-off 
realism with generality and use their results to investigate the overall magnitude and 
direction of change. 
Some empirical work relies on a production function approach, or a bio-physical 
simulation model integrated with an economic mathematical programming 
framework (linear and nonlinear), some studies have relied on a multi-objective 
programming framework to consider the interaction between multiple pollutants, 
while others have used chance constrained or probabilistic programming to deal with 
the stochastic nature of pollutant transport. Fewer researchers have used dynamic 
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programming. Studies also differ in their particular emphasis, i.e. some are 
concerned with spatial aspects (zoning), while others with the interaction between 
different inputs, or surface/groundwater interaction, other with transaction costs, 
equity considerations, uncertainty, temporal issues etc. 
Following the distinction in the literature, the empirical studies reviewed below have 
been divided into disaggregate (site specific farm or catchment level models) and 
aggregate (regional or national level) models. Additionally it is important to 
recognise the insight offered by empirical works not utilising economic instruments 
as control measures. Such studies can be of considerable interest to economists if 
they use novel/complex modelling techniques or integrate realistic biophysical 
considerations and interdependency between polluting decisions/outcomes. It is for 
this reason that some empirical studies not utilising economic instruments have been 
discussed at the end of each section. Certain differentiating or interesting aspects of 
some empirical studies in this chapter are indicated by italicised headings. 
42 Disaggregate Models 
Disaggregate models involve the use of a biophysical simulation mode 155  linked with 
a mathematical programming model representing the economic incentives and policy 
scenarios. Such models are most commonly found in the literature and can be 
divided on the basis of their scale into farm (field) level and catchment (or 
watershed) level models. 
It is interesting to note that earlier models of NPS pollution were predominantly at 
the catchment scale. Studies which have not used economic instruments have been 
discussed if they have used a novel methodology or if their results offer insights of 
use to regulators, e.g. using a mixed integer programming framework with 
stochastic specification (Halstead et al. 1991) or the use of stochastic environmental 
risk modelling (Teague et al. 1995). 
55 A model of natural processes pertaining to animal husbandry and crop growth. 
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4.3 Farm level Disaggregate Models 
A relatively simple investigation of the effects of alternative crop rotations on 
nitrogen leaching to groundwater from corn cultivation in Iowa (US) under the US 
Food Security Act (1985) was undertaken (Huang and Uri 1992). The 7 crop 
rotations considered, involved combinations of corn, soybean and meadow 
plantation. The other measures they considered included a) elimination of current 
price support programme, b) corn sales tax, c) nitrogen tax, d) nitrogen quota. They 
estimated the farmer's compliance cost to reduce 'excess nitrogen' i.e. the difference 
between the total amount of nitrogen applied from all sources to one acre of cropland 
and the amount of nitrogen removed by corps at the end of the growing season. Their 
results show that crop rotation patterns which limit nitrogen fertiliser use impose the 
lowest cost to farming while the sales tax is most costly. 
A very simple study of nitrate pollution from a single crop in Finland adapted a 
nitrogen loss function from the literature and compared a nitrogen tax, nitrogen quota 
and product price reduction (Miettinen 1993). It concluded that nitrogen quotas were 
the least cost farm level control policy. 
Another simple one dimension hydrological model of nitrate leaching for a single 
crop in Norway investigated the impact of nitrogen fertiliser taxation (Botterweg et 
al. 1994). They estimate that a 200 - 350% increase in nitrogen input price is 
required to bring about a significant reduction in leaching. However a lower input tax 
may confer indirect benefits due to input substitution in favour of manure which is 
less polluting in principle and confers other ecological benefits such as improving 
soil structure and biomass content. 
Multiple Production Function Specifications 
One study (Sumelius 1994a) researched the ability of economic instruments to 
control NPS nitrogen pollution in Finland. He examined four policy alternatives a) a 
nitrogen tax which approximately doubled the price of nitrogen, b) a 50% output tax, 
c) a mixed instrument combing fertiliser and output taxation, d) a per ha fertiliser 
quota. He estimated the crop production function for 2 crops and derived a leaching 
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function from the literature. The results established 1) the overall efficiency of input 
taxation 2) the product and fertiliser tax combination is more efficient than the 
product tax alone, but less than the nitrogen tax or quota, 3) yield is not that 
responsive to fertiliser price increases or product price decreases, 4) yields are 
reduced most by N quotas. 
More interestingly he examined the relative ranking of instruments based on different 
production function specifications i.e. quadratic polynomial (y = ax + bx 2 + cx 3 ), a 
square 	root 	polynomial 	(y = a Jx + bx +...), 	and 	Mitscherlich 
(y = Ynax [i - exp(— a - bx)]) - where x is the nitrogen input. He discovered that 
under a Mitscherlich specification nitrogen taxation was the most efficient, however 
under a quadratic specification it was ranked below the nitrogen quota. However the 
remaining policy options were not affected by production function specification. 
Additionally in deriving the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves he illustrates 
how the most cost-effective instruments are those which are directed at reducing high 
initial N leakages. Unlike Kampas (Kampas and White 2002) he believes a change in 
cropping area may impact more on leakages than a change in fertiliser intensity. 
Mixed Integer Linear Programming Framework 
Another study (Swinton and Clark 1994) evaluated policies to reduce nitrate leaching 
using a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model. They modelled a 500 ha 
farm growing five crops at 1993 prices on sandy loam soils under two crop rotations 
in Michigan. They assumed that 40% of the applied mineral nitrogen fertiliser is 
leached as nitrate, leaching occurs in the year of fertiliser application and that 
biologically fixed nitrogen does not leach at all. They examined the following five 
policies: a) obligatory use of the US integrated farm management programme b) a 
nitrogen fertiliser tax, c) a 'quasi deficiency' payment for specified crop rotations, d) 
a tax credit (subsidy) for nitrogen predicted to be fixed biologically by rotational 
crops, e) elimination of current price support (deficiency payments) programme. 
They concluded that the last option was the most efficient 'second-best' policy to 
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contain nitrogen leaching from both a private and government perspective (financial 
only). 
On a cautionary note they emphasise that the results are limited by the specification 
of price/cost relationships, technical parameters and that they ignore general 
equilibrium or 'second-round' effects on future relative prices. They advocate better 
crop and soil fertility management, i.e. introducing cover crops, which can 
potentially reduce soil erosion and leaching by 'improving nitrogen uptake during 
the crop season and immobilizing soil nitrogen during the off season' (Swinton and 
Clark 1994). A summary of farm level NPS control empirical studies is presented in 
table 4.1. 
4.3.1 Farm Studies without Economic Instruments 
Mixed Integer and Stochastic 
A mixed integer programming model of a representative dairy farm in Virginia (US) 
was used to determine the impact of stochastic constraints on nitrate groundwater 
loadings (Halstead et al. 1991). Their study linked an economic sub-model of 3 crops 
and manure management with 20 year CREAMS (Chemicals, Runoff and Erosion 
from Agricultural Management Systems ) simulation model (Kinsel and Walter 
1980) which utilises slope, tillage practices, and temperature besides soil type and 
rainfall. CREAMS cannot model movement to or within the groundwater system - it 
only modelled nutrients to the end of the root zone. 
The authors advocate the use of stochastic constraint specification because nitrate 
contamination is subject to stochastic 'pulses' or variability both within and between 
years, due to the weather and management processes. Using probabilistic constraints 
they analysed a 20% and 40% reduction at the 80% and 90% confidence level. Not 
surprisingly their results show that a stochastic specification can increase regulation 
costs above a deterministic one (the cost increasing with constraint tightening), and 
that this extra cost is an 'insurance' against chance violation of the loading 
constraint. They propose that policy makers should consider a 'two tiered' standard 
comprising of the average annual nitrate standard and a probabilistic bound on its 
violation. 
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MOTAD Risk Analysis 
A study of stochastic environmental risk from nitrate and pesticide pollution 
modelled a farm in Oklahoma (US) (Teague et al. 1995). They used a target 
MOTAD programme for producers who wished to maximise net expected returns, 
but were concerned about maintaining environmental risk indices (both surface and 
ground water) for pesticides and nitrates below critical targets. Stochastic measures 
of environmental risk can produce different prescriptions from deterministic ones, as 
the probability distribution of nitrate percolation is often skewed, i.e. the expected 
value of nitrate loading may not be high but the probability of a large nitrate 
emission might be. 
The research used EPIC-PST 56  to generate nitrate and pesticide emissions, as well as 
crop production using actual 20 year weather data. Some 5000 production activities 
differing in terms of nutrient use, irrigation scheduling and pesticide strategy (a 
minimum of 6 herbicides and 8 insecticides) were included for each of the 3 crops 
grown on 2 soil types. Three target percentage reductions of 25%, 50% and 75% 
were imposed to determine the trade-off between net returns and environmental risk 
by imposing restrictions on the pesticide environmental index, nitrate environmental 
index and both indices together. 
The permitted farmer responses included 1) re-allocating land to production on 
heavier soils, 2) crop substitution, 3) reducing per acre nitrogen applications, and 4) 
increased use of fallow rotations. Results showed that although indices involve value 
judgements and assumptions, overall expected income is more sensitive to nitrate 
loading restrictions than to pesticide loading restrictions. They also confirm the 
difference between stochastic and deterministic model specification. 
Overall it should be noted that the production function approach, prevalent in the 
early literature, assumes that the intensive margin effects of policies are more 
important than the extensive margin ones. However in reality there is considerable 
56 A mixture of EPIC (Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator) and GLEAMS (Groundwater Loading 
Effects of Agricultural Management Systems) 
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input substitution between land and fertiliser application (Bouzaher and Shorgen 
1995). Secondly, two problems with farm level studies are apparent a) how does one 
define a representative farm, and b) how can the effects of a policy at farm level be 
aggregated or extended beyond farm boundaries? For this and other reasons 
researchers have turned to catchment-scale studies. 
4.4 Catchment level Disaggregate Models 
One of the earliest works to empirically test the least cost property of economic 
instruments at the catchment level modelled the San Joaquin valley in California 57 
(Homer 1975). The study involved comparing the cost of water treatment for nitrates 
with that of a tax on nitrogen fertiliser. A nitrate loss function was econometrically 
established from data from 38 tile drains in the valley. This was linked with a multi-
period linear programming model which maximised the present value of future 
returns to the management of the land. The study concluded that the cost of treatment 
exceeded the cost of control. Similar results were established by latter work (Braden 
et al. 1994) which concluded that within certain risk parameters nitrate pollution 
from agriculture is more cost-effectively prevented than treated, i.e. removed from 
drinking water. 
A catchment level model of the River Gipping (England) compared the cost-
effectiveness of two types of a marketable pollution permit system with a regulatory 
standard to control nitrate leaching (Hartley 1986). The nitrate leaching model was 
combined with a linear programming model. The first permit system was an overall 
catchment reduction in nitrate fertiliser usage, while the second was based on 
specific reductions in the nitrate concentration of the catchment area's water supply. 
Not surprisingly both permit systems were more cost-effective than the standard, 
however under the second MPP system a standard was more efficient for really 
stringent compliance levels. Other early studies of NPS pollution at the 
watershed/catchment level modelled sediment loses (Lovejoy and Lee 1985) and 
sediments with nutrients (Kramer et al. 1984) using a basin segmentation approach. 
57 Subsequent studies on diffuse nitrogen pollution modelled this valley as well (Helfand 1995; Larson 
et al. 1996) 
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Spatial Variability 
Miltz et.al. (Miltz et al. 1988) question the superiority of a uniform discharge tax 
over a uniform discharge standard in the presence of spatial variability. They 
modelled diffuse sediment loadings into a watershed in Illinois (US) using a 
simulation model called SEDEC which estimates farm budgets, soil loss, sediment 
delivery and spatial considerations of land management. 
Although an emission tax encourages firms with low MACs to reduce discharges, if 
the firm's contribution to ambient pollution at the receptor site is low i.e. they have 
low transfer coefficients (i.e. if there is a positive correlation between MAC and 
transfer coefficients) then the discharge tax is not always superior. This analysis does 
not 	consider transaction costs. Secondly, the greater the transfer coefficient 58 
variance relative to the MAC variance the more likely the occurrence of a 'cross-
over'. This study acknowledges and relies on previous work by Nichols (Nichols 
1984) to explain its results. 
Land Use Permits 
A model of ground water nitrogen pollution in the Cambridge chalk (England) 
combined a hydro-geological model with a linear programming model (Pan and 
Hodge 1994). They assume there are 12 land use activities and four nitrogen 
fertilising regimes in the catchment, and that farmers follow ADAS farm 
management practices. They utilise average annual percolation rates and soil 
conditions thus the variation in leaching within and between years is not accounted 
for. The objective of the study was to find a cost-effective means to meet the EU 
limit on drinking water nitrate concentration. The limit was converted into a per 
hectare annual nitrogen load by simplifying and assuming various physical factors. 
The three policy options examined were a) a fertiliser input tax, and b) a tax on 
nitrate leaching and c) land use permits. The last option is a simple permit system, 
assuming the total catchment leaching corresponding to the standard and the nitrate 
58 The transfer coefficient is the sediment delivery ratio in this study. 
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leaching per hectare from different land uses (based on soil type and land use) can be 
estimated. Such a system requires that the regulator monitor land use and permit 
holdings. 
Their results indicate that land use permits are more efficient that fertiliser taxation 
but not as efficient as pigouvian taxation. This ranking was achieved after tax 
payments are returned to farmers as transfer payments. Overall they are critical of 
fertiliser taxation because: a) inelastic demand for fertiliser; and b) there may not be 
a direct link between nitrogen application and leaching, e.g. legumes. The potential 
transaction cost savings of land use permits is examined in later works (Hodge 
1997). 
Irrigation 
The following 5 empirical studies investigate the control of irrigation water 
restriction on nitrogen leaching. 
An early study of economic instruments to regulate nitrate and leaching and soil 
erosion examined controls on both irrigation water and nitrogen application (Pfeiffer 
and Whittlesey 1978). The authors incorporated an annual sediment and nitrate 
leaching loss function in a linear programming model of the Yakima Basin (US). 
Their results indicate that irrigation taxes are superior to nitrogen taxes and that a 
combination of both is better than separately taxing each alone. 
Johnson et.al. (Johnson et al. 1991) investigated the on-farm costs of ground water 
nitrogen pollution control in Oregon (US), where the climate is semi and and 
irrigation is required. Their model consisted of a) a plant simulation model (CERES) 
to estimate yield, soil water and nitrogen balances, b) a two state dynamic optimising 
model for scheduling irrigation and fertilising decisions for each crop, and c) a linear 
programming model to account for the rotational constraints on a representative 
farm. In the model four main crops 59  were grown on two soil types and it was 
59 They were unable to run CERES for alfalfa due to lack of data. Therefore although yield estimates 
were included in the analysis it was assumed there is no nitrate leaching from alfalfa. 
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assumed that farmers knew with certainty the current fertility and moisture states. 
They primarily tested three policies: a 100% input tax, a pigouvian or leachate tax, 
and optimal timing and application of water and nitrogen inputs. They found leachate 
taxation to be more efficient that input taxation but doubted its practical applicability 
due to monitoring and enforcement costs. They found the elasticity of demand for 
nitrogen fertiliser to be low, i.e. high input taxes are required to substantially reduce 
nitrate leaching. 
They concluded that optimal timing and application of fertiliser and irrigation water, 
would result in less total nitrate leaching, a slight increase in yields, and greater 
profit for the crops and irrigation technology modelled. Under their optimal solution 
the number of fertiliser applications was 2- 3 times higher under current practices. 
In testing the effect of site-specific information i.e. soil heterogeneity, a study 
compared the effect of uniform and targeted input taxation to reduce nitrate leaching 
from lettuce production on two soil types in the Salinas Valley (US) (Helfand and 
House 1995). One soil type is less porous, requires less irrigation water and nitrogen 
fertiliser. Given that farmers are able to distinguish the two soil types the more 
porous one leaches more nitrogen not just because of its physical characteristics but 
also because of farmer's differential nitrogen applications rates. They used the 
Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator (EPIC) to estimate nitrate effluent and crop 
production functions and incorporated them into a linear mathematical programme 
written in GAMS. Assuming an equal distribution of head lettuce (main crop) fields 
for each soil type and a regulatory objective of 20% reduction in estimated nitrate 
runoff per acre, they examined the following policies, a) tax both inputs, uniformly 
across soil types, b) a uniform reduction in levels of input use, c) tax either water or 
nitrogen uniformly across soil types, d) limit either water or nitrogen use uniformly 
across soil types. These were compared relative to separate input taxes for both 
inputs and soil types - the theoretical optimal, yet practically infeasible solution. 
Their results concluded that 1) taxing irrigation water is clearly more efficient tht 
taxing nitrogen aninput, 2) the efficiency difference between taxing water, both 
inputs or even separate taxes for each was not significant. Thus they conclude the 
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efficiency gain of targeted spatial taxation is limited, and that uniform imperfect 
instruments may not always impose higher social costs. As the model did not include 
transaction costs they point out that it is not possible to rank the practical efficiency 
of instruments and that as more heterogeneity is included in the analysis the social 
cost of uniform instruments is likely to increase. 
Helfand reports virtually the same study in another paper but emphasises the near 
equity in economic efficiency between the water and emission tax (Helfand 1995). 
Similar results were reported in yet another paper (Larson et al. 1996). However it 
must be noted NPS nitrogen pollution need not be most efficiently controlled 
elsewhere by restricting or taxing irrigation water alone. Leaching is an extremely 
complicated, climate-dependent process, and these studies ignore the variability in 
weather between years, e.g. the occurrence of a random high rainfall event. 
Another study utilising EPIC considers nitrate pollution controls in the presence of 
irrigation in a semi and Monegros—Flumen region of Spain (Murillo et al. 
2001).There is no explicit reference to the target reduction in nitrate leaching, 
presumably because EU limits are implicitly assumed. The model accounts for 6 
crops irrigated with surface water. Although the authors state that relevant soils, 
tillage and farm operations were included in the analysis, details are not mentioned. 
The study compares three production function specifications a) polynomial (allows 
substitution between inputs), b) von Liebig (defines maximum yield, such that 
further input use does not increase yield), and c) Mitscherlich-Baule (displays both 
input substitution and maximum yield property). However due to the complexity and 
convergence problem associated with the Mitscherlich-Baule functional form the 
polynomial was used. 
Three scenarios are examined a) increase in water prices b) increase in nitrogen 
prices c) a standard restriction on nitrogen use. A water price increase reduces 
percolation and nitrate leaching substantially (50 - 60%) but at high cost to farmers. 
Additionally the authors identify the problem of salt accumulation on the surface of 
certain soils if water use is reduced. An increase in the price of nitrogen reduces 
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percolation as much as the first policy but nitrogen leaching falls by only 26 - 36%. 
The cost to farmers is lower than under the water price increase. Lastly a standard on 
nitrogen use proves to be the most cost-effective in reducing nitrogen leaching (62%) 
and percolation (50%) with the lowest reduction in farmer's net margin. However 
their analysis does not include transaction costs, and they recognise the difficultly of 
enforcing a nitrogen standard. They recommend that monitoring and enforcement 
responsibility should be assigned at the district level through water quality 
measurements of irrigation district return flows. How the district authorities can 
differentiate between farmers in this way was not mentioned. 
The authors also analysed the introduction of better irrigation technology i.e. sprinkle 
irrigation. They found sprinkle irrigation to be extremely efficient as water and 
nitrogen utilisation does not fall, net margin increases, but percolation and nitrate 
leaching is reduced by 37 and 61% respectively. They estimate that the cost of 
introducing the new irrigation technology is substantially prohibitive and government 
incentives should be provided. 
Another study of irrigated crops in Spain (Cordoba) examined the trade-off between 
foregone compliance cost and environmental benefits by using a multi-objective 
programming framework (Zerki and Herruzo 1994). The multi-objectives of the 
problem included a) maximising gross margin, b) minimising nitrogen leachate, c) 
minimising nitrogen fertiliser applications and d) minimising drainage water 
applications. They used the NTRM simulation model to estimate the drain flow and 
nitrate emissions for different combinations of management practices. Their results 
show that the voluntary adoption of best management practices yield a reduction of 
losses ranging between 6 - 21%, whereas considerably high nitrogen taxation is 
required to achieve the same level of abatement. The interesting policy option of 
taxing drainage water proved more efficient than the nitrogen input tax. Although 
easier to monitor than leaching, in practice tracing the drainage water to the source 
field/farmer is not possible over a large spread of land. 
Targeted (Spatial Variation) 
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A study of groundwater nitrate pollution in Oregon (US) assessed the importance of 
spatial variance in physical parameters in the design of a regulatory tax policy 
(Fleming and Adams 1997). They modelled five major crops grown on four soil 
groups, where all representative farms within a soil zone are treated identical. The 
dynamic modelling was complicated and comprised of three sub-models: a) an 
economic model which maximises profits subject to an exogenous regulatory policy; 
b) a one dimensional sub-model which simulates the movement and transformation 
of nitrates from irrigated land; and c) a groundwater transport model which tracks 
loading and movement of nitrates within the aquifer. 
The research examined the effect of a spatially differentiated tax based on soil 
zoning, i.e. each zone is taxed differently but farmers within each zone are taxed the 
same. Their results concluded that the efficiency gains from introducing spatially 
differentiated taxation based on soil types are negligible and likely to disappear on 
considering the associated transaction costs. 
The hydrological model sets it apart from the Helfand studies where the objective 
was to control the quantity of nitrate leached into the root zone - this does not 
necessarily translate into actual groundwater concentration due to dilution, delay and 
groundwater flow. Another difference is that this study did not consider any 
irrigation water controls. This study is also very interesting because it highlights the 
complexities of the real world. The model calculated that once a tax is introduced it 
takes 5 to 10 years for soil water nitrate concentrations to return to a steady state, but 
groundwater nitrate concentrations require approximately 118 years to achieve 
stability 601 
Multiple Pollutants 
There has also been research which attempts to integrate policy controls of nitrogen, 
phosphorus and sediment (soil erosion) (Vatn et al. 1997). The authors contend that 
the degree of interaction (interdisciplinary) and resolution of their model 
6()  Where stability is defined as the state where the annual change in concentration across all cells is 
less than 0.3 parts per million. 
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ECECMOD, is comparable in sophistication with CEEPES (Bouzaher and Shorgen 
1995) and NERC/ESRC Land Use Programme or NELUP (NELUP 2000). 
ECECMOD is comprehensive, comprises of various non-linear sub-models, and 
accounts for spatial factors such as topography and farm position, besides agronomic 
practices such as tillage options, manure handling and spring-time management. It is 
realistic because its decision procedure is consistent with how information about the 
growing season is sequentially revealed to the farmer in practice; thus decisions are 
based on expected (average year) considerations. The study area is South Eastern 
Norway and the regulatory objective is that N and P must be reduced by 50%. The 
policies analysed are a) a 100% tax on N input, b) a 50% arable land requirement on 
catch crops/grass cover, and c) a per ha subsidy for spring tillage/ no tillage. 
The results show that the input tax is the least costly in terms of the per hectare and 
per kg reduction in N leached; whereas catch crops are most costly, however the 
introduction of catch crops do control P and soil erosion considerably. In combining 
catch crop requirement and input tax they found the combined effect was less than 
the sum of their separate effects. Whereas the tax (reducing N losses) and spring 
tillage (effecting soil erosion) combination does work without reducing their separate 
effects. 
Cost Benefit Analysis 
A study of an catchment in Ontario (Canada) compared the benefits and costs of 
nitrate pollution reduction (Giraldez and Fox 1995). The benefit of water quality 
improvement was derived from estimates of toxicological and epidemiological data 
from the literature. CREAMS was used to simulate surface runoff, root zone leaching 
and thus enable estimation of the on-farm cost of improving water quality. They 
conclude that a 55% nitrogen input tax is sufficient to induce optimal abatement. In 
addition they estimate that the on-farm cost of nitrate abatement and the cost of using 
bottled water is less than the off-farm benefits of nitrate abatement. 
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Transaction Costs and Stochastic 
A study of the Kennet catchment in England examined the affect of transaction or 
administrative costs on the policy ranking of instruments to control NPS nitrogen 
pollution (Kampas and White 2002). Farm heterogeneity is modelled through 3 
different soil types which were determined using GIS mapping. Two biophysical 
simulation models (NCYCLE and SUNDIAL) along with a simple hydrological 
model (TOPCAT) were used to generate production and emission functions (it was 
assumed that emissions were log normal in distribution) which were incorporated in 
a stochastic non-linear programming model written in GAMS. They used certain 
simplifying assumptions regarding the drainage volume carrying the nitrogen load to 
the subsoil, and in the conversion of the EU water nitrate concentration standard 
(mg/liter) into an equivalent per hectare load (kg). The policies analysed included 
emission permits and taxes, uniform and targeted input quotas, nitrogen tax, land tax, 
and setaside restrictions. They used some questionable 'best available proxies' for 
administrative costs based on the per hectare cost estimate of current agri-
environmental schemes. Their instrument ranking is based on social costs, i.e. 
abatement or resource cost (tax payments are considered transfer payments and 
excluded) plus administrative or transaction costs. 
Their results show a) price control policies outperform quantity control policies for 
both emission and input restrictions, b) they report modest improvements with the 
use of targeted input quotas, c) if considering only abatement costs emission taxation 
is the most efficient and land retirement is the most costly option and d) in terms of 
social costs nitrogen input taxation is the most cost-effective control option. 
A noteworthy finding of the study was that the policy ranking varied depending on 
the required regulatory stringency. For example setaside is an extremely costly 
control at high regulatory reliability (i.e. greater required likelihood of achieving 
standard) however at lower reliability is ranking improves. Their results show that 
the abatement cost of different control regulations do not exhibit 'cross-over' (unlike 
the previous findings based on spatial differences (Miltz et al. 1988)), but the 
administrative cost frontiers do intercept. 
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Spatial Zones 
Utilising Geographical Information Systems (GIS) a British study (Moxey and White 
1994) divided the Tyne catchment (England) into land classes (based on soil type, 
climate and gradient) and two hydrological zones (or two sub catchment boundaries). 
Five year average nitrogen response and emission coefficients for different 
production activities were estimated using EPIC and incorporated into a linear 
programming model. It was assumed that nitrate emissions were only diluted by the 
flow of discharged leachate (i.e. there was no ground water contribution and that 
river flow is comprised of mainly surface water) and carried to the receptor point in 
the lower zone by a delivery ratio of one (for upland to lowland). Their regulator 
objective was to meet the EC Nitrate Directive standard, and they examined three 
different quota systems a) tradable emission quotas, b) tradable nitrogen quotas and 
c) targeted nitrogen quotas for each land class, with no trade between classes 
They found that a nitrate emission quota was the most efficient, followed by the 
targeted nitrogen quota outperforming the uniform quota by a margin which 
increases as the abatement requirement increases. However no transaction costs 
estimates were included in the analysis. Research has also highlighted the potential 
benefit of using GIS for accurate integrated modelling at the regional/national level 
by linking the microparameter distribution model and GIS (Opaluch and Segerson 
1991). Overall there is considerable interest in the use of GIS (Cook and Norman 
1996; Moxey 1996). 
Groundwater Aquifer 
A study of the US southern high plains overlaying the Ogallala aquifer (Wu et al. 
1995) compared the use of the following policies to control ground water nitrogen 
leaching: a) a per-acre nitrogen restriction; b) nitrogen input tax; c) tax on irrigation 
water; and d) incentives to use modern irrigation technology. As the semi-arid study 
area has diverse physical features it was mapped using GIS and split into two sub-
regions. Nitrogen runoff and leaching from 4 crops (plus summer fallow) grown on 4 
representative soils, using 4 different irrigation technologies, phosphorus, nitrogen 
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and pesticides was determined by running EPIC-PST by inputing 20 years actual 
weather data. 
The above mentioned four policies were ranked both in terms of changes in farm 
income and social welfare. Results show that incentives to farmers to adopt irrigation 
technology outperformed all other policies overall from both society's and farmer's 
perspective. From society's perspective nitrogen input taxation is preferred over 
nitrogen input quotas which farmers prefer because they have lower compliance 
costs. Consistent with other empirical studies they found the demand for nitrogen 
was very inelastic. 
The paper admits that policies which reduce expected nitrogen losses might not 
reduce 'spikes' in emissions in the event of high rainfall. However they argue that 
groundwater acts as a buffer and these spikes are not transferred to the consumer, 
thus 'mean nitrogen runoff and leaching are useful indicators of surface and 
groundwater contamination potential'. This is true of nitrate leaching to groundwater 
but not surface water runoff (Shortle et al. 1998; Shortle and Horan 2001). A 
summary of catchment level NPS control empirical studies is presented in table 4.2. 
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4.4.1 Catchment Studies without Economic Instruments 
Nutrients, Pesticides, Sediments and Stochastic 
A seminal work not utilising environmental instruments comprehensively modelled 
a watershed using a stochastic programming framework to generate probability 
distributions of nitrogen, phosphorus, pesticides and sediments pollution (both loads 
and concentration) to surface and groundwater from agriculture (Milon 1987). Milon 
was interested in the surface/ground water interaction resulting from control policies. 
The example sited is that of conservation tillage which: 
'substitutes increased herbicide and pesticide usage for conventional cultivation 
practices. By reducing water runoff however, conservation tillage increases 
subsuiface water recharge and increased likelihood of groundwater contamination' 
(Milon 1987). 
This study is also unique because it was the first study to relate field losses to flow 
rates and receiving surface and groundwater quality (concentration). One earlier 
work of the Great Lakes (US) used a mass balance model to calculate surface water 
phosphorus concentrations (Chapra et al. 1983). Milon used PRZM, STREAM and 
AT123D models to estimate pesticide and sediment concentrations whereas HSPF 
was used to determine phosphorus and nitrates concentrations entering receiving 
water bodies. These relationships were incorporated in a stochastic optimising 
framework developed some 24 years earlier (Charnes and Cooper 1963). 
A basin in Ohio was modelled as 4 soil types grown on 3 crops for 29 years actual 
weather, utilising 3 tillage practices, various combinations of 8 pesticides, herbicides, 
nutrient levels and crops rotations. Various reliability levels of reductions from the 
baseline scenario were examined. Although no economic instrument was explicitly 
modelled the study concludes a) that in determining the offset ratio in a 
point/nonpoint trading policy a consistent reliability criteria should be applied across 
all sources, b) the control of one environmental externality can have detrimental 
impacts on the level of another (there is a trade-off). 
Spatial Modelling 
A study of the dairy farms in the Lower Susquehanna watershed (US) used spatial 
information (slope, proximity to water, soil type etc.)to reduce the costs of 
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controlling NPS nitrate pollution (Carpentier et al. 1998). Based on certain 
assumptions they estimated the 10 year average information, contracting and 
enforcement costs (the sum of which make up transaction costs) of implementing a 
performance based standard which aims to reduce N delivery by 40%. 237 farms are 
modelled in SUSFARM (an LP programme written in GAMS) which distinguishes 
36 crop rotations comprising of 9 crops, 4 tillage technologies, and the option of 
contour stripping. Nitrate emissions were generated in EPIC and a mixed integer 
programming model ALLOCATI was used to minimise the catchment cost of 
achieving the target reduction. Where catchment cost are the sum of compliance 
costs (approximate shadow prices of nitrate reduction on each farm) and transaction 
costs. 
Farmers had the option of reducing runoff by strip-cropping and manure 
management for both uniform and targeted policy controls. Targeted policies 
utilising spatial information (GIS and surveys etc.) reduced compliance costs by 
nearly 80% when compared to uniform policies. With targeted policies transaction 
costs were also reduced as fewer farms required contracting and enforcement of the 
performance standard. Overall total compliance costs were 75% lower with targeted 
polices. 
Sediment Movement Control 
A novel study of sediment control in Illinois (US) watershed analysed the option of 
containing the movement of emissions (Braden et al. 1989). The study used SEDEC, 
a programme which simulates profit, erosion and transport of sediments (based on 
parameters such as slope, soil type, topography, position of drainage network etc.) 
under various management practice alternatives. They modelled 3 crops, 4 crop 
rotations, six tillage practices, three structural measures to prevent sedimentation and 
set a 50% regulatory reduction target. Surprisingly crop rotations were the most 
efficient option and not structural practices - this was attributed to the gentle slopes. 
They also found strategic or targeted control measure were a lot more cost-effective. 
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Such containment is not relevant to the control of nitrates as current technology does 
not economically permit restricting the movement of nitrate emissions once 
generated. This study is mentioned because it illustrates the effectiveness of targeted 
and control policies and the importance and site specific characteristics/features. 
Integrated Control of Externalities 
Another study compared policies to control sediments from soil erosion, nitrate and 
arrazine (herbicide) leaching in a Iowa watershed. They disregard the piece-meal 
approach targeting particular water pollutants separately and stress the complex 
interaction between pollutants, e.g. increased chemical use with conservation tillage 
which may lead to reduced water quality. They address the fact that not only do 
economic and environmental objectives conflict, but that there is conflict between 
environmental objectives themselves (Lakshminarayan et al. 1995). They investigate 
these significant trade-offs using a multi criteria decision—making approach based on 
multi-attribute utility theory. To account for site-specific variability at the large scale 
without having to perform thousands of site-specific simulations, they use a 
procedure known as metamodelling6' which a simple response function fitted to the 
'biogeophysical' outputs from calibrated mathematical simulation models. They 
model a 25 million acre cropland watershed 62  in Iowa (US) by using a linear 
programme (not probabilistic or dynamic) which models 18 crop rotations, 2 
conservation, and 4 tillage practices. 
Their broad aims were to examine soil quality protection, groundwater quality 
protection and a combination of both. They concluded there was a significant trade-
off between economic and environmental goals, and even among environmental 
goals themselves. Policies targeting soil quality tend to adversely impact 
6!  A metamodel is a regression model explaining the input-output relationship of a process model. It is 
essentially a 'statistical approach which abstract away from detailed regional analysis by 
approximating outcomes of a complex process model through statistical/v validated parametric forms' 
(Bouzaher et al. 1993). 
62  A drainage basin or catchment is the area of land that drains water, sediment, dissolved materials, 
and biota to a common outlet at some point along a stream channel. If the area is large (hundreds of 
square miles) it is a drainage basin, if it is small (acres to square miles) it is a catchment. Watershed is 
technically defined as the topographical divide (drainage divide) that separates catchments. In the 
United States, a 'watershed' means a catchment and 'drainage divide' means a watershed (UCCE 
2002). 
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groundwater quality and vice versa, and thus a compromise solution can only be 
reached at high social cost. These results of significance to regulatory authorities and 
underlie the importance of integrating pollution control policies across different 
pollutants. For a discussion and empirical study of the use of metamodelling in 
investigating the comprise between elements which determine water quality 
(sediment, nutrient, chemicals, bio-toxins) see previous work by the author 
(Bouzaher et al. 1993). The need to integrate policies to control different (mutilple) 
agricultural pollutants has been emphasised by other commentators too (Connor et al. 
1995). 
Another empirical work which investigated the trade-off between groundwater 
pollution and soil erosion modelled an irrigated catchment in Oregon (US) (Connor 
et al. 1995). Their empirical work was based on integrating the relationships derived 
from CERES (nitrogen leaching model) and FUSED (sediment loss mode) into a 
multi-objective programming model. Their results highlight the need to integrate and 
coordinate the control of both sediment loss and nitrate groundwater pollution. 
Equity 
A very interesting study of atrazine (pesticide) and sediment (soil erosion) pollution 
in a watershed in Illinois (US) (primarily attributed to increased use of conservation 
tillage in a bid to control soil erosion!), utilises an indicator of equity to ensure that 
the economic burden of pollution control is distributed evenly (based on an 
exogenously specified equity indicator) between representative farms with differing 
environmental impacts (due to spatial variability and soil differences) and hence 
abatement costs (Onal et al. 1998). The equity indicator is based on absolute 
deviations from a uniform distribution of economic outcomes (each farm's income 
losses), and captures the difference in economic control costs of farms when subject 
to environmental regulation. 
Using GIS the catchment was divided into sub-basins and then seven representative 
farms, growing 3 crops on 6 different soil types (based on soil, slope, landscape 
complexes) utilising 3 different tillage practices. A chance constrained or stochastic 
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specification is used to limit atrizine runoff in a linear model written in GAMS. Their 
results show that the income distribution constraint does reduce economic efficiency, 
as expected, but the efficiency loss is less than 10% of the total costs of 
environmental regulation. The paper concludes with an ex post comparison with 
actual incentive payments to farmers in the watershed. The values of these payments 
were found to be approximately equal to the losses estimated by the model when the 
burden of regulation is equally shared among farmers. Obviously the result is 
catchment specific and depends on the stringency of standard, the required reliability, 
the degree of heterogeneity between farms and abatement cost structures 
Overall, although in regulatory terms catchment scale policy ranking is an 
improvement upon farm level results, most regulators are concerned with 
implementing and enforcing a national or regional policy. Thus it is important to 
aggregate or extend the analysis beyond catchment boundaries if possible. This of 
course involves loss of targeted or site specific information and a move towards more 
generic policy formulation. 
45 Aggregate Models 
This section will discuss empirical aggregate models which are larger in 
geographical scale than the catchment and encompass regions or national levels. A 
large study of a 48,500 sq mile Central Plains region over laying the Ogallala 
Formation (US) was modelled as five sub regions to test the potential gains of 
targeted policies to control stochastic nitrogen runoff and percolation (Mapp et al. 
1994). The model is comprehensive and accounts of alternative tillage practices, 4 
irrigation technologies at 6 levels, pesticide applications, 3 crops and 4 soil types. 
They employed EPIC-PST and MODFLOW (groundwater flow) to simulate 
production and the movement of nitrates using 20 years of actual weather data. They 
policies analysed included: a) an overall quota on nitrogen application; b) a per 
hectare nitrogen quota; c) a targeted nitrogen quota on coarser/permeable soils prone 
to leaching; and d) a targeted quantity restrictions on specific irrigation regimes 
(furrow). The results are presented as cumulative distribution functions of annual 
nitrate runoff and percolation losses. Their results show that per-acre restrictions are 
122 
Chapter 4: Empirical Studies of NPS Pollution Control 
likely to be more efficient than total nitrogen restrictions in reducing runoff and 
percolation at all reliability levels. Secondly, targeting soil types did not produce the 
expected efficiency gain due to the distribution of soils (heavier soils are dominant, 
coarser ones are few) and because producers had already moved intensive production 
off soils prone to emissions; therefore targeting production systems is better. Finally, 
the income loss under targeted policies is less than under broad ones because fewer 
total acres are targeted. They do not however consider the income distributional 
effects between individual farmers. 
Another way of aggregating site-specific pollution problem involves the use of 
microparameter distribution models (Wu and Segerson 1995a). Microparameter 
models use joint probability distributions of micro or firm/farm level parameters such 
as production and pollution functions (Opaluch and Segerson 1991). Wu and 
Segerson studied the control of groundwater nitrate pollution in Wisconsin (US) for 
which they derived acreage elasticities with respect to site-specific characteristics 
and policies to analyse the extensive margin impact of commodity programmes on 
nitrate groundwater pollution. Three polices were examined a) reduced target corn 
price, b) increase in the APR rate for corn, c) nitrogen input tax. The APR scheme is 
an annual voluntary land retirement scheme where participating farmers setaside a 
proportion of their arable land to qualify for benefits such as loans and deficiency 
payments. An interesting outcome of the approach is that it is not possible to 
calculate the social welfare impact of policies as acreage changes (extensive margin) 
cannot be immediately translated into changes in consumer or producer welfare. 
Their main finding was in favour of the policy increasing the APR payment for corn. 
In an extremely large simulation modelling exercise (Bernardo et al. 1993a; 
Bernardo et al. 1993b) researchers investigated relative efficiency of polices to 
control nitrate pollution to groundwater in the High Plains Aquifer. The terrestrial 
area of the aquifer region modelled was over 125,000 km square and spread over 5 
US states. They sub-divided the region into five agro-regions which they defined as 
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agricultural regions exhibiting similar ecological, political boundaries 63  and farming 
characteristics (soils, climate, production practices etc.). Their simulation modelling 
is comprised of a) a crop growth/pesticide and nitrate percolation and runof transport 
model (EPIC-PST), b) a regional linear mathematical programming model which 
simulates decision making over a 20 year horizon and c) a groundwater flow model 
(MODFLOW) to determine future groundwater pumping scenarios. They 
investigated the effect of: 1) a per unit acre restriction which limits nitrogen 
application by one third; 2) a total upper bound on farm nitrogen application; and 3) 
the effective banning of certain pesticides. Their results concluded that although a 
total quota was the most effective policy to control runoff losses, a per unit acre limit 
was the most effective tool to control nitrate percolation. Overall however, a total 
restriction on nitrogen pollution had a lower compliance cost to producers than a per 
unit-area restriction. 
This is a very interesting result at it implies that efficient policies to control nitrate 
pollution differ depending on the type of nitrate pollution i.e. runoff to surface water 
or percolation to groundwater. 
Some commentators have listed problems associated with aggregating data at 
regional levels (Wu and Segerson 1995b), whereas others (Constanza et al. 1995) 
have argued the inherent difficulties of aggregating ecological systems due to their 
non-linearities and irreducible complexities. 
Table 4.3 is a summary of regional NPS control Empirical studies. 
63 Although it is not necessary that agro-region boundaries correspond to political boundaries it is 
often the most practical division as economic data are reported at this level. 
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4.6 Studies Integrating Water Quality and Quantity 
Studies which do not consider the issue of water quality and quantity interaction at 
the catchment level; rather at the aquifer, field, or valley 'portion' levels are 
discussed in this last section. 
A non-economic study involving field trials and laboratory analysis of potato 
production in the US (North-Central region) investigated the impact of different 
irrigation schemes (sprinkler and drip), irrigation triggers, various sources of N and 
their timings on nitrate leaching to groundwater (Waddell et al. 2000). The study 
reports that 40% deficit irrigation, five N applications splits, drip irrigation, reduced 
N leaching significantly and has a minimal impact on potato tuber yield and quality. 
Thus it can be concluded that irrigation and nitrogen management has a definite 
impact on the control of nitrogen leaching to groundwater under potato cultivation. 
Another study of cotton production in a 'portion' of the San Joaquin Valley (US) 
investigated the impact of 1) increased water prices, 2) adoption of water conserving 
technologies (four different irrigation technologies), and 3) the imposition of a 
pollution tax, in terms of yields, water use, profitability and the quantity of drainage 
effluent (Caswell et al. 1990). The research concludes that the adoption of modem 
irrigation technology (sprinkle or drip irrigation) would reduce the quantity of 
contaminated drainage water by a) reducing pollution per acre, and b) reducing the 
quantity of wate applied per acre. Secondly, the introduction of a pollution tax should 
reduce water use and pollution by a) reduce water use and pollution generation on 
farms, b) encouraging adoption of more efficient and less polluting irrigation 
technology, and c) providing incentives to retire low quality lands. 
An interesting study of regulating both water quantity and quality in California (US) 
involved a 20 year dynamic model of 3 producers of cotton and alfalfa reliant on a 
limited supply of surface water irrigation and common property aquifer (Dinar and 
Xepapadeas 1998). In the unregulated case each producer acts myopically and the 
percolation of irrigation water pollutes the aquifer. The results show that there is no 
convergence to a steady state; without monitoring quality, deterioration will result in 
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water over exploitation. Two regulatory scenarios were examined, 1) involving a 
central monitoring case where taxes and quota are applied to surface water uniformly 
across all producers, and 2) individual monitoring (using observation wells) of water 
withdrawls and pollution by each producer allowing a flat tax on pollution volume 
and a pollution volume quota. The regulator's objective function is to maximise total 
regional income; tax receipts are assumed to be returned to the region for investment 
in regional water improvement activities. 
Their results show a surface-water tax appears to be more efficient than surface 
water quota in achieving both better environmental standards and higher regional 
income. They also argue that by incurring costly monitoring, the regulator can use 
pollution taxes which ensure a steady state of better quality and higher level of water 
in the aquifer. Additionally individual monitoring was found to be superior to central 
monitoring. However these results should be viewed with caution because they are 
based on certain assumptions. A similar study of quantity and quality management of 
groundwater in Greece derived the optimal taxes under cooperative and non-
cooperative solutions (Xepapadeas 1996). 
Yet another study of San Joaquin Valley, California (US) examined the impact of 
water markets on water conservation, economic efficiency and the environmental 
consequences of drainage reduction using a micro-level production model i.e. in a 
single crop and single field setting (Dinar and Letey 1991). They conclude that water 
markets enable farmers to both invest in more efficient irrigation technology and pay 
for the safe disposal of drainage produced on their fields. It must be remembered that 
the model was very simplistic and does not capture any substitution between inputs, 
or farm heterogeneity - to name a few limitations. 
A later study extended the above analysis by examining the impacts of changes in a) 
irrigation practices, b) water prices and allotments, and c) the introduction of water 
markets on five crops grown on 70,000 hectares of the San Joaquin Valley (US). The 
regulatory target was to achieve a 30% drainage reduction to limit the impact of 
selenium. They found that water markets were less cost-effective than input or 
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effluent based taxes to control pollution. This was attributed to the different 
incentives, i.e. a) water markets created a general incentive to reduce water use while 
the taxes motivated conservation of only that water applied in excess of plant 
requirements, and b) unlike water markets tax instruments created a direct incentive 
to reduce consumption of all instruments contributing to effluent production. 
However, interestingly, they claim that the transaction costs of implementing water 
markets are lower than those of input taxation (observation and monitoring costs) 
therefore potentially making controlling diffuse pollution through water markets a 
more efficient means to control pollution. They argue that water markets provide a 
positive environmental impact. 
4.7 Discussion 
The problem with absolute comparisons of empirical studies is that no two studies 
assume the same parameters, or model the same degree of complexity, management 
practices, etc. Thus economists generally rely on relative instrument/policy ranking. 
Empirical works differ on the basis of 1) their efficiency criteria, i.e. whether they 
are concerned with farmer costs or social costs, 2) transaction costs, the inclusion of 
which changes policy ranking, 3) stochastic specification, i.e. whether standards 
target the mean alone or the mean and variation in pollution, 4) the inclusion of 
spatial factors such as slope and topography, 5) degree of farm/catchment 
heterogeneity, i.e. number of crops and soil types (the use of GIS and its resolution) 
6) whether tillage and irrigation technology has been accounted for, 7) the prevalent 
management practice of farmers in terms of type, timing and application method of 
artificial fertilisers and their substitutes, 8) whether input substitution is accounted 
for, 9) climatic differences or weather patterns, 10) the number of actual years 
weather the simulation is run for, 11) the crop rotations considered, 12) the 
regulatory standard and its stringency (required degree of attainment), 13) whether 
the objective is to control surface (runoff) or groundwater (leaching) pollution, 14) 
the catchment scale and type, i.e. surface water or groundwater catchment, 15) 
whether pollution reduction is required at the root zone or actual aquifer 
groundwater, 16) whether the regulatory objective is in terms of load (kg) or 
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concentration (mg/1), 17) the biophysical model used, its assumptions and calibration 
to site-specific conditions (sophistication), 18) whether the modelling framework 
allows for discrete decision making e.g. choice of technology or adopting a 
subsidized management scheme, and 19) whether interaction with other water 
pollutants is considered, for example the use of conservation tillage may decrease 
sedimentation but will probably increase herbicide use. The differences do not end 
here and the above is not a definitive list. 
Some of these factors determine how close the model baseline is to the reality. Other 
considerations include behavioural assumptions regarding farmer's risk preference, 
strategic behaviour, and utility maximisation by maximising profits alone. In reality 
the political feasibility of a control measure is probably as important a consideration 
as efficiency (Hahn 1990; Keohane et al, 1997; Aidt 1998). In modelling and 
parameter setting there is a degree of subjectivity, which must be kept in mind. All of 
the above makes empirically modelling pollution control an extremely complicated 
procedure and as any comparison of empirical studies must consider the above, it is 
apparent why comparative analysis and policy ranking on the basis of one study does 
not resulted in one 'true policy ranking'. However, once aware of these caveats it is 
safe to consider the general conclusions of empirical studies; some of which are 
presented below. 
Firstly it must be remembered that these studies are limited to a partial equilibrium 
analysis utilising consumer and producer surplus changes as measures of welfare. In 
reality environmental pollution control policies are likely to change prices 
(depending on the level they were implemented) and incomes, of farmers those 
linked to farming, thus a more relevant measure of social cost would be 
compensating or equivalent variation (Hazilla and Kopp 1990). A general 
equilibrium analysis of the welfare effects of implementing the Clean Air Act and the 
Clean Water Act in the US found it to be significant (Hazilla and Kopp 1990). 
Numerous studies have confirmed the least cost property of taxation (emission or 
input) (Homer 1975; Pan and Hodge 1994; Giraldez and Fox 1995; Wu et al. 1995; 
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Kampas and White 2002). However some studies have identified 'cros-overs', i.e. 
ranges in which taxation is sub optimal in comparison with regulator standards 
(Nichols 1984; Miltz et al. 1988; Bouzaher et al. 1990). 
On the question of which input to regulate there are conflicting results. Four 
empirical studies of semi-arid agriculture where irrigation water is a necessary input 
fail to conclude the optimality of taxing one input over the other, although it seems 
as if a conclusion based on one years weather (Larson et al. 1996) conditions is not 
as convincing as one based on many years weather. 
Although targeted polices are theoretically more efficient that uniform ones (Kolstad 
1987) two empirical studies outlined above conclude that the efficiency gain is quite 
small (Helfand and House 1995; Fleming and Adams 1997). However other studies 
which compare the welfare gains of targeted polices with estimated transaction costs 
(Carpentier et al. 1998) estimate tremendous long term cost-effectiveness. In fact the 
overall majority favour the efficiency of the targeted policies (Fox et al. 1995; 
Shortle et al. 1998), but whether practical enforcement and administrative cost 
considerations allow it is another matter (Moxey and White 1994; Dion et al. 1998). 
Another interesting study demonstrated the inefficiency of applying uniform policies, 
and showed that this inefficiency was dependent upon the extent of spatial variability 
in costs relative to benefits and the correlation between them (Fox et al. 1995; 
Babcock et al. 1997). 
As argued in chapter 2, price support distortions provide false incentives to farmers 
to over produce by both intensification and extensification of agricultural production 
which invariably increases nitrate loading to the environment. In fact one empircial 
study concluded that phasing out price support would be the most cost-effective 
control of nitrate pollution (Swinton and Clark 1994). However due to the sensitive 
income effect of this policy on farmers, and due to the sensitivity of resolving 
environmental and agriculural considerations such controls are not vociferously 
advocated (Hrubovcak et al. 1990; Abler and Shortle 1992). 
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Better management practices (crop rotations, timing, application of fertilisers etc.) 
and technology (irrigation, tillage) have repeatedly been advocated as efficient policy 
options (Braden et al. 1989; Johnson et al. 1991; Huang and Uri 1992; Mapp et al. 
1994; Swinton and Clark 1994; Wu et al. 1995; Vatn et al. 1997; Murillo etal. 2001). 
Thus implying there should be more incentives, like cost sharing programmes and 
education, to encourage adoption of better management and technology. 
Trade-off between policy objectives has been established. This trade-off exists not 
only between different types of water pollutants but between different water bodies 
receiving the same pollutant. It has been demonstrated that the control of one 
externality can have a detrimental impact on the level of another agricultural 
externality (Milon 1987; Lakshminarayan et al. 1995), similarly the optimal policy to 
control nitrate runoff may be different from the one which contains nitrate leaching 
(Murillo et al. 2001). 
Only one study explicitly accounts for transaction costs 64  (Kampas and White 2002), 
the fact that so many studies have ignored transaction cost estimates is a major 
failing for economists, and without doubt adds to the general 'impracticality' 
associated with economic solutions to environmental pollution. 
64  Another research (Carpentier et al. 1998) also estimated transaction costs but did not use economic 
instruments. 
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Chapter 5 
Internalising Agricultural Surface Water 
Externalities Theoretically 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to theoretically model the internalisation of two surface 
water externalities in an agricultural catchment. The two agricultural externalities 
considered are non-point source nitrogen pollution and reduced river flows from 
surface water irrigation. The previous two chapters detailed theoretical and 
empirical developments in the efficient control of non-point source nitrogen 
pollution from agriculture65. To date, numerous aspects of diffuse nitrogen pollution 
as a negative production externality have been examined (Shortle and Dunn 1986; 
Segerson 1988; Xepapadeas 1992a; Braden and Segerson 1993). This chapter will 
consider the dual nature of surface water diffuse nitrogen pollution both as a positive 
and negative externality in a catchment where a regulator wishes to enforce a 
minimum river flow and water quality standard. 
The first part will introduce the concept of 'complimentary interaction' between 
controls which target different agricultural externalities, i.e. surface water NPS 
nitrate pollution (quality) and low river flows (quantity). The next section will detail 
positive production, while the final section theoretically integrates complimentary 
interaction and the dual nature of NPS nitrate pollution as a positive and negative 
externality. 
5.2 Complimentary Water Quantity/Quality Interaction 
Given a function of crop yield in terms of both nitrogen and water it is possible to 
demonstrate the contribution of both the application of water and nitrogen inputs in 
the generation of NPS nitrate pollution. Thus both inputs should be investigated to 
determine whether there are efficiency gains from the regulation of both rather than 
one in the control of NIPS nitrate pollution. 
132 
Chapter 5: Internalising Agricultural Surface Water Externalities Theoretically 
Consider a catchment comprised of one farm (one decision maker) producing a 
single crop, for simplicity. The regulatory objective is to maximise catchment profit 
subject to two environmental standards, one pertaining to nitrogen emissions, E*  
(water quality) and the other to surface water extraction for irrigation, x (water 
quantity). Where x1 and x2 refer to nitrogen and water inputs respectively. The 
water extraction standards can be thought of as the maximum extractable water 
which will ensure compliance with a minimum river flow restriction. The need for 
minimum river flows arise because surface water extraction by irrigators reduces 
natural flows to levels which are damaging to catchment ecology and other users, i.e. 
recreational usage, fishing etc. 
Furthermore assume the production and emission functions capture the variability in 
the catchment weather; i.e. both are based on expected weather patterns. The 
emission function and regulatory standard are stated in terms of load or mass (kg) of 
nitrogen being carried to the receiving water body. Although a rather crude 
assumption, it can be excused on the grounds that it remains illustrative while 
simplifying notation considerably. The regulatory objective is to maximise 
catchment profits subject to the environmental standards E*andX, the emission 
and water extraction standards respectively: 
MaxIr pf (x1 x2 )—wx1 —hx 2 	 (EQ 5.1) 
X 1x2 
Subject to: 






	 Water Extraction Standard 
	
(EQ 5.3) 
Where, e=s(x1 ,x2 ) 
65 There is an abundance of theoretical reviews of NPS control instruments in the economic literature 
(Dosi and Tomasi 1994b; Weersink et al. 1998; Ribaudo et al. 1999; Shortle and Horan 2001) 
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Setting up the Lagrange (with 2 and z as Lagrange multipliers): 





=pf'(x)—w+As'(x)=O 	 (EQ 5.6) 
ax, 
aL 
=pf'(4) — h+As'(x)+z=O 	 (EQ 5.7) 
X2 
The optimal solution reveals that to ensure the standards are not exceeded the 
following two taxes must be levied (either based on estimated or actual emission): 
Emission tax 
2= w—pf'  (XI ) 	
(EQ 5.8) 
s'(x1 ) 
Surface water extraction tax z = h - pf'(4) - As'(x) 	 (EQ 5.9) 
Since2, i.e. the emission tax (EQ 5.8) enters the surface water extraction tax 
equation (EQ 5.9) it is evident that the optimal emission tax determines the optimal 
irrigation tax level. This relationship can be called 'complimentary interaction', 
because the control of one input compliments the control of the other. It is safe to 
assume that s'(x)is positive because greater water application on soils rich in 
nitrate fertiliser will probably increase emissions by washing it out. However it is 
possible, given dry conditions, that at initial levels of crop growth the availability of 
water allows for more uptake of nitrogen and reduces emissions i.e. the value of 
s'(x) may be negative. Whether the value of As'(x) is significant enough to make 
a significant impact on z66 , is an empirical issue and will undoubtedly be catchment 
and climate specific. 
66 The equivalent input tax is  . s'(xj), whether this is larger or smaller than the emission tax 
depends on whether s'(x) is < or> 1. However this does not necessarily indicate which instrument 
shall have the greater compliance cost, that depends on the input demand elasticity of nitrogen. 
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The result is intuitively obvious. The regulatory instrument reducing nitrogen usage, 
also affects the level of the other corrective instrument targeting water extraction. 
One explanation is that within the range of nitrogen input normally applied, there 
exists a complimentary relationship between the crop uptake of water and nitrogen, 
thus lowering the use of one necessitates reducing the consumption of the other. 
Alternatively it may be argued that restricting irrigation water usage reduces crop 
yield and quality (thus market price and profitability) - thereby reducing the 
economic incentives to use nitrogen. For example on the East Coast of Scotland, 
where rainfall is plentiful, irrigation water contributes to tuber quality or better 
'finish', i.e. less lines and reduced incidence of scab etc. The potato crop may be 
divided into scabbed and scab free, the former being associated with inadequate or 
'restricted' irrigation, while the latter with optimal or higher irrigation. The 
difference is reflected in the market price of potatoes as the 'optimally irrigated' crop 
has a higher scab free proportion thereby fetching a significantly higher price. By 
restricting irrigation the regulatory authority will lower the profitability margin per 
hectare and shift land allocation from optimal to restricted irrigation thereby reducing 
incentives to apply as much of the other input, nitrogen. 
To the regulator who seeks to control both externalities by ensuring least cost 
compliance with environmental standards the result of complimentary interaction 
between instruments is significant. The fact that taxation of one externality 
determines the optimal control of another implies the two problems should be 
considered jointly; doing so should reduce the compliance cost. 
The literature (Helfand 1995; Larson et al. 1996) has theoretically and empirically 
modelled the efficiency gain of regulating water as opposed to nitrogen input directly 
in a bid to curb NPS nitrate pollution - a review of other empirical studies 
investigating the efficiency of which input should be regulated has been presented in 
chapter 4. It should be noted that what differentiates this research from previous 
work is that previous literature has considered the control of NPS nitrate pollution by 
limiting irrigation water application or creating water markets - no specific minimum 
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acceptable river flow (MAF) restrictions have been considered. Whereas the analysis 
presented in this chapter (and onwards) considers the efficiency gain in NPS nitrate 
pollution control when MAF restrictions are enforced. 
5.3 Positive Production Externalities in a First-best World 
This section concerns internalising the potential positive production externalities 
associated with diffuse nitrogen pollution in a first-best world without irrigation. In 
an ideal world the regulator has perfect information (Braden and Segerson 1993) 
regarding the contribution of emission to environmental damage (ecological and 
human). The regulatory objective is to maximise catchment profits (a proxy for 
utility) while internalising environmental externalities. Assume the entire catchment 
can be spatially split up (Moxey and White 1994) into two zones A (upstream) and B 
(downstream). Each zone comprises a single decision making farmer. Assume that 
the downstream activity requires irrigation of arable land. Upstream nitrogen 
emissions (from artificial nitrogen or farmyard manure) enter the river and form a 
portion of the irrigation water applied downstream. Thus upstream emissions act as 
positive externality to downstream farmers. The value of this contribution can vary 
from negligible to marginal depending upon the area of upstream land, the intensity 
of arable agriculture and the reliance on irrigation downstream. 
Assume instantaneous interaction i.e. no time lags in the movement or mixing of 
emissions. Furthermore both farms produce different output dependent on their 
unique known production functions (fi f2) while the amount of their output is 
insignificant in proportion to the market, thereby making them price takers. 
Upstream Emissions (Zone A) 
e1 = E1 (x1 ) 
	
(EQ 5.10) 
a1 =A1 (e1 ) 
	
(EQ 5.11) 
Upstream emissions depend on the amount of nitrogen fertiliser appliedx1 . 
Emissions are stated as the load or mass of nitrogen carried to the receiving water 
body. The volume of water which carries emissions and the actual river flow rate 
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determines the overall ambient concentration of nitrogen upstream a1 . The 
environmental damage d1 to society (anglers, cross-country walkers etc.) in zone A 
from fertiliser applications arises if 
if a1 >a* 
f a1 a 
(EQ 5.12) 
where ais the equilibrium concentration representing the assimilative capacity of 
the environment. 
Downstream Emissions (Zone B) 
Downstream nitrogen emissions depend on the actual nitrogen applied by the farmer 
x1 (artificial or farmyard manure) and the nitrogen content (e j ) of the applied 
irrigation water from the riveru2 , and h is the associated irrigation water extraction 
and application cost per unit 11 2 . The nitrogen concentration of irrigation water 
applied downstream is determined by a1 , or farming activities upstream. 
e1 =g(u 2,a1 ) 
	
(EQ 5.13) 
e2 =E2 (x2,e j ) 
	
(EQ 5.14) 
Assuming no collusion/bargaining between upstream and downstream farmers 
implies the farmer in zone B does not know the exact level of e1. Thus the ambient 
nitrogen concentration of river water is a) a positive production externality to 
farming downstream if e1 contributes to production i.e. x2 + e1 xrx,  where 
max is the input level corresponding to the maximum physical production (not 
economic) i.e. af2 = 0 o b) a negative production externality if x2 + e1 >ax 
X2 
and af2  <0, i.e. stage III of production where the diminishing or toxic effect or 
X2 
both of nitrogen application occur. Therefore whethere1  , which is provided free of 
charge, is a positive or negative production externality depends on x2 - 4nax or the 
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downstream farmer's knowledge of e1 . Thus the ambient nitrogen concentration 
downstream is a-, and the environmental damage d7 . 
a2 =A2(e1 ,e2 ) 	 (EQ 5.15) 
d, (a,) if a2 > a * 
a, — 	 (EQ5.16) 
- 	
if a,:~ a* 
Assuming that the farmers are risk neutral, profit maximising and have no influence 
on the prices of input or outputs, a simplified 67 social net benefit function which 
maximises the difference between the expected benefits of polluting activities and 
the resulting environmental damages is: 
Regulator's welfare problem (First Best World): 
Max (PIA (Xi )—wixi)+(p2f2(x2,eI,u2)—w2x2 _hu2)_di(ai)_d2(a7) 
X1 '2 '2 
(EQ 5.17) 
F.O.C. 
* 	[3di Jai 	*\ 	d 2 a2 ae2 e1 a1 	* 
p1f1 (XI )+p2 e j (x1) a1 	
e1 (x1 )+ 
ae1 	 e1 aa2 
-5__-5__-____ei (xi ),J=wi 
f 2(x) d2 a2 ' * 
P2 	---------e2(x2,e1) = w2 
x2 	a2 Je2 
(EQ 5.18) 
(EQ 5.19) 
P2f2(U2)_ M2 aa2 2 '' * , h e1 u2 ai )= 	 (EQ 5.20) 
a2 e2 e1 
Upstream emissions contribute to environmental degradation (negative impact) while 
also fertilising crops downstream (positive impact). In setting the corrective 
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pigouvian tax the regulator must account for both opposing impacts. In choosing the 
optimal tax levels the regulator equates each input's net marginal benefit with the 
marginal social cost. As the regulator has perfect information he is able to enforce 
the social optimum by levying two spatially differentiated emission taxes equal to the 
aggregate marginal external 'effects' of each farmer (Xepapadeas 1997). 
Upstream Tax 
d1 	a1 - (x.)+  ad 2  aa2 e2Lie *" 	 * x1 )—p,---e j (x1 ) 	(EQ5.21) T1 =----e1  
da1 de1 aa2 ae2  ae, aa, Je1 	ae, 
Downstream Tax 
_d2 3a2 	* 	d2 a2 Je2 	
(EQ5.22) T2 ---------e2 (x2,e1 )+------------e1  
a2 ae2  ae1  
It is likely that upstream emission tax might be lower than downstream taxation; 
because a portion of up stream pollution benefits the farmer downstream. However 
how they differ depends on catchment specific farming practices, the relative size of 
zones, ambient nitrate levels before regulation and the particular crops grown in each 
zone. 
5.4 Complimentary Interaction and Positive Externalities: Second-best 
Solution 
This section of the chapter will model complimentary interaction and positive 
externalities in a second-best world where due to imperfect information on 
environmental damage estimation regulatory standards are imposed (Beavis and 
Walker 1983a) . To reiterate, complimentary interaction refers to the situation where 
two inputs contribute to non-point source pollution and where controlling one 
indirectly reduces the need to control the other. 
67  The is formulation is simplified since it ignores a) other factors of production which may be 
pollution abating or increasing, and their substitution, b) the entry exit condition on the number of 
production sites i.e. the acreage of land under cultivation. 
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Assume the regulator divides the catchment into two zones or farms, upstream and 
downstream. The regulator's objective is to keep the river nitrate concentration in 
both zones below E*  while ensuring that river flow in both zones (i.e., r, r ) does 
not fall below particular standards. Unlike the water quality standard, which is the 
same for both zones, due to river hydrology complications simplicity requires the 
quantity standards are stated in terms of upper bounds on allowable water extraction 
IRR1* and 1RR, for each zone respectively68. Both ensure that that a minimum river 
flow rate is maintained at any given time of an 'average year'. Assume that the 
weather pattern realised 	corresponds to an 'average year' 
For simplicity assume only one predominant soil type and one irrigated crop, such as 
potatoes, is grown in the catchment and its market price is fixed at p. It should be 
noted that land allocation within each zone is an important factor in determining 
emission concentration, however its inclusion complicates notation considerably. 
Each farm has its own production function with unique managerial approaches 
ni and iii, which refer specifically to any managerial practices related to nitrogen and 
water usage only, not any other input. As this is a static representation of a dynamic 
process it necessitates assuming instant mixing and no lag in the movement of 
emissions. 
Relationships 
r1  =Ri(x?,bi) 
	
River flow rate upstream 
	
(EQ 5.22) 
r2 =R2(x,r1 ) 
	
River flow rate downstream 
	
(EQ 5.23) 
1 	--- 	- 
Cl =s1(x1,x1 
2,  j,in1,OJ,b1) Upstream river concentration (EQ 5.24) 
	
C2 = s2  (4  ,c[ , 4, r1 ,k2 , In 2 , ) Downstream river concentration 	(EQ 5.25) 
= 1(c1 ) 	 Interactive term (concentration) 	(EQ 5.26) 
68  In reality they would probably vary by the month/week. 
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Where x and x (subscript refers to the upper (1) and lower (2) zones) are the 
nitrogen inputs (superscript 1), whereas x and x refer to the irrigation water 
extraction (superscript 2). Both depend on the area under potato cultivation, plant 
growth requirements, desired potato tuber finishing, incidence of disease, cost of 
irrigation etc. c( is the interactive term or the nitrate concentration of irrigation 
water applied to crops downstream as a result of upstream nitrogen fertiliser 
applications; thus the irrigation water applied downstream x has an nitrate 
concentration of [ 
y and y, refer to the proportion of total catchment land in each zone and not the 
land allocation within each zone. The river flow upstream r1 , comprises of base river 
flow b1 (given), and all the drainage associated with land in the upstream zone. 
Upstream flow r1 , also serves as the base river flow to the downstream zone. 
Essentially upstream decisions affect downstream farming but not visa versa. 
Cu refers to the weather pattern realised in both zones and any symbol with a hat on it 
implies it is given and not a decision variable. 
An important distinction here is that nitrogen emissions are stated as concentrations, 
i.e. capturing both the mass of nitrogen and its dilution in the water (both rain and 
irrigation) carrying it. The regulator's social welfare problem is: 
Max L= 	 _hx)+y2 (pf 2(x,x,c[ ,i2, eo )—wx _hx) 
xi_.x1 ,x,x7 
+21 (c1 _E*)+zl(x? —IRRj)+22(c2 _E*)+z2(x —IRR) 
(EQ 5.27) 
The above has been subject to the following constraints, i.e. environmental 
standards: 
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X2 <— IRR 
	
(EQ 5.30) 
The first order conditions are: 
aL 	( 	* 	 ac1 
ax1 ac( ac, ax,,* 
/ ' 	* ac, ac1' ac' 




72 - f2' 
(x*))_w+(s2(x*))=O 	
(EQ 5.32) 
aL  =pIy1.f1(x )+Yi( 	 h 
ax, 	 ac1 ac, X1 2  
(x ))+(ac2 ac' ac, 
2 
\ 
°(EQ 5.33) +,  
aL 
= P112 f2(x))h+ /12  (s2 (x))+z2 = 0 	 (EQ 5.34) 
ax2 
Resulting in the following four corrective taxes: 
Upstream ambient N tax 
* 	f2c[ac1]" 	12 _ W_P[7i .f1 (4 )+y 
c1 ;1 4* c1 3c14* J 
	(EQ 5.35) 
=S, (X
I  ) ) 
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Upstream water extraction tax 
	
2* 	dJ, dc dc, 	i 	 I dc' dcdc1 
ac , ac x I 	 J 
z1 =h — pIyf(x1 )+y., -------- —A s1 (x)I—A.,i-- 
(EQ 5.36) 





Downstream water extraction tax 
Z2 = h- PY2 f2(x2 ) 	( s (xi)) 	 (EQ 5.38) 
As is expected the downstream impact of upstream input use factor into upstream 
taxation through the inclusion of 2, in both upstream ambient and extraction taxes. 
Both up and down stream extraction taxes are affected by the ambient taxes in their 
respective zones. Thus to ensure cost-effective compliance with the regulatory 
standards the regulator will have to enforce all four corrective taxes. 
The regulatory instruments targeting nitrogen usage also affect the optimal level of 
instruments controlling water consumption. One explanation is that within the range 
of nitrogen input normally associated with farming, there exists a relationship 
between crop uptake of water and nitrogen, thus lowering the use of one necessitates 
reducing the others application. Alternatively it is possible to reason that restricting 
irrigation water usage reduces crop profitability and therefore the economic incentive 
to use the other input. 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
Obviously any policy which can differentiate between polluters and their marginal 
impact is not only more efficient but equitable. Although it is probable that 
enforcement/transaction costs of implementing a spatially differentiated (targeted) 
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tax will be higher, whether these costs outweigh the efficiency gain over a non-
spatially differentiated tax policy is an empirical issue. 
This chapter has presented a theoretical outline of two possible efficiency gains a) 
diffuse N as a positive externality and b) complimentary interaction between NPS 
nitrate pollution and minimum river flow restrictions. The relative gains in practice 
would depend on catchment specifics, such as size of catchment (acreage), 
distribution of zones, extent of irrigation downstream etc. It is possible to extend the 
analysis by including different soil and crop types; one might even consider the game 
theoretic implication of upstream and downstream negotiations given the benefit 
incurred downstream is significant to warrant it. 
Similarly a situation might occur whereby the cropping pattern and size of a 
catchment is such that the regulator increases the number of zones beyond the two 
modelled here. However disaggregating the effects of different zones and indeed 
relaxing the assumption of one decision making farmer per zone will result in the 
problems usually associated with ambient taxation. Incomplete information will 
probably prevent completely realising the theoretical benefits outlined in this paper. 
However, any effort which brings us closer to the ideal will definitely confer benefits 
in the long run. 
The empirical component of this research in the following chapters only models the 
presence of river MAF (minimum acceptable flows) and their impact on NPS nitrate 
pollution control regulation - not positive production externalities. Positive 
production externalities were not modelled since it requires complex hydrological 
and spatial modelling which was not available. 
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The previous chapter details the theoretical economic benefits of an integrated policy 
which jointly considers the control of both diffuse nitrate pollution and low river 
flows. This chapter will outline the framework and assumptions used to model 
diffuse nitrate pollution as a negative externality in the presence of minimum 
acceptable flow (MAF) restrictions. The West Peffer catchment (East Lothian, 
Scotland) was modelled because of the prevailing reliance of farming on surface 
water irrigation and intensive cultivation. 
This chapter comprises a) an estimation of catchment soils and land uses, b) a brief 
description of irrigation modelling c) nitrogen crop production function estimation d) 
nitrogen leaching function estimation, e) irrigation modelling and potato 
growth/leaching estimation, f) livestock modelling and, g) an economic model which 
maximises social welfare in the presence of nitrate regulation and river flow 
restrictions. A diagrammatic representation of the catchment model and its links is 
presented in Figure 6.1. 
The economic model assumes the catchment is one farm, i.e. one decision maker, 
whose objective is to maximise returns over nitrogen input use subject to bio-
physical resource limitations such as rotational constraints. The arable area of the 
West Peffer catchment is divided into 3 soil texture categories - sandy, silty and 
loamy, on the basis of their texture and drainage properties. It was also assumed that 
5 main crops were grown - winter wheat, spring barley, winter oilseed rape, 
maincrop potatoes and grass of which only potatoes required irrigation. Grass was 
subdivided into grazing and cutting (silage). 3 potato crop types were considered 
based on the level of irrigation water applied i.e. optimal, 
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Figure 6.1: Catchment Model 
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restricted and tin-irrigated. Overall the crops account for 94% of the crops produced 
on average in the catchment69. 
The West Peffer is a very small low ground catchment located in the East Lothian 
region of Scotland (see map 6.1). This region comes under the new proposed nitrate 
vulnerable zones (NVZs) (Ball and MacDonald 2001; Scottish-Executive 2002). In 
comparison with England and Wales, Scottish catchments experience shorter 
residence times i.e. water movement from groundwater to rivers is quicker. However 
this does not rule out dilution of nitrates in groundwater by 'old water', nor does it 
mean that there is no recharge from purer source of water i.e. non-agricultural land 
such as forestry etc. There is no known groundwater specific modelling of the 
catchment to date. The West Peffer catchment is characterised by complex 
groundwater flows and is 'likely' to be a predominantly surface water catchment 
(MacDonald 2002). To date there has not been any detailed hydrological modelling 
of the catchment. 
Table 6.1 lists SEPA's measurement of N concentration (mg/1) in the burn at 4 
different locations from Jan 1990 - May 2002. This is all the collected data on nitrate 
concentrations in the catchment. Although the nitrogen concentrations are not 
particularly high it (i.e. do not exceed the Water Framework Directive 11.3 mg/I 
nitrogen standard by much) it must be noted that there are only 6 measurements per 
year of which 3 are in March, May and July year when nitrate losses are 
comparatively low as nitrate losses tend to coincide with high rainfall events. 
Additionally given that the catchment is so small and intensively cultivated it is 
suspected that there are complex underground soil processes in the catchment 
preventing river nitrate levels to rise (MacDonald 2002). 
69 This figure is based on farm level IACS estimates of the proportion of crops grown on farms within 
the catchment. Of course farm and catchment boundaries do not necessarily coincide. 
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Table 6.1: Measured West Petter Nitrogen Concentrations (Jan 1990-













24-Jan-1990 Not Measured Not Measured 12 8 
08-Mar-1990 Not Measured Not Measured 11.6 12.8 
14-Mar-1990 I 	Not Measured Not Measured 10.8 12.2 
07-Jun-1990 Not Measured Not Measured 4.5 2.5 
26-Jun-1990 Not Measured Not Measured 2.2 1.3 
20-Jan-1994 15 15 14 16 
24-Mar-1994 14.4 15 13.9 15.3 
05-May-1994 10.2 11.4 11.9 11.6 
07-Jul-1994 5.34 10.1 1.26 8.29 
08-Sep-1994 5.71 7.12 9.75 7.54 
27-Oct-1994 4.94 5.64 1.86 6.6 
12-Jan-1995 12.3 13.4 12.2 13.7 
22-Mar-1995 10.6 11.9 12 11.9 
11-May-1995 7.61 7.61 2.9 8.81 
20-Jul-1995 5.51 3.56 1.86 2.85 
14-Sep-1995 12.2 12.4 Not Measured 12.9 
05-Oct-1995 Not Measured Not Measured 9.86 Not Measured 
16-Nov-1995 23.2 23.5 21.8 22.3 
25-Jan-1996 13.8 14.8 13.9 14.7 
19-Mar-1996 10.9 11.7 12.2 11.7 
14-May-1996 8.66 10.5 11.9 9.91 
27-Aug-1996 7.99 3.53 10.8 2.65 
19-Sep-1996 1.63 5.78 Not Measured 2.05 
19-Nov-1996 9.86 9.69 12.2 9.48 
29-Jan-1997 13.7 14.8 16.2 14.5 
27-Mar-1997 12.2 13.6 15.4 13.5 
20-May-1997 16.3 15.4 16.7 20.9 
24-Jul-1997 10 11.2 12.5 11.1 
18-Sep-1997 6.32 7.27 11.9 7.44 
12-Nov-1997 8.71 9.66 11.2 9.62 
22-Jan-1998 21.7 23.6 19.5 22.4 
26-Mar-1998 13.8 14.7 16.3 13.9 
27-May-1998 8.8 9.66 12.8 9.29 
28-Jul-1998 11.6 12.5 14.7 12.2 
23-Sep-1998 9.64 10.2 14.1 9.68 
18-Nov-1998 17.1 18.4 15.2 17.2 
27-Jan-1999 17.3 18.7 19.4 17.8 
18-Mar-1999 13.4 12.9 16.2 13.1 
26-May-1999 9.23 9.68 15.3 8.98 
22-Jul-1999 7.05 7.68 13.8 7.64 
22-Sep-l999 9.16 9.44 12.9 9.52 
16-Nov-1999 7.43 7.92 11.3 7.49 
148 
Chapter 6: Catchment Modelling 
01-Feb-2000 18.1 18.1 17.4 17.8 
16-Mar-2000 10.1 10.9 11.9 10.6 
25-May-2000 10.6 11.8 13 11 
19-Jul-2000 12.5 13 4.73 10.5 
05-Sep-2000 7.72 9 11 8.66 
25-Oct-2000 9.51 9.96 10.6 10.1 
31-Jan-2001 11.4 12.6 12.6 12.4 
22-Mar-2001 12.4 Not Measured 13.2 Not Measured 
24-May-2001 8.24 9.05 11.7 8.62 
18-Jul-2001 7.11 7.8 11.2 7.34 
04-Sep-2001 5.39 6.37 10.3 6.37 
21-Nov-2001 9.23 9.21 11.61 9.13 
30-Jan-2002 14 15.3 14.4 13.2 
20-Mar-2002 9.31 9.77 12.2 12 
16-May-2002 7.09 7.92 10.8 7.2 
(Ordnance Survey map grid references are in parentheses) 
6.2 Catchment Soils 
This section describes the spatial distribution of agricultural activities. The MLIJRI 
holds a database comprising approximately 12,000 descriptions of soil profiles 
collected from throughout Scotland in order to characterise soil mapping units. 
Information such as depth of soil layers and soil texture can be derived from this dataset 
for all soils in Scotland. 
Soil maps of scale 1: 25,000 are available for approximately 50% of Scotland including 
the West Peffer catchment (Ragg et al. 1966). Many of these maps have been digitised 
and the digital dataset stored within the ARC/Info geographic information system 
(GIS). The West Peffer catchment boundary is also held in digital format (ordnance 
survey 50m digital elevation model) and the soils that lie within the catchment can be 
easily determined by simple overlay within a GIS. Map 6.3 shows the distribution of 
different soils in the catchment. 
In general, soil map units at the 1:25,000 scale, are considered to be homogenous and 
to comprise only one soil taxonomic unit (a soil series) with the map unit bearing the 
name of the taxonomic unit. However, natural variability often means that these map 
units contain more than one soil taxonomic unit - even though at the time of 
mapping care was taken to ensure other soil taxonomic types within a map unit had 
similar physical/chemical properties to those of the dominant soil type. Where this 
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was not possible, the map units were deemed 'soil complexes' and the inclusion of 
other taxonomic units clearly stated. The soils were grouped on the basis of their 
drainage and texture properties into sandy, silty and loamy soils, the results are 
presented in table 6.2. 
6.3 Catchment Land Use Estimation 
Normally catchment scale studies of agricultural pollution calibrate their baseline 
land allocation and livestock numbers based on annual Agricultural Census data. 
This census data is available at the parish or sometimes grouped parish level for 
confidentiality reasons. It is likely that parish boundaries will not coincide with 
catchment boundaries (Miles et al. 1996). Under such circumstances it is possible to 
assume that the proportion of agricultural activities in the parish (as a whole) is also 
present in the area of the parish within the catchment. Alternatively one can use the 
method of areal interpolation (Moxey and Allanson 1994). 
There are a total of 6 parishes in the catchment (see map 6. 1), most of which when 
viewed on a map lie outside the catchment boundary. Fortunately for this study farm 
level IACS (Integrated Administration and Control System) data for the West Peffer 
Catchment was made available by SEERAD provided it met confidentiality 
requirements. Access to farm level data is not usually allowed. Figures of the total 
area of land in the catchment under potato, wheat, spring barley, winter barley, 
oilseed rape, permanent and temporary grassland, setaside and protein pea cultivation 
were made available. In none of these 9 categories did the number of holdings fall 
below the minimum requirement of 5 holdings - a necessary condition for public 
disclosure. 
Obviously farm boundaries do not necessarily coincide with catchment boundaries, 
but the error in using farm boundaries is likely to be considerably smaller than if 
parish boundaries are used. Unfortunately the data could not be refined further as the 
proportional method mentioned earlier (Miles et al. 1996) requires knowledge of 
farm areas which was not disclosed. 
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The sum acreage of all the crops reported (IACS statistics) in 1997 was 
approximately 4387 ha. Whereas the total catchment area by GIS estimation was 
approximately 4518 ha, and after subtracting buildings, loch and rough grazing 
(peaty and shallow soil in table 5.2) acreage left approximately 4346 ha of arable 
land - and was take to be the total catchment area in the model. The total acreage of 
each soil texture was estimated at sandy 876 ha, silty 732 ha and loamy 2740 ha. 






Association Series Texture 
4150400 9259605 925.9605 Kilmarnock Kilmarnock Loamy 
7100500 3269857 326.9857 Rowanhill Winton Loamy 
4151400 2362666 236.2666 Kilmarnock Brownrigg Loamy 
1244000 400708 40.0708 Darleith Dariskel shallow 
7101500 6634160 663.416 Rowanhill Macmerry Loamy 
2302100 1204399 120.4399 Fraserburgh Fraserburgh Sandy 
5002000 669074 66.9074 Buildings 
159400 1211774 121.1774 Alluvial soils Ali Loamy 
4150432 1383288 138.3288 Kilmarnock Kilmarnock Loamy 
7101532 408078 40.8078 Rowanhill Macmerry Loamy 
1241100 70565 7.0565 Darleith Darleith Loamy 
2302140 229617 22.9617 Fraserburgh Fraserburgh Sandy 
1241144 343634 34.3634 Darleith Darleith Loamy 
7100532 671294 67.1294 Rowanhill Winton Loamy 
4153700 638471 63.8471 Kilmarnock Loudoun peat 
1441400 6880163 688.0163 Dreghorn Peffer Silty 
159900 1210207 121.0207 Alluvial soils Alundiff Loamy 
1442100 7221495 722.1495 Dreghorn Dreghorn Sandy 
1272100 96558 9.6558 Darvel Darvel Sandy 
7249900 5046 0.5046 Saltings Saltings Silty 
7490400 430121 43.0121 Stirling Cauldside Silty 
5001800 12234 1.2234 Loch 
1241145 516805 51.6805 Darleith Darleith Loamy 
159700 53000 5.3 Alluvial soils Alp Loamy 
Total (ha) 45182819 4518.282 
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The disclosed IACS figures revealed temporary grassland accounted for 43.04% of 
the total catchment grass production. Some winter barley is also cultivated, however 
as a proportion of the total catchment barley production it only accounts for 24.89%. 
However as the farm level statistics were made available after the nitrate leaching 
functions for specific crop rotations had been established spring barley and 
temporary grassland were not modelled. 
If one ignores the difference between spring and winter barley and between 
temporary and permanent grassland then the catchment model's baseline 
(unrestricted crop allocation i.e. in the absence of regulation) crop allocation acreage 
is remarkably similar to farm level IACS figures (discussed in detail in the next 
chapter). However it must be noted that differences between the model baseline and 
actual catchment land allocation are likely to be greater due to a variety of reasons, 
some of which include a) protein peas were not modelled, b) temporary grass and 
winter barley was not modelled, c) some farm boundaries extend outside the 
catchment, c) IACS reporting errors, d) land use and soil type approximating errors, 
e) the assumption that farmer maximise utility by profit maximisation alone, 
capital cost constraints, g) the inability to model complex bio-physical considerations 
(such as pest control considerations, animal husbandry etc.). The following chapter 
discusses the difference between the model baseline and actual catchment land 
allocation in greater detail. 
6.4 Crop Production functions 
Based on experiments over two decades ADAS has compiled the results of a large 
number of field trials all over the UK (mostly England) relating artificial Nitrogen 
application with crop yield (Chambers and Johnson 1990). This data set was used to 
derive the crop production functions of five main crops. 
A regression analysis of yield on nitrogen input using the a) linear, b) cubic and c) 
linear plus exponential (LpE) functional forms was carried out in MICROFIT 
(Pesaran and Pesaran 1991). The LpE form gave the best fit, see table 6.3. The 
155 
Chapter 6: Catchment Modelling 
choice of this functional form is consistent with previous work in the literature 
(George 1984; Lord and Mitchell 1998). The model uses the same crop production 
function irrespective of the previous crop. This is a modelling limitation as in reality 
yields are dependent on the previous crop (England 1986). The functions are convex 
in shape and have a maximum point within reasonable bounds of those found in the 
literature (England 1986) 
The ADAS report (Chambers and Johnson 1990) uses the soil classification used by 
'FERTIPLAN' (ADAS) and MAFF7° which includes organic, peaty, shallow, other 
mineral, sandy, clay, deep silty, chalk and 'all other' soil categories. Obviously not 
every soil classification in the entire data set matched the sandy, silty and loamy 
categories; thus assumptions were made about classification of the available data on 
the basis of texture and drainage 71. The derivation of potato growth functions in the 
presence of irrigation is discussed latter, as are the grass and silage production 
functions. 
6.5 Nitrate Leaching 
The nitrate leaching modelling comprised primarily of NITCAT (ADAS) and N-
CYCLE which was developed by the Institute of Grassland and Environment 
Research (IGER). The nitrate leaching work was carried out by the Environmental 
Modelling and GIS group at ADAS (formerly the Agricultural Development and 
Advisory Service). The NITCAT model (Lord 1992; Lord et al. 1999) was used to 
estimate the relationship between nitrogen fertiliser application, arable crop 
management and nitrate leaching for all crop/soil combinations. NITCAT is an 
established model which has been used on behalf of MAFF and DETR to assess the 
impact of restrictions on agricultural practices within Nitrate Vulnerable Zones 
(NVZs) (Lord et al. 1999). 
NITCAT requires detailed information on crop husbandry and rotations (sequence of 
crops grown, fertiliser use, manure inputs and timing, yield, harvest and sowing 
° Reference booklet 209 Fertiliser Recommendations for Agricultural and Horticultural Crops' 
71  This classification was performed with the help of Dr Allan Lilly (MLURI soil scientist). 
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dates, and ideally an estimate of the growth of autumn crops before winter sets in). 
Since it is generally agreed that farmer practices are varied, certain simplifying 
assumptions regarding crop husbandry were made, e.g. it was assumed that farmers 
applied two split nitrogen fertiliser applications (40kg/ha plus a variable). 
Table 6.3 Crop Nitrogen Production Functions 
Basic functional form: y = a1  + a2 (0.99) N  + a3 N 









Winter 3.501 -1.523 -0.0000795 
Oilseed Loam (0.07344) (0.10919) (0.2307E-4)  0.91321 3.451 172.49 
Rape 
Winter 3.606 -1.245 -0.000190 
Oilseed Silty (0.00320) (0.00476) (0.1008E-4)  0.99970 3.507 148.43 
Rape 
Spring 7.242 -4.013 -0.00543 
Barley 
Loam (0.00634) (0.07353) (0.3297E-03) 0.99880 5.615 137.80 
Spring 7.554 -4.292 -0.0104 
Barley 
Sandy (0.05959) (0.06908) (0.3097E03) 0.99807 5.035 104.66 
Spring 8.781 -5.22 -0.009615 
Barley 
Silty(0.07865) (0.09118) (0.4088E03) 0.9985 6.197 129.46 
Winter 7.7716 -2.972 -0.000305 
Wheat 
Loam (0.00594) (0.00738) (0.2606E4) 099997 7.601 181.47 
7.8623 -3.277 -0.001278 
Winter 
Silty (0.04062 (0.05048 (0.1782E-3)  0.99866 7.320 172.90 
Wheat 
4) 3) 
Winter 8.295 -4.341 -0.00242 
Wheat 
Sandy (0.01269) (0.01614) (0.5513E-4) 0.99992 7.357 182.98 
Grass 6.311 -4.545 0.00929 
(grazing) 
Loam (0-15347) (0.26197) (0.3668E3) 0.98839 3.911 Na 
Grass 5.3194 -4.284 0.00817 
(grazing) 
Sandy(0.14313) (0.2443) (0.321E-3) 0.98769 3.1542 Na 
Grass 7.0225 -4.6533 0.01029 
(grazing) 
Silty (0.16917) (0.28878) (0.4043E-3) 0.98780 4.442 Na 
Silty, 
Grass Loamy, y= 	3.565 	+ 0.1279N 
(cutting) and (1.94192) (0.00810) 
0.99601 Na Na 
Sandy 	I  
INote: 1) there is no winter oliseeci rape grown on sandy soils, nor are potatoes grown oil silty or loamy 
soil, thus the corresponding entries are not present in table, 2) standard errors are in parenthesis, and 
3) there is no one maximum nitrogen application rate for grass and silage as there is no unique output 
price for grass, 
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These crops were combined in two 4-5 year rotations. The two rotations were a) 
spring barley, winter wheat, spring barley followed by potatoes on sandy soils and, 
b) winter wheat, winter wheat, spring barley, followed by winter oilseed rape on the 
remaining two soil categories. After consultation with ADAS it was decided that 
since the majority of grass production is on long-term grass (rather than ley-arable 
rotations) and as estimating nitrate loss when leys are ploughed out is difficult and 
inaccurate (Lord 2001b), it was assumed that grass is grown on permanent pastures 
only and thus not included in crop rotations. Permanent swards also have a number 
of potential benefits associated with sward density, which enable production to be 
utilized in conditions when leys would be vulnerable to poaching. There may be 
some nutritional benefits arising from species diversity in permanent swards, e.g. 
higher concentration of certain minerals (Hopkin 2000). 
Nitrate losses depend on both the crop and its management besides the subsequent 
crop and its management especially during the autumn/early winter. For example if 
spring barley is followed by oilseed rape, nitrate leaching is smaller than if followed 
by winter wheat (which is drilled latter) or by bare ground kept free of weeds all 
winter until the next spring barley crop is sown. 
Table 6.4: Range of Fertiliser Application tested 
Crops Mm Max 
Survey of Fertiliser 
Practice (1998) Mean 
Spring Barley 70 200 104 
Winter Wheat 100 230 190 
Winter Oilseed Rape 100 230 184 
Man crop Potatoes 140 270 197 
Grass Grazing 25 375 136* 
Grass Cutting 25 375 136* 
* Refer to long term or permanent grassland 
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NITCAT was not run for specific calendar years because the amount of excess winter 
rainfall (a key determinant of nitrate runoff) depends on both the previous crop and 
the whole winter of interest. NITCAT was run using metrological data which cuts 
across calendar years. 
Metrological Office Data (including rainfall, evapotranspiration, max and minimum 
daily temperature) from 3 synoptic weather stations (Haddington, Stobshiel reservoir 
and Fordel Dean) for the period 1989-1998 in the neighbouring Tyne catchment was 
forwarded to ADAS, besides information regarding catchment soil textures, 
cropping and animal husbandry practices. Daily rainfall data for the West Peffer was 
assumed to be the average of the surrounding three metrological stations, see table 
6.5. 
Table 6.5: Annual Rainfall Data 
Weather Type Annual Rainfall (mm) Reference Potential Evapotranspiration 72  (mm) 
Mean 672 564 
Wettest 8 27 530 
Driest 470 602 
The above data were used in regressions (Barrie et al. 1981) previously developed by 
ADAS which relate rainfall, mean PE, crop and soil type to the mean HER 
(hydrologically effective rainfall i.e. excess winter rainfall), see table 6.6 and 6.7. 
These regressions have been well substantiated across the UK and give the expected 
mean value for the results of MORECS (Meteorological Office Rainfall and 
Evaporation Calculation System) modelling (Thompson et al. 1981). The results for 
each soil type are presented below. 
72  Potential Evapotranspiration (FE) is the water that would evaporate from the surface and transpired 
by plants if the supply of water unlimited. It is calculated from the mean monthly temperature, with 
corrections for day length. From PE minus precipitation an approximate index can be calculated of the 
extent to which the water available for plants falls short of the amount they are capable of transpiring. 
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Table 6.6: Excess Winter Rainfall Calculation - Sandy Soil 
Crop Wet Mean Dry 
Winter Wheat 412 263 71 
Spring Barley 423 272 78 
Winter Oilseed Rape 416 266 74 
Maincrop Potatoes 426 279 91 
Grass (Grazing) 354 208 22 
Grass (Cutting) 354 208 22 
Partitioning Excess winter rainfall 
Rainfall was distributed evenly on a weekly basis (beginning 1 August) using the 
monthly rainfall means. These weekly values were multiplied by the ratio of the 
wettest annual total to the mean annual total to give the weekly values for a 1 in 10 
wet year; and similarly by analogous calculation for a I in 10 dry year. 
Table 6.7: Excess Winter Rainfall Calculation - Silty and Loamy Soil. 
Crop Wet Mean Dry 
Winter Wheat 381 229 35 
Spring Barley 396 224 47 
Winter Oilseed Rape 396 243 47 
Maincrop Potatoes 403 254 63 
Grass (Grazing) 343 193 
Grass (Cutting) 343 193 1 
The NCYCLE model was used to estimate relationships between nitrogen fertiliser 
application, grass management and leaching (Scholefield et al. 1991). NCYCLE was 
run for both cutting and grazing grassland. The application of manure to grassland is 
discussed later. 
The output from the IRRIGUIDE model (Anthony et al. 1996; Bailey and Spackman 
1996a; Bailey and Spackman 1996b) was used to give crop-dependent weekly values 
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of evapotranspiration over winter. It was assumed that the soil was at field capacity73 
by mid January. The following week in which evapotranspiration exceeded the 
rainfall was the week in which drainage ceased. Excess rainfall (rainfall - 
evapotranspiration) was then accumulated until the week in the autumn or winter at 
which the accumulated total was equal to the climatically expected excess rainfall for 
the crop. Thus an averaged value for weekly drainage and their start and end date for 
the mean, wet and dry scenario was obtained. 
The temporal distribution of drainage, i.e. the actual week in which drainage begins 
and ends, varies substantially between years. However the relationship between 
cumulative drainage and nitrate concentration is relatively insensitive to the date of 
drainage, i.e. the first drainage events will generally carry the greatest concentration 
and consequently the concentrations will decline over winter according to the volume 
of water which as flowed rather than the date (Lord 2001b). 
On freely draining soils such as sands and barns, such smooth behaviour is common. 
However on clays large flows tend to be of lower concentration because the rate 
cannot be accommodated by the clay matrix and most of the water tends to move 
through cracks to drains or overland —sometimes called 'bypass' or 'crack' flow. It 
does not have time to equilibrate with the soil matrix. Concentrations during low 
flow periods will tend to be greater than the mean while those during high flow 
periods will be smaller. In general, on such soils the mean concentration is about 60-
80% of the peak concentration (Anthony et al. 1996; Lord 2001b). Fortunately the 
clay content of soils in the West Peffer is negligible. 
Elution 74  behaviour was modelled using the SLIMMER algorithm (Anthony et al 
1996), which sums up the behaviour of more detailed models such as those of 
B  The percentage of water remaining in the soil 2 or 3 days after the soil has been saturated and free 
drainage has practically ceased. The percentage may be expressed in terms of weight or volume. The 
water content and the hydraulic conductivity of the porous medium (soil) is so low, that the water 
does not appear to 'flow or drain downwards under the unit gradient of gravity, and is held by 
capillary forces and surface tension (Mayhew 1997). 
74  The process of removing an adsorbed material (adsorbate) from an adsorbent by washing it in a 
liquid (eluent) (Press 1999). 
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Addiscott and Burns. Essentially it relates how the quantity of nitrate leached is a 
diminishing function of the cumulative excess rainfall and of the soil water capacity, 
i.e. the greater the flow the greater the proportion lost. When the flow through the 
soil exceeds about 1.3 times the volume of water held in the soil in winter, the soil 
will have lost most of its nitrate (Scholefield et al. 1996). 
By applying this equation to the potential nitrate loss calculated by NITCAT an 
estimate of the nitrate loss each week was obtained for each scenario i.e. each 
crop/soil/weather combination. NITCAT was run for each soil and climate (9 
combinations) a total of 56 arable crops (4 rotation years multiplied by 14 N levels) 
plus 16 grass types (silage and cutting with 8 N levels). 
The data set from these runs was regressed (OLS) to obtain estimated nitrogen 
leaching functions for crops and grass, table 6.8 and table 6.9 respectively. In order 
to determine the best 'fit' the adjusted R2 and plotted residuals were compared in 
GENSTAT 5. The cubic (Lord and Mitchell 1998), semi-log (Sumelius 1994a), 
linear plus exponential and power functional forms were considered. The results 
showed that the power functional form gave the best fit by far. 
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Table 6.8: Crop Nitrogen Leaching Function 
Functional Form: Yj + r2 (N) 
Crop 
Previous Soil 
Weather 71 R Crop Type  
Winter Spring 
Sandy Dry 
12.535 4.30E-l5 6.445 
0.9998 
Wheat Barley  (0.115) (0.1 OE- 13) (0.429)  
Winter Spring 
Sandy Mean 
39.423 1.20E-14 6.462 
0.9986 
Wheat Barley  (0.369) (0.29E-13) (0.436)  
Winter Spring 
Sandy Wet 
44.828 l.40E-14 6.462 
0.9977 
Wheat Barley  (0.408) (0.32E-13) (0.426)  
Winter Winter 
Silty Dry 
5.742 7.80E-09 3.684 
0.9958 
Wheat wheat  (0.135) (0.16E-07) (0.365)  
Winter Winter 
Silty Mean 
36.832 0.000000094 3.571 
0.9921 
Wheat Wheat  (0.890) (0.183E-06) (0.355)  
Winter Winter 
Silty Wet 
54.62 0.000000142 3.566 
0.9861 
Wheat Wheat  (1.35) (0.284E-06) (0.362)  
Winter Winter 
Loam Dry 
6.0394 6.00E-12 5.004 
0.9967 
Wheat wheat  (0.0983) (0.14E-10) (0.441)  
Winter Winter 
Loam Mean 
35.75 2.90E-1 1 5.042 
0.9942 
Wheat Wheat  (0.555) (0.677E-10) (0.427)  
Winter Winter 
Loam Wet 
49.327 4.20E-1 1 5.029 
0.9983 
Wheat Wheat  (0.766) (0.99E-10) (0.426)  
Spring Winter 
Sandy Dry 
12.769 0.0000112 2.639 
0.9897 
Barley wheat  (0.580) (0.0000148) (0.246)  
Spring Winter 
Sandy Mean 
36.63 0.0000333 2.632 
0.981 
Barley Wheat  (1.70) (0.0000448) (0.250)  
Spring Winter 
Sandy Wet 
41.14 0.0000384 2.678 
0.9869 
Barley Wheat  (1.92) (0.517E-04) (0.251)  
Spring Winter 
Silty Dry 
4.191 0.001885 1.5792 
0.9852 
Barley wheat  (0.199) (0.000799) (0.0763)  
Spring Winter 
Silty Mean 
21.54 0.00893 1.5914 
0.9814 
Barley Wheat  (1.02) (0.00387) (0.0781) 
Spring Winter 
Silty Wet 
31.3 0.01223 1.6005 
0.9839 
Barley Wheat  (1.41) (0.00516) (0.0760)  
Spring Winter 4.204 0.0000448 2.296 
Barley wheat 
Loam Dry 
 (0.299) (0.474E-04) (0.196)  
0.9991 
Spring Winter 20.01 0.000167 2.339 
Barley Wheat 
Loam Mean 




26.28 0.000236 2.327 
0.9964 
Barley Wheat  (1.90) (0.262E-03) (0.206) _ 
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Crop 
Previous Soil 
Weather 71 72 73 R Crop Type  
Oilseed Spring 
Silty Dry 
4.983 0.00157 1.641 
0.9852 
Rape Barley  (0.511) (0.00115) (0.127)  
Oilseed Spring 25.58 0.00739 1.655 
Rape Barley 
Silty Mean 
 (2.40) (0.00506) (0.119)  
0.9758 
Oilseed Spring 36.95 0.01049 1.658 
Rape Barley 
Silty Wet 




5.867 0.0000148 2.503 
0.9967 
Rape Barley  (0.520) (0.202E-04) (0.245)  
Oilseed Spring 
Loam Mean 
27.98 0.0000533 2.55 
0.9988 
Rape Barley  (2.42) (0.749E-04) (0.253)  
Oilseed Spring 36.76 0.000076 2.536 
Rape Barley 
Loam Wet 
 (3.18) (0.105E-03) (0.249)  
0.9996 
Spring 
Potatoes Sandy Mean 
31. 48 0. 6320000438 	2 . 
0.9967 Barley  (1.71) (0.0000569) (0.241)  
Spring 
Potatoes Sandy Dry 
10.984 0.0000 147 2.639 
0.9994 Barley  (0.607) (0.196E-04) (0.247)  
Spring 
Potatoes Sandy Wet 
48.65 0.0000265 2. 96 
0.9999 Barley  (0.57) (0.587E-05) (0.101)  
Winter Oilseed 5.4811 0.50E-08 3.508 
Wheat Rape 
Silty Dry 




35.610 0.24E-08 3.984 
0.9986 Wheat Rape  (0.416) (0.1OE-07) (0.776)  
Winter Oilseed 
Silty Wet 
52.896 0.16E-08 4.128 
0.9985 Wheat Rape  (0.314) (0.74E-08) (0.816)  
Winter Oilseed 5.7671 0.1 OE- 13 6.177 
Wheat Rape 
Loamy Dry 




34.103 0.69E-13 6.152 
0.9997 Wheat Rape  (0.415) (0.17E-12) (0.435)  
Winter Oilseed 
Loamy Wet 
47.103 0.92E-13 0.6159 
0.9991 Wheat Rape  (0.565) (0.22E-12) (0.430)  
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Table 6.9: Grazing Grass Nitrogen Loss Function 
Functional Form: fll + /37 (N)133 
Soil 
Weather fll 33  R Texture I 
Grazing Grass  
0.7766 0.00107 1.5979 
0.998 
Sandy Dry (0.0461) (0.000103) (0.0160) 
1.737 0.004092 1.7023 
0.992 
Sandy Mean (0.376) (0.00494) (0.0202) 
2.274 0.005515 1.7011 
0.987 
Sandy Wet (0.512) (0.000678) (0.0205) 
Silty Dry 0 0 0 na 
2.113 0.00377 1.656 
0.989 
Silty Mean (0.308) (0.000513) (0.0227) 
1.908 0.004569 1 .6973 
0.981 
Silty Wet (0.432) (0.000583) (0.0213) 
Loam Dry 0 0 0 na 
2.221 0.004194 1.6741 
0.991 
Loam Mean (0.338) (0.0005 13) (0.0204) 
2.103 0.005238 1.6992 
0.987 
Loam Wet (0.447 (0.000641) (0.0205) 
Cutting Grass  
0.3783 0.000471 1.6002 
0.999 
Sandy Dry (0.0472) (0.000 104) (0.0369) 
0.829 0.002286 1.665 
0.982 
Sandy Mean (0.168) (0.000268) (0.0196) 
1.071 0.003104 1.6624 
0.976 
Sandy Wet (0.243) (0.000391) (0.0211) 
Silty Dry 0 0 0 na 
1.003 0.002007 1.6267 
0.979 
Silty Mean (0.143) (0.000275) (0.0229) 
0.921 0.002488 1.6643 
0.979 
Silty Wet (0.186) (0.000296) (0.0199) 
Loam Dry 0 0 0 na 
1.04 0.002264 1.6424 
0.983 
Loam Mean (0.144) (0.000257) (0.0189) 
1.032 0.002871 1.6651 
0.974 
Loam Wet (0.256) (0.000407) (0.0237) 
(There is negligible leaching from cutting and grazing grass on loamy 
and silty soils under the dry weather scenario) 
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6.6 Irrigation Modelling 
The West Peffer catchment is extensively used for surface water extraction and is 
presently subject to abstraction controls (Fox 1999). The need for controls arises 
from the damaging effects of uncontrolled surface water extraction on river ecology, 
wildlife populations, and recreational use 75  (anglers etc.) The current practice 
involves stopping abstractions through licence suspension when river flow falls 
below the MAF one-day flow at specific gauging points (Crabtree et al. 2000). 
This research relies heavily on a study undertaken by MLURI on the economic 
impact of irrigation controls on potato farming in the West Peffer and Tyne 
catchment (Crabtree et al. 2000). The study was commissioned by SEERAD and is 
evidence of the Scottish Executive's interest in 'good ecological status' as outlined 
under the water framework directive (WFD). 
Field surveys suggest there is considerable reservoir storage (lined and unlined) in 
the West Peffer. Therefore historic measurement of stream flows reflect the managed 
system i.e. with abstraction and storage. The study modelled naturalised flows using 
the DIY model (Dunn 1998) which uses a GIS approach to spatially categorise the 
catchment into 50x50m cells on the basis of physical properties such as rainfall, 
elevation, hill-slope, distance to stream and soil type. The model allowed stream 
flows to be calculated for any location in the catchment, by estimating the weighted 
contribution of each category. The natural flow rate was estimated from Jan 1989 - 
Dec 1998 on a daily time step basis. 
IACS data of the location and areas of potato crops was made available for the 
MLURT report (not this research), the report assumed potato irrigation occurs at the 
nearest point on the digitally derived stream network thus enabling a spatial 
distribution of irrigation abstraction to be estimated. The discrepancy between 
measured (very close to no flow) and modelled naturalised flows (minimum of 0.03 
m 3 /s) was so great that it could not be attributed to modelling errors; thus 
concluding that indeed in the West Peffer there are considerable abstractions despite 
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the present irrigation control order. For detailed hydrograms, modelling assumptions 
and methodology refer to the report. Possible errors in the river flow modelling 
include a) limitations in the groundwater modelling, b) heterogeneity in the soil 
hydrological process, and c) feedback effects of soil moisture on actual 
evapotranspiration. 
By assuming the regulator was able to impose abstraction bans instantaneously 
depending on the weather, the report modelled MAF restrictions at the 98 (NE), 95th 
(NF) and 901h  (NT) percentile flow level. The 95th  one-day flow defines a flow that 
would be exceeded naturally 95% of the days in a year. These flow restrictions 
pertain to 'natural' flows, i.e. in the absence of abstractions. Thus a 901h  percentile 
flow restriction imposes a tighter surface water abstraction control than the 95th 
percentile restriction; and likewise the 95th  is more stringent than the 981h  percentile 
flow restriction. 
Overall the river flow modelling enabled calculation of the total volume of water 
available for potato irrigation over the summer period for a particular weather 
condition and percentile river flow restriction for a particular day. This was done by 
subtracting the naturalised river flow from the percentile flow at the 98th, 95th and 
90th % level. 
6.7 Potato Production and Leaching equations 
The potato growth and quality model was developed at Cambridge University Farm 
and consists of an irrigation scheduling model which predicts yield on the basis of 
potential water use and accounts for the effect of irrigation on the incidence and 
severity of common scab. Thus not only does it model potato yield but also quality. 
The 'Mans Piper' variety was modelled because it occupies 47% of the potato crop 
in East Lothian. Date of emergence was estimated from two temperature driven 
models in the literature (Mackerron 1985; Firman et al. 1992). Potato growth from 
emergence to tuberization was modelled according to previous work by the authors 
(Stalham et al. in press). For details on data source and model assumptions regarding 
75 Landscape amenity quality may also be reduced. For studies detailing the economic valuation of 
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date of planting, soil temperature estimation, scab risk, irrigation scheduling, 
cumulative water use and soil moisture deficits see the report. 
The MLURI report attempts to classify each year in the 1989 - 98 period as 'dry', 
'average' or 'wet' on the basis of a) rainfall, b) evapotranspiration and c) irrigation 
requirement during the summer period (June - August). It concludes, ' it proved 
impossible to use a singe season for 'dry', 'average' or 'wet' scenario, but the best 
way of categorising would appear to be irrigation demand' (Crabtree et al. 2000). 
It must be noted that the derived leaching functions were based on stylised wet, mean 
and dry 'annual' rainfall which cut across calendar years (August - August). Thus in 
linking the leaching and production function for potatoes (for each weather 
condition) with the MLURI reports' associated irrigation regime it became necessary 
to assume that: 
The 1989 June-August period with 'average' summer rainfall and high 
evapotranspiration, and irrigation requirement corresponded with dry weather 
conditions. 
The 1991 June-August period with 'average' rainfall and evapotranspiration 
but 'low' irrigation corresponded with mean weather conditions. 
While the 1998 June-August season with the 'wet' rainfall and low 
evapotranspiration and irrigation requirement corresponded with wet weather 
conditions. 
It should be noted that Dr Mark Staiham (Cambridge University) potato growth 
modeller for the MLURI report liaised with Eunice Lord (ADAS) to calibrate the 
potato growth (table 6.10) and leaching functions (table 6.11) under different 
irrigation regimes and weather conditions. The potato leaching data was generated by 
NIETCAT and regressed in MICROFIT similar to the crops mentioned earlier. 
Scab was controlled through irrigation. It was assumed that infected tubers with a 
scab severity greater than 3% of surface area would be rejected for high quality 
river flow ecological benefits see (Willis and Garrod 1995). 
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packing; and if the proportion of scabbed tubers exceeded 30%, packers would not 
be able to differentiate and the sample would be rejected for a lower price market 
(processing or bag trade). The percentage of scab per hectare of produce for all 
combinations of weather, river flow restriction and irrigation regime is listed in table 
6.10. Scab is the only differentiating aspect of tuber quality, other quality parameters 
such as cracking, secondary growth, bruising etc. are not considered. 
Besides the option of not irrigating potatoes, the modelling process allowed for two 
irrigation regimes termed optimum and restricted. Of the two, optimum irrigation 
resulted in the better quality potato crop with significantly less incidence of scab. 
However, it must be noted that the 'optimum' strategy differs from full irrigation, in 
that full irrigation prevents any loss of quality through scab infection, whereas 
optimum irrigation allows the maximum acreage of potato land to be irrigated with 
an acceptable level of scab. Optimum gives the best financial return, as the reduction 
in packable yield under optimal irrigation was outweighed by the larger tonnage of 
potatoes grown which met packing specifications. 
Thus the potato crop may be divided into scabbed and scab free, the former being 
mostly associated with inadequate or 'restricted' irrigation, while the latter to a great 
extent with optimal irrigation. The difference is reflected in the market price of 
potatoes as a hectare of the 'optimally irrigated' crop which has a lower scab 
proportion and slightly greater yield is more profitable than a hectare of 'restricted' 
or 'un-irrigated' potato land. By restricting available irrigation water (through river 
flow controls) the regulatory authority lowers the profitability margin per hectare, 
prompting a shift in land allocation from optimal to restricted irrigation which 
reduces the incentive to apply as much nitrogen. 
The potato and irrigation modelling yielded the total acreage of potato crops allowed 
under optimal and restricted irrigation for each river flow restriction in every 
representative year (see tables 6.12, 6.13, and 6.14). These upper bounds on acreage 
acted as constraints in the economic model reflecting the scarcity of irrigation water 
in each year. It must be noted that in the MLURI report, abstraction controls were not 
imposed to curb diffuse pollution but to simply ensure a minimum river flow. 
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Table 6.10: Potato Nitrogen Response Function 




Restrict Pi 02 03 R 2  
Scab Physical 
Condition Regime (%) Yield 
'on (tlha) 
76.1 -32.08 -0.01993 0.994 68.59 
Dry Optimum NE 
(0.0024) (0.0068) (0.568E-4)  
0 
55 -17.56 -0.01993 0.989 48.686 
Dry Optimum NP 
(0.0056) (0.0049) (0.783E-3)  
0 
55 -17.56 -0.01993 0.989 48.686 
Dry Optimum NT 
(00056) (0.0049) (0.783E-3)  
87.5 
Dry Unirrigated NE 
50.9 -14.36 -0.01993 0.989 
87.5 
44.98 
(0.00 159) (0.0085) (0.652E-4)  
50.9 -14.36 -0.01993 0.989 44.98 
Dry Unirrigated NF 
(0.00159) (0.0085) (0.652E-4)  
87.5 
50.9 -14.36 -0.01993 0.989 44.98 
Dry Unirrigated NT 
(0.00159) (0.0085) (0.652E-4)  
87.5 
63.4 -26.24 -0.01993 0.987 56.29 
Mean Optimum NE 
(0.00098) (0.00791) (0.367E-3)  
3.1 
63.4 -26.24 -0.01993 0.987 56.29 
Mean Optimum NF 
(0.00098) (0.00791) (0.367E-3)  
3.1 
63.4 -26.24 -0.01993 0.987 56.29 
Mean Optimum NT 
(0.00098) (0.00791) (0.367E-3)  
3.1 
Mean Restricted NE 
60.6 -23.73 -0.01993 0.981 
15.6 
53.68 
(0.0046) (0.00427) (0.592E-3)  
Mean Restricted NF 
60.6 -23.73 -0.01993 0.981 
15.6 
53.68 
(0.0046) (0.00427) (0.592E-3)  
60.6 -23.73 -0.01993 0.981 53.68 
Mean Restricted NT 
(0.0046) (0.00427) (0.592E-3)  
15.6 
56.33 -17.56 -0.01993 0.984 50.01 
Mean Unirrigated NE 
(0.0028) (0.00754) (0.122E-3)  
15.6 
Mean Unirrigated NF 
56.33 -17.56 -0.01993 0.984 
15.6 
50.01 
(0.0028) (0.00754) (0.122E-3)  
56.33 -17.56 -0.01993 0.984 50.01 
Mean Unirrigated NT 
(0.0028) (0.00754) (0.122E-3)  
15.6 
60.6 -23.73 -0.01993 0.991 53.68 
Wet Optimum NE 
(0.0386) (0.00 128) (0.985E-4)  
0 
60.6 -23.73 -0.01993 0.991 53.68 
Wet Optimum NF 
(0.0386) (0.00128) (0.985E-4)  
0 
60.6 -23.73 -0.01993 0.991 53.68 
Wet Optimum NT 
(0.0386) (0.00128) (0.985E-4)  
0 
60.6 -23.73 -0.01993 0.991 53.68 
Wet Restricted NE 
(0.0386) (0.00128) (0.985E-4)  
3.1 
60.6 -23.73 -0.01993 0.991 53.68 
Wet Restricted NT 
(0.0386) (0.00 128) (0.985E-4)  
3.1 
60.6 -23.73 -0.01993 0.991 53.68 
Wet Unirrigated NE 
(0.0386) (0.00128) (0.985E-4)  
3.1 
60.6 -23.73 -0.01993 0.991 53.68 
Wet Unirrigated NF 
(0.0386) (0.00128) (0.985E-4)  
3.1 
60.6 -23.73 -0.01993 0.991 53.68 
Wet Uninigated NT 
(0.0386) (0.00128) (0.985E-4)  
3.1 
(No optimum N fertiliser rate is shown as the packable and scabbed potato yield fetch different market 
prices.) 
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Table 6.11: Potato leaching function 
Functional Form: 	+ £ 
Weather Irrigation River Flow e1  e 2 R2  Condition Regime Restriction 
Dry Optimum NE 
8.721 3.66E-05 2.296 
0.993 
(0.914) (0.61E-13) (0.637)  
Dry Optimum NF 
8.721 3.66E-05 2.296 
0.993 
(0.914) (0.61E-13) (0.637)  
Dry Optimum NT 
8.721 3.66E-05 2.296 
0.993 
(0.914) (0.61E-13) (0.637)  
Dry Unirrigated NE 
2.76 0.00244 1.693 
0.987 
(0.879) (0.31E..12) (0.797)  
Dry Unirrigated NF 
2.76 0.00244 1.693 
0.987 
(0.879) (0.31E12) (0.797)  
Dry Unirrigated NT 
2.76 0.00244 1.693 
0.987 
(0.879) (0.31E-12) (0.797)  
Mean Optimum NE 
38.94 3.1OE-09 4.217 
0.976 
(0.987) (0.961E-11) (0.936)  
Mean Optimum NF 
38.94 3.1OE-09 4.217 
0.976 
(0.987) (0.961E-1l) (0.936)  
Mean Optimum NT 
38.94 3.1OE-09 4.217 
0.976 
(0.987) (0.961E-11) (0.936)  
Mean Restricted NE 
3842 5.90E-08 3.719 
0.981 
(0.571) (0.143E-1 1) (0.912)  
Mean Restricted NF 
38.42 5.90E-08 3.719 
0.981 
(0.571) (0.143E-1 1) (0.912)  
Mean Restricted NT 
38.42 5.90E-08 3.719 
0.981 
(0.571) (0.143E-1 1) (0.912)  
Mean Unirrigated NE 
30.87 1.01E-05 2.835 
0.979 
(0.217) (0.85E-10) (0.865)  
Mean Unirrigated NF 
30.87 1.01E-05 2.835 
0.979 
(0.217) (0.85E-10) (0.865)  
Mean Unirrigated NT 
30.87 1.01E-05 2.835 
0.979 
(0.217) (0.85E-10) (0.865)  
Wet Optimum NE 
46.26 7.1OE-08 3.719 
0.975 
(0.964) (0.759E-11) (0.951)  
Wet Optimum NF 
46.26 7.1OE-08 3.719 
0.975 
(0.964) (0.759E-11) (0.951)  
Wet Optimum NT 
46.26 7.1OE-08 3.719 
0.975 
(0.964) (0.759E-11) (0.951)  
Wet Restricted NE 
46.26 7.1OE-08 3.719 
0.975 
(0.964) (0.759E-1 1) (0.951)  
Wet Restricted NF 
46.26 7.1OE-08 3.719 
0.975 
(0.964) (0.759E-1 1) (0.951)  
Wet Restricted NT 
46.26 7.1OE-08 3.719 
0.975 
(0.964) (0.759E-1 1) (0.951)  
Wet Unirrigated NE 
46.26 7.1OE-08 3.719 
0.975 
(0.964) (0.759E-1 1) (0.951)  
Wet Unirrigated NF 
46.26 7.1OE-08 3.719 
0.975 
(0.964) (0.759E-1 1 (0.951)  
Wet Unirrigated NT 
46.26 7.1OE-08 3.719 
0.975 
(0.964) (0.759E-1 1) (0.951)  
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Area (ha) 13 3 
Cum water use (mm) 340 245 
Stress (mm) 14 107 
Irrigation (mm) 160 60 
Drainage (mm) 2 6 
Yield (tlha) 81.6 58.8 
Harvested yield (t/ha) 73.4 52.9 
<40 mm yield (t/ha) 5.8 4.2 
Saleable yield (t/ha) 67.6 48.7 
Days >13.7 mm during scab control 0 0 
Scab incidence (%) 0.0 0.0 
Packable yield (tlha) 67.6 48.7 
Scabbed yield (tlha) 0.0 0.0 







amount (mm) 15 15 
date 23-May 23-May 
2 n Irrigation 
amount (mm) 15 15 
date 30-May 01-Jun 
3rd Irrigation 
amount (mm) 15 15 
date 12-Jun 10-Jun 
4th Irrigation 
amount (mm) 15 15 
date 19-Jun 19-Jun 
5"  Irrigation 
amount (mm) 25 25 
date 30-Jun  
6th Irrigation 
amount (mm) 25 
date 12-Jul  
7th Irrigation 
amount (mm) 25  
date 24-Jul  
Irrigation 
amount (mm) 25  
date 05-Aug  
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Area (ha) 164 65 150 60 137 55 
Cum water use (mm) 283 270 283 270 283 270 
Stress (mm) 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Irrigation (mm) 65 50 65 50 65 50 
Drainage (mm) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yield (t/ha) 68.0 64.7 68.0 64.7 68.0 64.7 
Harvested yield 
(t/ha) 61.2 58.3 61.2 58.3 61.2 58.3 
<40 mm yield (t/ha) 4.9 4.6 4.9 4.6 4.9 4.6 
Saleable yield (tlha) 56.3 53.6 56.3 53.6 56.3 53.6 
Days >13.7 mm 
during scab control 1 5 1 5 1 5 
Scab incidence (%) 3.1 15.6 3.1 15.6 3.1 15.6 
Packable yield (t/ha) 54.6 45.3 54.6 45.3 54.6 45.3 
Scabbed yield (t/ha) 1.8 8.4 1.8 8.4 1.8 8.4 
Irrigation cost (f/ha) 260 200 260 200 260 200 
Irrigation Optimal Restricted Optimal Restricted Optimal Restricted 
Scheduling 98 98 95 95 90 90 
1st amount 15 25 15 25 15 25 
(mm)  
Irrigation 
date 24-May 27-Jul 24-May 27-Jul 24-May 27-Jul 
2 nd 
amount 
25 25 25 25 25 25 
(mm)  
Irrigation 
date 27-Jul 12-Aug 27-Jul 12-Aug 27-Jul 12-Aug 
3rd amount 25 25 25 
(mm) 
Irrigation 
date I 	12-Aug  12-Aug  12-Aug  
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Restricted 90  
Area (ha) 17 450 16 423 14 396 
Cum water use (mm) 270 270 270 270 270 270 
Stress (mm) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Irrigation (mm) 40 25 40 25 40 25 
Drainage (mm) 66 52 66 52 66 52 
Yield (t/ha) 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 
Harvested yield (tlha) 58.3 58.3 58.3 58.3 58.3 58.3 
<40 mm yield (t/ha) 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 
Saleable yield (t/ha) 53.7 53.7 53.7 53.7 53.7 53.7 
Days >13.7 mm during 
scab control 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Scab incidence (%) 0.0 3.1 0.0 3.1 0.0 3.1 
Packable yield (t/ha) 53.7 52.0 53.7 52.0 53.7 52.0 
Scabbed yield (t/ha) 0.0 1.7 0.0 1.7 0.0 1.7 
Irrigation cost (f/ha) 160 100 160 100 160 100 
Irrigation Optimal 
Restricted 98 
Optimal Restricted Optimal Restricted 
Schedulin__________ 98  95 95 90 90 
I Irrigation 
Irrigation amount 15 25 15 25 15 25 
(mm)  
Irrigation 
27-May 07-Jul 27-May 07-Jul 27-May 07-Jul date 
2' Irrigation 
Irrigation amount 25 25 25 
(rnii)  
Irrigation 
07-Jul 07-Jul 07-Jul 
date  
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6.8 Potato and Irrigation Modelling Assumptions and limitations 
The MLI.JRI report assumed a hypothetical soil, i.e. a clay loam/sandy clay 
loam/sandy loam soil with a 7% stone content. For the purposes of this research it 
was assumed that its properties were similar to those of a sandy soil. It should be 
noted that the potato growth and irrigation scheduling relied on rainfall 
measurements taken from the Haddington measuring station, while the rest of the 
crops were assumed to receive an average of all three surrounding metrological 
office stations Haddington, Stobshiel reservoir and Fordel Dean. 
Another assumption is that the prices of outputs and inputs do not vary between 
years and stay constant at the 1997/98 level. The type of irrigation technology 
assumed in the study was a 100mm x 350 in raingun/hosereel; this was the most 
common form of irrigation technology in 1999-2000 (Crabtree et al. 2000). 
The practicality of enforcing minimum river flow restrictions was not considered, for 
example the transaction costs (administrative and enforcement) of enforcing such 
regulation is not accounted for. Another practical consideration concerns the 
prediction of surface irrigation water demand, especially given the presence of 
reservoirs, boreholes, as it is likely the regulator will not have perfect information on 
irrigation technology, reservoir capacity and crop management etc. 
The fact that catchments are not spatially uniform and don't have the same flow at all 
points i.e. low upstream flow. This implies that separate minimum acceptable flows 
(MAFs) and corresponding gauging points may have to be devised for different 
lengths of the river. In reality, a system of continuous monitoring and instantaneous 
response would probably not be plausible as farmers require notice and an erratic 
restriction might induce perverse behaviour by some farmers who over irrigate to 
compensate for an anticipated ban. A more appropriate control would entail an 
averaged restriction based on past weather patterns. 
As only 8 of the 20 farmers in the West Peffer participated in the survey, the MLURI 
report had to estimate the reservoir and borehole capacity. These estimates were not 
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used in the potato modelling listed in table 6.12, 6.13, and 6.14. because they were 
considered approximations. 
6.9 Livestock Farming 
Livestock farming is particularly difficult to model as herd structure and husbandry 
varies considerably and due to the presence of farm payments, such as beef special 
premium 76  and extensification premiums (based on stocking density), besides 
restrictions such as milk quotas. Transfer payment schemes and subsidy incentives 
for both livestock (SOAEFD 1997b) and arable cultivation (SOAEFD 1997a) were 
included in the model. In the discussion below where subsides are mentioned their 
eligibility conditions are assumed to be met. As a general caveat it should be noted 
that during the 1997/98 period beef markets were still greatly affected by the BSE 
crisis and the consequent ban imposed in Spring 1996. The prices budgeted in the 
study assume only a marginal recovery. 
In total 5 types of livestock were modelled, diary cows, low ground suckler cows, 
over winter suckled calves, summer finished beef cattle and low ground sheep. 
Details of modelling assumptions pertaining to all 5 livestock types as well as 
production costs and market prices can be found in the Farm Management Handbook 
1997/98 (SAC 1997). Livestock numbers were converted into Grazing Livestock 
Unit (GLU) using standard conversion factors in the literature (Holmes 1989b; Nix 
1997; SAC 1997). 
Dairy cows were modelled as 'all year' cows producing an annual average of 6,000 
litres of milk with a herd life of 4-5 years, winter feeding period 185 days, calving 
interval 390 days, and a cow size of 600kg approximately. The cow requirements or 
costs besides grazing grass and silage include concentrates77, grainbeet, artificial 
insemination, vet and medicines, and other minor livestock expenses (SAC 1997). 
After considering these the gross margin before forage, i.e. before the cost of silage 
76 
 For example with beef special premiums male calves only are subject to a limit of 90 per head 
(SAC 1997) 
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and grazing production, is around £914. Concentrates are essential in maintaining a 
balanced diet and normally account for roughly 35%, 25% and 15% of the ME 
(metabolised energy) requirement of dairy cows, beef and sheep production (Forbes 
et al. 1980; M.A.F.F. 1984). 
Low ground stickler cows were assumed to have a Feb-Apr calving period. After 
considering their relevant costs (i.e. barley and minerals, calf concentrate, purchased 
straw, vet and medicine, mart commission, haulage, bedding) and subsidies (suckler 
cow premium of £117.36 per cow) their gross margin before forage is £302 per head. 
This assumes the calf's weight at sale or transfer to winter finishing is 250kg. 
Similarly the gross margin before forage for over wintered suckled calves comes to 
£123 for steers and £73 for heifers (with finishing weight 385kg and 355kg 
respectively after 180 days feeding). While the same value for winter finished beef 
cattle is £77 and £71 per head for steers and calves respectively after 150 days of 
finishing. These are stylised statistics, for dairy-beef cross cows bred to a rand of 
mostly continental bulls, and a particular herd structure, mortality, replacement and 
housing system (SAC 1997). 
It was assumed that sheep farming comprised of low ground breeding ewes with 
early finished lamb production (Suffolk crossed with Halfbred, Halfbred, Mule ewes 
with a terminal sire) averaging approximately 140 finished lambs per 100 ewes. The 
lambs are sold at a live weight of around 40 kg and wool sales are included. The 
variable costs considered include barley and minerals, protein supplements, lamb 
concentrate, vet, drugs and dips, mart commission, haulage and shearing. The cost of 
purchased gimmers and replacement rams is also been included. The gross margin 
before grazing and silage production averages £4,781 per 100 ewes. This value 
includes the sheep annual premium at £13.3 per head. The catchment is not eligible 
to receive a hill stock compensatory allowance. 
77 In addition to grainbeet, hay and silage farmer provide protein, mineral and vitamin 
supplementation from conserved feeds (concentrates). Protein based supplements are used in forage-
based diets, especially silages. for both dairy and beef cattle (Beever et al. 2000). 
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Given that only IACS figures on suckler cows, bulls, beef cattle not for breeding, 
cattle under 1 year and total cattle were available (other figures78 could not be 
disclosed because they failed to meet the minimum requirement of 5 holdings) 
certain assumptions about herd structure were made to approximate the overall 
catchment stocking density at 2.2 GLU/ha. The additional exrensfication premium of 
£29.16 per head has been excluded. This is consistent with the observation that such 
premiums are normally awarded to hill stickler cow enterprises with stocking 
densities below 1.4 GLU/ha. The current estimated livestock numbers form the upper 
bounds in the model because they reflect the limited availability of inputs such as 
labour and capital costs and also the presence of farming restrictions such as milk 
quotas. 
Stocking rate influences both individual animal performance and animal output per 
hectare. It is expressed as the number of animals per ha for a given time period. As 
stocking rate is increased, grazing pressure 79  increases, herbage allowance80 
decreases and the level of competition between animals increases. Consequently 
although herbage intake and animal performance decreases, the efficiency of herbage 
utilization (proportion of herbage removed relative to that available) increases (C.S. 
et al. 2000). 
It was assumed that dairy and beef cattle are kept indoors during the winter period 
for 6 months, while sheep are kept indoors for 3 months (Holmes 1989b). During this 
wintering period the energy requirement of animals is predominantly met by silage 
and other supplements i.e. maize or barley silage, or barley and mineral supplements 
etc. 
Initially a 'metabolised energy' (ME) approach was modelled (Forbes et al. 1980; 
M.A.F.F. 1984) which involved calculating the total ME requirement of each type of 
livestock (MJ/kg DM) and its equivalent dry matter content (g/kg). The dry matter 
78 The number of catchment dairy cows and heifers, beef heifers, other dairy cattle for breeding, other 
beef cattle for breeding and lamb statistics were not made available 
79 Grazing pressure is defined as the number of animals per unit mass of herbage. 
° Herbage allowance is the weight of herbage DM (dry matter) per animal. 
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content is multiplied by the number of each livestock and equated with the dry matter 
content of grass and silage produced. However this procedure when compared with 
estimated statistics (SAC 1997) on the quantity of silage and grazing grass (yield) 
required to satisfy each GLU of livestock proved unnecessarily complicated and time 
consuming - it slowed the optimisation process and required the inclusion of 
additional constraints (bounds). The adopted procedure was also better because it 
allowed including other associated costs of livestock husbandry in a comparatively 
simpler manner. The results of both procedures were marginally different. 
A linear silage production function, assuming 3 cuts, was estimated by regressing 
data from the Farm Management Handbook (SAC 1997) assuming a dry matter 
(DM) of 220 g/kg of settled silage. The model permits the option of purchasing 
silage. In reality there is marked seasonal variation in grass production, with 
maximum production in late spring and early summer. This seasonal surplus is 
harvested to make conserved feed for winter rations. Forage was traditionally 
conserved as hay, made in late summer, and is still an important feed, particularly for 
young stock. However since 1970's there has been a widespread adoption of silage 
as the major winter feed. 
The aim of haymaking is to preserve grass or other forage by drying to a moisture 
content < 18%, at which point microbial and plant enzyme activity is minimal. Silage 
making (both bale and clamp) involves the additional use of chemical (acids) and 
biological additives (inoculants etc.) to conserve the protein content. Silage is 
generally described in terms of their pH values, the concentration of their 
fermentation end-products (lactic and volatile fatty acids) and their ammonia-N 
contents (Merry et al. 2000). Silage production also releases 'effluent'. Silage 
effluent has a biochemical oxygen demand of up to 90,000 mg oxygen per liter, 
which is almost 200 times more polluting than raw sewage, and even more polluting 
if released to water courses. It is regulated under the Control of Pollution Act 1992. 
There is not much rough grazing land (peaty and shallow soil in table 5.2 amount to 
103.91 ha) in the catchment and it is assumed to supplement sheep production. The 
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approximate value of the number of ewes sustained by rough grazing is estimated by 
calculating the ME provided per ha of rough grazing - assuming an average rough 
grazing ME 6.5 KJ per kg DM of herbage production (Forbes et al. 1980; Holmes 
1989a). 
For both conserved feeding and grazing in situ, the feeding value of any forage 
depends on its ability to supply nutrients to the animal. This in turn has three main 
components: voluntary intake, nutrient content, and the animal's ability to absorb and 
utilize the nutrients. Whether directly or after storage (silage/hay) grass has to be 
utilized by animals before conversion into useful products; levels of utilized output 
are expressed in terms of energy, e.g. GJ/ha of utilized metabolizable energy (UME). 
'UME output from grass shows large variations between farms, even for similar 
swards under similar inputs of fertilized N' (Forbes et al. 1980). Losses occur under 
grazing, particularly under poor drainage conditions, besides during harvesting, 
conservation and feeding out of the crop as hay or silage. 
Grazing efficiency is defined as the proportion of herbage grown which is consumed 
by livestock and ranges from 50% to 90% (Holmes 1989a). Although typically a 
grazing efficiency of 70% is assumed (Holmes 1989b), after consulting with an East 
Lothian dairy and beef farmer an estimate of 78% was used. 
Farm Yard Manure 
Faeceas and urine from housed livestock are commonly managed as semi-liquid 
slurries or solid farm yard manures (FYM) and spread on to grassland as fertilizer. 
Livestock wastes are complex materials varying in physical, chemical and biological 
composition. They all contain water and wide range of carbon compounds, with 
appreciable amounts of plant nutrients and trace elements. 
There are three potential sources of externalities from wastes. Firstly, a point-source 
of watercourses may result from, for example, burst or overflowing slurry stores. 
Secondly, diffuse pollution from leakages can occur, especially of plant nutrients, to 
both the aqueous environment (ammonia NH3 ) and the atmosphere (greenhouse 
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gasses e.g. nitrous oxide (N20) and methane (CH 4 ). Leaching N losses during 
storage of FYM depend on where and how it is stacked over winter. Thirdly gaseous 
losses or volatilisation to the atmosphere varies considerably depending on 
environmental factors and management. Thus estimating the N available from FYM 
is not considered an 'exact science' (SAC 1992). The availability of nitrogen in 
manure can vary from 50% to 75% while losses from volatilisation can range from 
20% to 60% (Ryden 1984). 
Besides the EU Nitrate Directive there are national or regional recommendations and 
regulations for controlling pollution in the EU. Most of these consist of licensing 
requirements for housed animals, minimum periods of storage for manure, and 
prohibited periods and methods of application to land. These are tailored to the 
requirements of individual countries. 
Estimates of the N content of farm yard manure (FYM) and slurry from cattle and 
sheep were estimated (pigs and poultry farming in the catchment is negligible in 
comparison and excluded) assuming farmers comply with the code of good practice 
'Prevention of Environmental Pollution from Agricultural Activity' (SOAFD), or the 
PEPFAA code, in all aspects of collection, storage and land application of FYM. The 
code stipulates procedures for land application, such as rate and uniformity of 
spreading, so that nutrient loss to water bodies is minimised. 
Scottish Agricultural College (SAC) guidance or 'technical note' practices and 
figures were assumed as their recommendations are circulated widely among 
farmers. Estimates of the N 'available' to the crop in the season of application for 
each type of livestock (weight adjusted) were calculated based on SAC technical 
notes (SAC 1992). The total N content of FYM comprises of available and 
organically bound N. The organic fraction is not available in the year of application 
and only of practical significance if large amounts are applied annually (some 
commentators assume that 20% of the remaining non-available organically bound N 
is released in each of the three years after application (Lord 1992)). 
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It should be clarified that although casual labour costs are included in the analysis, 
field and mobile machinery, fuel, building upkeep, drainage, fencing, miscellaneous 
costs etc. have not. Thus most labour charges and capital costs were not considered. 
Setaside 
The option of voluntary setaside land was included at a gross margin of £207.11 per 
ha including area payments. The catchment is not designated a less favourable area 
(LFA) hence non-LFA arable area payments apply. Obligatory setaside land was 
modelled with a gross margin of £301 per ha. It is assumed that the setaside land 
undergoes natural regeneration and thus seed costs (such as those of ryegrass or 
white clover) are not included. 
An estimate of N leaching from setaside land was generated from the estimated 
grazing grass N loss function assuming natural regeneration of grass. In keeping with 
good agricultural practice it is assumed that setaside land is not temporary or 
ploughed as this releases lots of potentially leachable N. 
Nitrate Modelling Summary 
To summarise NITCAT essentially determined the amount of nitrate leaving the root 
zone and subsoil for all crop, soil, weather, minimum river flow restriction and 
potato irrigation regime combinations. It was assumed that the water from the root 
zone mainly leaves the soil via deep drains and goes directly to the river within a day 
or within a few days. Hence data in the following chapter is presented as a daily 
average for every week. 
In reality there would be some 'vertical' nitrate leaching to groundwater. If water 
spends a long time in an aquifer before entering the river as 'base flow' there will be 
an averaging of concentrations (on a flow-proportional basis) over periods of months 
to centuries. Thus water originating from groundwater tends to have a fairly stable 
concentration. However modelling groundwater leaching is notoriously difficult and 
requires complicated dynamic modelling of catchment specific hydrological and 
geological processes which was beyond the scope of this study. 
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Many rivers are a combination of what was modelled (i.e. direct drainage to rivers) 
plus a groundwater component. Thus in winter when flows are high most of the 
water will be quick-pathway water from the land, showing fluctuating 
concentrations. While summer low flow concentrations would mainly reflect 'base 
flow' from groundwater (Lord 2002). 
Thus overall the model estimates the total nitrogen in the root zone of all arable 
crops. It is assumed that this is transported to the river by rainwater or irrigation 
water via deep drains or surface runoff, where is diluted with a ground water 'base 
flow' contribution with no N content. It was assumed that the base flow can be 
estimated by averaging summer flow. This 'heroic' assumption was made because 
estimating the overall river concentration was required. Unfortunately detailed river 
and ground water hydrological modelling was beyond the scope of the study. 
6.10 Economic Model 
A non-linear model was written in General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) 
(Brooke et al. 1998) and solved using the CONOPT 2 solver (Stolbjerg-Drud 1993). 
CONOPT 2 solver is designed for models with non-linear constraints and a few 
degrees of freedom (Stolbjerg-Drud 1993).The large model comprised of 27865 
single equations and 9049 single variables, where single refers to the individual rows 
and columns in the generated matrix. The results were confirmed by using the 
MINOS 5 solver which yielded similar results within reasonable bounds (see 
appendix 6.1 for a brief mathematical formulation of the model). 
The model essentially minimises the cost of achieving the environmental standard 
(i.e. the WFD or Nitrate Directive (91/616) - which sets an upper bound of 11.3 mg 
per litre of nitrogen or 50mg of nitrates in drinking water) in the catchment. The 
regulator's objective is to minimise the difference between the unrestricted 
catchment profit (i.e. in the absence of regulation) and the catchment profits under 
environmental regulation. As all prices are exogenously determined, the 
minimisation of abatement costs is equivalent to inaxinzising restricted profit under 
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regulation (Comes 1992). Put simply the problem of minimising the income forgone 
due to the environmental standard 0 can be written as: 
Mini C(e,) 
subject to 	e1 !~ 0 
where 	C(ej)={fl(p,w,x)_(fJ,(p,w,i))} 
The function c(.) is the catchment abatement cost, i.e. the difference between 
unrestricted f11(.)and restricted profitsfl1() for each unit of land i. Where p is a 
vector of output prices, w a vector of input prices, x the unrestricted input use and 
the restricted input use. A more detailed explanation of the modelling framework is 
presented in Appendix 6.1. Such a framework allows for input substitution between 
land and fertiliser, i.e. both the intensive and extensive margin effects of policies can 
be examined. However it cannot accurately predict changes in production decisions 
regarding the input set and crop mix, as labour and capital (hence technology) are not 
considered. Input substitution is an important aspect of environmental policy design. 
'Understanding input substitution is critical. Alternative policy strategies will 
provide different incentives to agricultural producers that may cause themn to change 
their input sets' (Bouzaher and Shorgen 1995). 
However it should be noted that the above conclusion is based on modelling of 
pesticides which have many more close substitutes than nitrogen. In most empirical 
studies of environmental regulation the capital and labour costs are ignored and 
assumed not to affect the relative ranking of alternative policies. 
6.11 Transfer Payments and Transactions Costs 
It is assumed the regulator's objective is to ensure compliance with the 
environmental standard at least cost to society. The cost of environmental regulation 
comprises abatement and transaction costs. Where 'abatement cost' is the reduction 
in catchment profit from reduced catchment wide application of nitrogen fertiliser 
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under a policy and 'transaction costs' are the administrative costs borne by regulator 
to ensure compliance (Beavis and Walker 1983b). Transaction costs include the 
designing, running and monitoring costs of policies (Stavins 1995). The inclusion of 
transaction costs would enable realistic policy ranking (allowing the comparison 
between economic and administrative efficiency) however whether reliable proxies 
exist is questionable. A recent paper (Kampas and White 2002) has used the closest 
available estimates by approximating the weighted average of EU Agri-
Environmental Schemes (Agricultural-Committee 1997). Although it is safe to make 
some generalisations such as, the transaction costs of emission based policies are 
higher than input based ones, this study ignores transaction costs on the ground that 
accurate values are unavailable at present. 
Although the model accounts for existing subsidies and grants, any transfer payments 
made to induce compliance with the environmental standard are ignored as they 
distort the economic comparison. Thus tax revenues are not included in abatement 
costs as they are transfer payments from firm/farm to regulator and do not contribute 
to economic welfare (Prato 1998). It is argued that transfer payments do not affect 
the performance of the regional economy as a whole (Hoel 1998). This is the basis of 
the difference between 'farm profit' (with transfer payments) and 'resource profit' 
(excluding transfer payments) in some of the tables listed in the following chapter. In 
practice, assuming that the purpose of regulation is to control pollution and not 
generate income through taxation, the regulator can rebate the taxation amount. The 
double dividend hypothesis argues that such tax revenues may alleviate the distortion 
of pre-existing taxes (Pezzy and Park 1998). However investigating this was beyond 
the scope and purpose of this research and so not considered. 
The following chapter presents the baseline solution and results of the model. 
185 
Chapter 6: Catchment Modelling 
Appendix 6.1: A Concise Mathematical Representation of the Model 
Regulatory objective 
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Bounds on land allocation: 	G1 =I gl 	G, L = l 	(EQ 15) 
Land use constraints: 	 Z gl1 +1 l + Ify 2 lc ~ T 	(EQ 16) 
Crop Rotational Constraints: + 1 5 r + yt 2r 	0 (EQ 17) 
Crop Nitrate load (kg/ha): 	 = 	+ Sf (n '\ 2cs 	(EQ 18) csl 
Livestock Nitrate load (kg/ha): 	 v 	8S + G (jib )1c 	(EQ 19) 
Potato Nitrate load (kg/ha): 	xr" = 
OK- + 1C(, )2i 	 (EQ 20) 














C S 	 t S 	 i 
Environmental Quality Constraint: WgW1c 0 	 (EQ 22) 
The regulator's objective is to minimise the difference between the unrestricted 
catchment profit nov and the catchment profit under different pollution control 
policies. Where 0 is the prevailing weather condition that year (dry, mean, or wet) 
and Kis the catchment river flow restriction (no flow restriction or 98,95 and 90 
percentile flow restriction) enforced by the regulator. U"for each äJKcombination 
is the outcome of an unrestricted run of the model without any regulation. Thus when 
considering a particular regulatory policy it remains constant and independent of the 
optimisation problem. The catchment profit in the objective function is defined as the 
return to the producer's management and allocation of resources over the cost of total 
catchment 	nitrogen 	consumption 	111w 11  ncc l (arable 	crops), 
w' 	i721 (potatoes), w' 1u 5 gl15 (silage and grazing grass)} and all other 
secondary costs of farming C. Where p is the market price of arable crop c, p the 
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market price of potato quality j, and Pb'5  the market return from one grazing 
livestock unit (GLU) of livestock type b. w' refers to the cost of nitrogen fertiliser, 
n and l is the nitrogen applied and land allocated to arable crop c (excluding 
potatoes and grassland) con soil type s. glt,, andu ç refer respectively to land and 
nitrogen allocated to grassland type t (grazing and cutting), while 27Kand iir" refer 
to land and nitrogen applied to potato crop under irrigation regime i (optimal, 
restricted or un-irrigated). 
Secondary expenses C (EQ 2) refer to all other catchment production costs 
excluding that of nitrogen fertiliser application: fb, = (k11 ...... .kb,1 ) is a vector of ni 
costs per unit of livestock type (b) associated with feeding and other animal 
husbandry expenses, 	z, = (z .....z) is a vector of it per hectare costs of 
grassland management, v = (vi .......vcr )is a vector of 	per hectare costs 
J(cii associated with the production of each arable crop type and 	= 	 is a 
vector of x costs per hectare associated with potato farming including irrigation costs 
under each weather condition. 
The crop production function equation set (EQ 3) yields the output (kg/ha) for each 
crop soil combination (the source of heterogeneity in the catchment) and is based on 
estimated coefficients 7, 	y v. The grassland yield for both silage and 
01 2 3 grazing grass on all soil types is given by the EQ 5, where 	 are 
estimated coefficients. EQ 6 ensures that the actual grazing grass and silage 
production meets the requirements of livestock numbers ab.  If EQ 11 is satisfied 
then livestock qualifies for certain grants and subsides which are accounted for 
in Pb  EQ 15 is a constraint on the allocation of land, and ensures that the model 
allocation is similar to the actual situation on the ground. Most of these constraints 
were not binding. EQ 16 ensures the land allocation to any soil type does not exceed 
the actual acreage of each soil type. EQ 17 is a representation of the two 
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representative rotational constraints in the catchment. As the model only allows 
potato allocation on sandy soils, i' = 0 for silty and loamy soils and I for sandy. 
EQ 12 is a set of equations for every weather (J) and river flow restriction (K ) 
giving the potato yield per hectare under every irrigation regime i (optimal, 
restricted, and unirrigated) for nitrogen application l/. Where 
O/C luic lux- lux- 
E, Eli  ,E,Eare estimated coefficients for the potato production function. 
EQ 13, converts potato crop yield into quality categories j (scabbed and scab free), 
given the available irrigation water under each weather condition. EQ 14, limits the 
allocation of land to every irrigation category based on the available irrigation water. 
EQ 18 estimates the total nitrogen load (per ha) E 5  for a total nitrogen application 
of 	(per ha) based on the weather estimated coefficientsCS' cs, 	 Whereas 
EQ 19 and EQ 20 provide the annual load per ha from Livestock/grassland (V) and 
potato (Xi ) based on the weather estimated coefficients 0 S ,O,82 S and 
OYIC OK- 07C 
respectively. It is assumed that the nitrogen from animal waste 
allowed by MAFF regulation is applied to grassland. Ab  is a vector of the estimated 
annual N content of one GLU of each livestock type. Therefore EQ 7 provides the 
per hectare availability of Nitrogen from animal waste to grassland, which along with 
the artificial N fertiliser ot, provides the total Nitrogen application to grassland ,u, 
per ha (EQ 8). The annual loads from EQ 18, 19, and 20 were converted into the 
average daily load for every week of a weather condition based on computations of 
NITCAT whichgave three vectors. 'F = (1& ,'a) is a proportionality 
vector of the average daily arable crop load for each week (w), 
W 117(i tij 	wlu = , 	. , oo 	a proportionality vector of the average daily 
grassland/livestock crop load for each week , and 'A = ( i . ...... a 
proportionality vector of the average daily potato crop load from each irrigation 
regime for each week. 
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Likewise the estimated daily average drainage (rainwater / rain + irrigation water) 
lu from each catchment activity ( ' N CS arable crops, " XI grassland, 
%1  h7' potatoes) ts 
for every week under all three weather conditions was calculated from the nitrate 
leaching model runs. EQ 21 gives the overall river concentration from farming 
activities at the mouth of the river assuming instantaneous mixing. 	VR is an 
approximation of daily river base flow for ever week under each weather condition. 
Unit conversions have been ignored in EQ 21, EQ 22 is the environmental constraint 
relating to river nitrate pollution, where 8 is the standard. 
As the model was run for every weather condition and river flow control, the 
potato/irrigation variables, yield/leaching equations, and constraints varied 
accordingly. Similarly when a regulatory policy was considered corresponding 
adjustments to the constraints and constants were made. 
190 




This chapter will present the results of empirical modelling outlined in the previous 
chapter. It is divided into an analysis of a) the model's baseline calibration, b) the 
presence of river restrictions (MAF) on instruments to control NPS nitrate pollution, 
c) changes in catchment land and fertiliser allocation under single and 'mixed' 
instrument NPS control policies, d) the comparative performance ranking of all 
policies under different weather conditions, and e) general conclusion. 
7.2 Baseline Calibration 
A comparison of the actual situation in the catchment as deduced from IACS data 
and the 'basic' baseline solution (i.e. without regulation) is presented in table 7.1. 
This table is termed the 'basic' baseline because it does not include the effect of river 
flow restrictions or different weather conditions. It is assumed that minimum 
acceptable flow (MAF) restrictions and weather affects the break-up of the total 
potato acreage into the 3 irrigation types, i.e. optimal, restricted and unirrigated - and 
therefore the catchment profitability. 
In addition to the percentage deviation column in Table 7.1, two basic summary 
measures of how closely the bio-physical economic model replicates the baseline 
where calculated: a) Mean Absolute Deviation8 ' (MAD), and b) Percentage Absolute 
Deviation 82  (PAD). For arable activities (grassland and setaside included) MAD = 
83.58, while PAD = 20.58. Whereas for livestock MAD = 35.96 and PAD = 10.13. 
In calculating the statistics for livestock all animal numbers were converted to GLU 
(Grazing Livestock Units) for a meaningful comparison (SAC 1997). It must be 
noted that these statistics could only be calculated for activities for which the actual 
Mean Absolute Deviation MAD = 	I x. - I, where xi are the N observations and 7 their 
N 1 
mean. 
82  Percentage Absolute Deviation PAD is calculated in the same way as MAD except it uses 
percentage values instead. 
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catchment situation was known, i.e. disclosed values. Thus activities termed NA 
(Not Applicable) or 'not disclosed' in table 7.1 could not be included. 
Table 7.1 Comparison between Actual Catchment Activities and Model 
Baseline Solution 






Arable Area (ha)  
Potatoes 591.85 590 -0.31 
Winter wheat 1968.61 1950.01 -0.94 
Spring Barley 774.68 1030 32.96 
Winter Barley 256.84 NA NA 
Winter Oilseed Rape 145.94 116.46 -20.20 
Protein Peas 199.46 NA NA 
Total Arable 3937.38 3686.47 - 6.37 
Grassland Area (ha)  
Permanent Grass 286.55 479.77 67.43 
Temporary Grass 216.53 NA NA 
Total Grassland 503.08 479.77 - 4.63 
Setaside (ha) ____________________________ 	________________ 
Obligatory 	 183.01 	 180 	 -1.64 
Livestock Numbers  
Stickler cows 384 400 4.17 
Suckled calves Not Disclosed 400 NA 
Over-wintering calves Not Disclosed 400 NA 
Intensive Beef Not Disclosed 180 NA 
Bulls 15 NA NA 
Beef 	Cattle 	not 	for 
breeding  
706 820 16.14 
Cattle under 1 year 445 400 -10.11 
Dairy cattle Not Disclosed 300 NA 
Ewes Not Disclosed 50 NA 
Total Cattle GLU Not Disclosed 1106 NA 
Stocking density Not Disclosed 2.2 NA 
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7.3 Impact of Minimum Acceptable Flow (MAF) on NPS Control Policies 
Section 7.3 will detail the modelled impact of minimum acceptable flow (MAF) 
restrictions on NPS control policies for the West Peffer catchment under different 
weather conditions, beginning with the mean or average catchment weather. 
7.3.1 Mean Weather Conditions 
The impact of a catchment artificial fertiliser tax (nitrogen input tax) was simulated 
by running the model iteratively with increasing nitrogen costs. Figure 7.1 shows the 
percentage increase in the price of nitrogen required to reduce the number of weeks 
in the year which exceed the standard with different river flow standards (MAF 
restrictions) under mean weather conditions. It is evident that with irrigation 
restrictions in place the required increase in nitrogen taxation is less than without any 
river flow controls and that the more stringent the surface water extraction control 
the lower the optimal tax. Secondly as the regulator tightens the requirement to meet 
the water quality standard (regulatory target) the greater the difference between 
taxation required with and without the river flow restrictions. 
As detailed in previous chapters, the potato crop may be divided into scabbed and 
scab free, the former being mostly associated with inadequate or 'restricted' 
irrigation, while the latter, to a great extent, with 'optimal' irrigation. The difference 
is reflected in the market price of potatoes as a hectare of the 'optimally irrigated' 
crop which has a lower scab proportion and slightly greater yield is more profitable 
than a hectare of 'restricted' or unirrigated potato land. By restricting irrigation 
(through MAF controls) the regulatory authority lowers the profitability margin per 
hectare, prompting a shift in land allocation from optimal to restricted irrigation 
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Four other measures to reduce 
diffuse nitrogen pollution under 
mean weather conditions. were 
considered. These were stocking 
density reduction (figure 7.2), 
setaside83 restriction (figure 7.3), 
input quota (figure 7.4) and 
emission taxation (figure 7.5). 
The results are, for the most part, 
consistent with those for input 
taxation i.e. the presence of river 
MAP controls reduces the need to 
I 	 I I impose as stringent an instrument 
level to control diffuse nitrogen pollution when compared to the absence of any river 
flow restrictions. Under all regulatory regimes (NPS control policies) the distinction 
between the presence and absence of a river flow restriction is clear; the exception 
being stocking density reduction, where the difference is marginal. 
However the ranking amongst the three river flow restrictions is not consistent. 
Irrespective of the pollution control policy, one would expect that the presence of the 
tightest river flow restriction (901h1  percentile) would required the least stringent 
diffuse pollution control policy followed by the 95th  and then 98th  percentile river 
flow restriction. The results are not entirely consistent in this regard due to certain 
rotational and livestock restrictions in the model. It seems that within the feasible 
region there are land, nitrogen and crop/soil allocations under the 95 1h  and 98' 
percentile river flow restrictions which result in marginally less diffuse pollution than 
under the 901h  percentile restriction. This is by no means an error; rather it highlights 
the complexity of bio-physical economic modelling. 
83 It is assumed that setaside land is not rotational. Rotational setaside is exacerbates diffuse nitrogen 
leaching. 
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7.3.2 Wet Weather Conditions 
 
The same runs where carried out 
under the 'wet year weather' 
scenario where the difference in 
diffuse nitrate pollution between any 
of the three minimum river flow 
controls and their absence was 
negligible (figure 7.6). It is 
intuitively clear that irrespective of 
the river flow regime (MAF) and 
irrigation type (optimal, restricted or 
unirrigated) the leaching rates were 
fairly similar due to the high volume 
of water flow through the soil. Thus 
when rainfall is plentiful irrigation controls will not affect nitrogen input or land 
allocation as much. Therefore in terms of diffuse nitrate control in a wet year the 
presence of river flow restrictions has no real impact. The need to investigate various 
policies in the dry year did not arise as baseline runs showed pollution levels well 
below the standard. 
Nevertheless, the question is whether it is more cost-effective to control diffuse 
pollution in the catchment with irrigation controls or by using conventional 
instruments which limit the polluting input's consumption. Suppose the regulatory 
target was to ensure that the standard was exceeded no more than 8 weeks of the 
year. In the absence of a river flow control (MAF) this required an input tax of 
266.66%84,  whereas under a 95th  percentile river flow control the required input tax 
was 233.33%. The extra resource cost (due to loss of productivity) from the higher 
tax under no river flow control amounts to £24,140 whereas the resource cost under 
the lower tax rate required with river flow controls is £901,954. Therefore as a 
means to control diffuse pollution river flow controls alone are not an efficient 
84  The market price of nitrogen in 1997/98 was £0.42 per kg. 
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mechanism. The reduction in pollution in the presence of river flow controls was not 
much when compared to the reduced crop profitability. Whether this can be said of 
other irrigated crops depends on the crop's input demand function for irrigation 
water (hence climate), production and nitrogen leaching function. It must be noted 
that this analysis does not consider the transaction/implementation costs of imposing 
and monitoring percentile bans on river flow which are likely to be higher than those 
of enforcing input taxation. Note that due to the inclusion of existing agricultural 
support payments profit overstate the net social benefits (similarly lost profits 
overstate recourse costs). 
The impact of river flow controls on diffuse pollution depends on catchment specific 
MAE restrictions, regulatory targets, farming's dependence on surface irrigation 
water, weather, catchment hydrology and spatial aspects of extraction. In designing 
diffuse nitrogen pollution regulation in the presence of river flow restrictions the 
income distributional effects on irrigating and non-irrigating farmers will also need 
to be considered. Unfortunately the model assumed that potatoes were only grown on 
sandy soils. It would be interesting to compare the efficiency gains from river flow 
controls on potato leaching on other soil types. 
7.4 Catchment Impact of NPS Control Policies 
This section will detail catchment impact of different NPS control policies. In the 
tables which follow the term catchment profit refers to the 'farmer' profit in the 
presence of transfer payments such as taxes and setaside subsidies; whereas resource 
profit is the profit in the absence of any transfer payments. Thus 'farm profit' 
includes a setaside subsidy of £207.11 per ha (SOAEFD 1997a; SOAEFD 1997b), 
which is offered to farmers if they voluntarily setaside land in excess of their 
obligatory commitment under the Arable Areas Payment Scheme (AA-PS), is 
assumed to be offered to catchment farmers under all NIPS control policies 
considered. Similarly assuming the regional ceilings are not exceeded an 
extensification premium of f29.16 per head on both Beef Special Premium and 
Suckler Cow Premium is added if  under any policy the stocking density falls below 
1.4 GLU/ha and £42.12 if less than 1.0 GLU/ha (SAC 1997). 
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Two levels of standard compliance (or leniency of implementing the WFD 
11 .3mg/litre nitrate standard) are considered as policy targets i.e. one which permits 
the standard to be exceeded a maximum of 8 weeks of the year and one 6 weeks of 
the year. The catchment changes brought about by implementing a particular NPS 
control policy (i.e. instrument or instrument mixes) which ensures compliance with 
both regulatory target levels (i.e. 8 and 6 week standard target) are listed. The tables 
in the following sections will only consider NPS control policies under mean and wet 
weather conditions and with or without a NT (or 90 percentile) minimum 
acceptable river flow (MAF) restriction. Only the 90th  percentile MAF restriction is 
considered as it represents the most stringent of the three river flow restrictions 
considered (see previous chapter). Since there are only very insignificant differences 
with and without MAP restrictions under wet weather conditions the two are not 
distinguished. Dry weather changes are not listed because nitrate losses to surface 
water under dry weather conditions are minimal and below the WFD nitrate standard. 
The optimal NPS instrument(s) level under each weather/river flow scenario was 
determined by iterative increments in the instrument until compliance with the 
relevant policy target is achieved. Setaside in all tables refer to the sum of both 
obligatory and voluntary setaside land under the AAPS. The following subsections 
will detail the actual catchment changes in land allocation, fertiliser consumption, 
livestock numbers and profitability under each regulatory alternative. It must be 
noted that a) all following table values are percentage changes relative to the 
baseline under each weather/MAF restriction, and b) that the baseline situation 
under each weather and MAF combination is different. 
7.4.1 Emission Based Policies 
Two emission based policies (EBP) were examined - emission taxation and quotas. 
Emission taxation has often advocated in the economic literature because it is similar 
to pigouvian taxation. However, in reality, due to the very high monitoring costs 
associated with NPS pollution, emission based policies (EBP) are not viable. Instead 
regulators have relied on estimated emission taxation (Shortle and Dunn 1986; 
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Shortle and Abler 1994) which is based on biophysical economic simulation 
modelling, or an approach which combines the use of periodic actual emission 
measurements to calibrate and refine emission estimates generated from models. 
Biophysical simulation models express changes in resource quality as a function of 
management practices and location specific environmental practices (Weersink et al. 
1998). ADAS combined both actual and estimates in monitoring and enforcing the 
NSA scheme (DEFRA 2002a). The potential legal and political difficulties in 
implementing an estimated emission taxation policy have been discussed in chapter 
3. 
Table 7.2 details percentage changes in catchment activities under estimated 
emission taxation. In terms of land allocation there is a shift away from arable 
farming and towards livestock production, thus the increase in grazing and silage 
land as well as an increase in livestock numbers. This is true of all weather/river flow 
combinations. 
There is significant reduction in arable crop nitrate fertiliser consumption but not 
such a considerable reduction in grassland production, in fact in mean weather with 
the absence of river flow restrictions grassland application of fertiliser increases to 
support the increased livestock production. Overall there is significant catchment 
wide reduction in N application and a general shift to livestock production; this can 
be attributed to the fact that arable farming is relatively more polluting and less 
profitable than livestock farming. On comparing table 7.2 with table 7.3 (emission 
quotas) it is apparent that there is not much difference between the two. It is 
interesting to note that emission based policies are the only instruments which induce 
an increment in voluntary setaside land (under wet weather conditions). This is 
because setaside land is assumed to undergo natural grass regeneration without the 
application of fertiliser and thus produces relatively low nitrate emissions. 
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Table 7.2: Percentage Catchment Changes under Emission Taxation 
Regulatory Standard should Not Be Exceeded more Standard should Not Be Exceeded 
Target than 8 weeks  more than 6 Weeks  
Weather Mean Year Wet Year Mean Year Wet Year 
901h 	%ile No 	River 
With 	or 90h 	%iie No 	River 
With 	or 
River 	Flow without River without 
River Flow Flow River Flow Flow 
Restriction Flow River Flow 
Restriction Restriction Restriction Restriction 
Restrictions Restrictions 
Land Use  
Potatoes 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arabic 
(excluding -0.88 -2.35 -15.83 -0.88 -2.35 -56.23 
Potatoes)  
Grazing 
5.38 15.52 54.93 6.31 15.52 47.33 
land 
Silage 6.47 14.21 57.39 4.04 14.21 39.67 
Total 
Grassland 
5.69 15.16 55.61 5.69 15.16 45.21 
(Silage 	+ 
grazing)  
Setaside 0 0 124.08 0 0 846.87 
Fertiliser Use 
Potatoes -15.0 -14.5 -21.4 -16.9 -16.8 -21.4 
Arabic 
Crops 




-7.75 6.07 -27.53 -8.95 3.11 -29.86 
Grass  
Silage Grass 6.48 14.21 7.27 4.05 14.21 8.92 
Total 














Units 633 1537 1537 633 1537 1537 
(GLU)  
Stocking 
0 0 -21.82 0 0 -17.73 
Density 
Profitability 
Farm Profit -9.82 -10.02 -26.16 -11.62 -12.69 -26.82 
Resource 
-0.95 -0.95 -3.92 -1.12 -1.21 -5.69 
Profit 
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Table 7.3: Emission Load Quota 
Regulatory Standard should Not Be Exceeded more Standard should Not Be Exceeded more 
Target than 8 Weeks  than 6 Weeks  
Mean Year Wet Year Mean Year Wet Year 
Weather  
9015 	%ile No 	River 
With 	or 90th 	%ile No 	River 
With 	or 
River 	Flow without River without River 
River Flow Flow River 	Flow Flow 
Restriction Flow Flow 
Restriction Restriction Restriction Restriction 
Restrictions Restrictions 
Land Use  
Potatoes 0 0 0  0 0 
Arable 
-1.81 -2.35 -2.34 -2.41 
(excluding -15.82 -56.43 
Potatoes)  
11.83 15.52 15.52 15. 52 
Grazing land 54.97 47.32 
11.39 14.21 14. 21 
Silage land 14.21 57.41 39.67 
Total 





(obligatory and 0 0 124.81 0 0 845.87 
voluntary 
Fertiliser Use 
Potatoes -12.24 -14.51 -21.4 -14.29 -16.82 -21.41 
Arable 	Crops 
(excluding -24.53 -34.17 -54.94 -27.40 -37.40 -81.97 
Potatoes)  
Grazing Grass 3.99 6.23 -27.57 4.82 3.10 -29.81 
Silage Grass 11.39 14.21 7.27 14.21 14.21 8.72 
Total 








-18.47 -25.67 -44.03 -20.63 -28.56 -63.12 
Catchment 
Livestock  
Livestock 12.08 15.37 15.37 15.37 
15.37 15.47 
Units (GLU)  
Stocking 
0 0 0 0 
Density  -21.82 -17.73 
Profitability  
-0. 2294 -1. 
Farm Profit -0.95 -3.92 -1.17 -5.68 
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7.4.2 Input Based Policies 
In practice the regulation of NPS nutrient pollution most commonly involves controls 
on artificial or natural nitrogen inputs (Anderson et al. 1990). Input taxation remains 
the most practical economic instrument to implement because of its relatively lower 
monitoring and enforcement costs since fertiliser sales are easier to record. Input 
taxation is often considered an imperfect substitute of pigouvian taxation. 
Table 7.4 details the changes in the West Peffer catchment simulation model in the 
presence of nitrogen input taxation. Input taxation does not affect catchment land 
allocation as much as it does catchment nitrogen input application - generally the 
reduction in nitrate losses under input taxation occurs due to reduction in the 
intensity of farming and not its extensive margin. In fact, under an input tax level 
required to meet the policy target under mean weather conditions there is no change 
in any land allocation. There is an allocation of land away from arable farming 
towards livestock (i.e. grassland) production only under the much higher input 
taxation levels required to meet policy targets under wet weather conditions. 
The most significant reduction in nitrate fertiliser application occurs in arable crops, 
whereas the reduction in grass production is insignificant in comparison. Arable crop 
fertiliser application rates reduce over 50% and 85% under mean and wet weather 
condition input tax levels respectively relative to the appropriate baselines. There is 
no change in livestock numbers or stocking density under mean weather conditions, 
this reduces under wet weather input tax levels. Interestingly even with over a 78% 
reduction in catchment nitrate fertiliser application, induced by wet weather input tax 
levels, the associated reduction in resource costs is less than 9% of the baseline. The 
difference between jarin and resource profit reduction arise due to the tax amount 
which is excluded from the resource profit as it represents a transfer payment. 
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Table 7.4: Percentage Catchment changes under Input Taxation 
Regulatory Standard should Not Be Exceeded Standard should Not Be Exceeded 
Target more than 8 Weeks  more than 6 Weeks  
Weather Mean Year Wet Year Mean Year Wet Year 
90th 	%ile No 	River 
With 	or 9015 	%ile No 	River 
With 	or 
River 	Flow without without 
River Flow Flow River Flow Flow 
Restriction River 	Flow River Flow 
Restriction Restriction Restriction Restriction 
Restrictions Restrictions 
Land Use  
Potatoes 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arable 
(excluding 0 0 -4.83 0 0 -10.65 
Potatoes)  
Grazing 
0 0 44.08 0 0 102.63 
land 
Silage 0 0 -2.68 0 0 -19.95 
Total 
Grassland 
0 0 31.16 0 0 68.76 
(Silage 	+ 
grazing)  
Setaside 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fertiliser Use 
Potatoes -8.33 -7.93 -29.58 -10.01 -10.60 -53.95 
Arabic 
Crops 




-1.29 -1.23 -42.03 -1.29 -1.23 -79.88 
Grass  
Silage Grass -2.68 -2.68 -2.68 -2.68 -2.68 -19.95 
Total 














Units 0 0 0 0 0 -10.85 
(GLU)  
Stocking 
0 0 -23.64 0 0 -47.27 
Density  
Profitability  
Farm Profit -7.01 -7.20 -18.56 -8.20 -9.17 -29.76 
Resource 
-1.53 -1.63 -8.65 -2.04 -2.62 -13.43 
Profit  
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Table 7.5: Percentage Catchment changes under Input Quotas 
Regulatory Standard should Not Be Exceeded Standard should Not Be Exceeded 
Target more than 8 Weeks more than 6 Weeks 
Weather Mean Year Wet Year Mean Year Wet Year 
90th 	%iie With 	or 901, 	%iie With 	or 
No 	River No 	River 
River Flow River without River without 
Flow Flow 
Restriction Flow River Flow Flow River Flow 
Restriction Restriction 
Restriction  Restrictions Restriction  Restrictions 
Land Use  
Potatoes 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arabic 
(excluding 0 0 -4.23 0 0 -11.02 
Potatoes)  
Grazing 
0 0 38.94 0 0 105.90 
land  
Silage 0 0 -3.17 0 0 -19.95 
Total 
Grassland 
0 0 27.30 0 0 71.12 
(Silage 	+ 
grazing)  
Setaside 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fertiliser Use 
Potatoes -8.61 -8.97 -32.79 -10.21 -11.22 -52.36 
Arabic 
Crops 




-1.32 -1.32 -30.38 -1.32 -1.32 -70.22 
Grass  
Silage 
-2.68 -2.68 -3.17 -2.68 -2.68 -19.95 
Grass 
Total 














Units 0 0 -0.31 0 0 -10.85 
(GLU)  
Stocking 
0 0 -21.82 0 0 -48.18 Density 
Profitability  
Farm Profit -1.60 -2.01 -9.34 -2.11 -2.89 -14.57 
Resource 
-1.60 -2.01 -9.34 -2.11 -2.89 -14.57 
Profit 
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Catchment changes under an 'input quota' NPS control policy are listed in table 7.5. 
The results are similar to input taxation; however input quotas are marginally more 
expensive. It should be noted that under quotas there is no difference between 'farm 
profit' and 'resource profit' reduction simply because no transfer payments are 
involved in the levying input quotas. The difference between input taxation and 
quota has been theoretically proved in the literature (Wu 1999; Wu and Babcock 
2001). 
7.4.3 Setaside Land 
A voluntary setaside scheme was introduced under the MacSharry CAP reform 
primarily to reduce agricultural surpluses - however as it essentially removes land 
from cultivation it effectively reduces the total amount of nitrogen being applied in a 
catchment and so becomes an instrument of NPS nitrate pollution control (Burt and 
Haycock 1993). The impact of a setaside policy on the West Peffer catchment is 
presented in table 7.6. Under a setaside policy most of the cultivated land reduction 
occurs as arable land (excluding potatoes) primarily because such land is least 
profitable. Only under the much higher setaside levels required to achieve the policy 
targets under wet weather conditions are there reductions in grassland and increments 
in silage production, which nearly doubles (the only other increase in land allocation 
other than the setaside itself). 
Fertiliser application on arable land is significantly reduced however total grassland 
applications are marginally affected, except under wet weather setaside levels where 
there is nearly a 18 % increase in total grassland fertiliser application. The grassland 
increase is required to keep the livestock numbers and stocking density constant, as 
land allocation to total grassland decreases. 
Regarding profitability, since farmers are offered a subsidy to setaside further land 
resource profits reduction is higher than jarin profit reduction. The most interesting 
result to be noted is the relatively low resource cost under setaside levels required to 
meet the regulatory targets under wet weather conditions. 
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Table 7.6: Percentage Catchment changes under Setaside 
Regulatory Standard should Not Be Exceeded more Standard should Not Be Exceeded more 
Target than 8 Weeks  than 6 Weeks  
Weather Mean Year Wet Year Mean Year Wet Year 
901h 	%ile No 	River 
With 	or With 901h 	%ile No 	River 
or 
River 	Flow without without 
River Flow Flow River Flow Flow 
Restriction River 	Flow River 	Flow 
Restriction Restriction Restriction Restriction 
Restrictions Restrictions 
Land Use  
Potatoes 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arable 
-56.19 -59.42 
(excluding -41.01 -43.60 -44.89 -46.83 
Potatoes)  
-32. 35 
Grazing land 0 0 0 
-25.15 
 0


















Potatoes 8.14E-06 -1.20E-05 -3.2E-06 6.34E-06 -5.60E-06 -1.6E-06 
Arable Crops 
(excluding -3.65E+01 -4.OlE+01 -56.56 4.07E+01 -4.35E+01 -59.89 
Potatoes  
Grazing 
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 36.45 -8.90E-1 1 0.00E+00 15.83 
Grass 
Silage Grass 1.26E-1l -1.00E-ll -7.87 0.00E+00 -1.00E-ll -6.12 
Total 




-29.62 -31.82 -45.231 -33.05 -34.51 -47.89 
Arable Crops 
+ Potatoes)  
Total 




0 0 0 0 0 0 
Units (GLU)  
Stocking 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Density  
Profitability  





Resource 14.93 -15.77 
-11.33 -10.85 -12.50 -11.77 
Profit  
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7.4.4 Stocking Density Reduction 
Stocking density reduction involves any measure which increases the amount of total 
grassland relative to the number of livestock GLU, i.e. an increase in total grassland 
or a decrease in livestock. The results of implementing a stocking density reduction 
are presented in table 7.7. As is expected the total grassland increases more than 
three times at the cost of a significant reduction in land under arable cultivation, 
however there is no change in potato cultivation acreage. 
As a consequence there are significant cuts in the total grassland fertiliser 
application, both silage and grazing grass. Although there is a slight increase in 
livestock numbers overall there is a reduction in stocking density. Since the stocking 
density required to meet both regulatory targets under all weather/river flow 
restrictions is lower than 1.0 GLU/ha the catchment qualifies for an additional 
extensification premium which is the reason why farm profit are greater than 
resource profits. The model could not reach an optimal solution under the 6 week 
regulatory target by reducing stocking density reduction. This is primarily due to the 
numerous rotational constraints present in the model. It is safe to say that the 
stocking density required to satisfy the 6 week regulatory target had rotational 
constraints been removed would have been extremely low indeed - probably less 
than 0.4 GLU/ha. 
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Table 7.7: Percentage Catchment changes under Stocking Density 
Reduction 
Regulatory Standard 	should 	Not Be 	Exceeded Standard 	should 	Not 	Be 	Exceeded 
Target more than 8 Weeks  more than 6 Weeks  
Weather Mean Year Wet Year Mean Year Wet Year 
901h 	%ile No 	River 
With 	or With 901h 	%iie N o 	River 
or 
River 	Flow without without 
River Flow Flow River Flow Flow 
Restriction River 	Flow River 	Flow 
Restriction Restriction Restriction Restriction 
Restrictions  Restrictions 
Land Use  
Potatoes 0 0 0 0 0 
Arabic 
(excluding -34.86 -34.87 -48.04 -34.86 -48.04 
Potatoes)  
Grazing land 159.61 159.61 194.06 159.61 194.06 
Silage land 396.21 396.21 613.72 396.21 613.77 
Total 
Grassland 224.98 224.98 310.03 224.98 310.03 
(Silage 	+ 
grazing)  
Setaside 0 0 0 0 0 
Fertiliser Use 
Potatoes -4.50E-07 8.07E-08 1.48E-03 -4.509-07 -4.40E-07 
Arable .9 
Crops 
-2.96E+Ol -2.959+01 -4.499+01 -2.96E+01 -4.43E+Ol -5 (excluding 
Potatoes  
Grazing 
-7.86E+01 -8.06E+0l -7.78E+0i -7.86E+01 -8.06E+01 
Grass LL 
















-1.09E+01 -1.09E+O1 -1.08E+Ol -1.09E+01 -1.08E+0I 
Units_(GLU)  
Stocking 
-7.27E+01 -7.27E+01 -7 73E+01 -7.27E+O1 -7.73E+01 
Density  
Profitability  
Farm Profit -1.15E+01 -1.049+01 -1.42E+01 -1.159+01 -1.42E+01 
Resource 
-1.16E+01 -1.429+01 -1.45E+01 -1.16E+Ol -1.94E+01 
Profit 
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7.4.5 Mixed Instrument Policies 
Numerous mixed instrument NPS pollution control policies which combine 
economic and non-Economic instruments were considered. The relative performance 
of these mixed instruments relative to the individual instruments which comprise 
them is detailed below along with changes in catchment allocations and profitability 
- the relative ranking of all instruments is detailed in the next section. 
7.4.5.1 Setaside and Input Taxation 
Firstly a policy combination of setaside land with input taxation was imposed on the 
catchment. Ten different setaside levels were considered (in the range of 100 - 900 
ha) along side an incremental input tax level until the regulatory targets were met 
under all weather/river flow conditions. Overall a mandatory setaside of 300 ha (in 
addition to the 180 ha obligatory setaside required under the AAPS) proved to be the 
most efficient level when combined with input taxation. The results of such a 
combination are presented in table 7.8. 
Overall the increased land setaside is mostly at the expense of arable land (excluding 
potato land) and there is a nominal change in total grassland. However at input 
taxation levels required to meet compliance under wet weather conditions the 
reduction in arable cultivation is also accompanied by increased total grassland 
cultivation. There is considerable reduction in fertiliser applied to arable crops; while 
the overall reduction in total grassland fertiliser applications is considerably less 
(increasing under one condition). The number of livestock does not change and nor 
does the stocking density, the exception being at the higher input taxation required 
under wet weather conditions. 
It should be noted that farm profit is greater than resource profit; since resource 
profit excludes compensatory setaside payments made to the catchment (those in 
addition to the obligatory setaside compensation required under the AAPS scheme) 
and also the additional cost of input taxation, both of which represent transfer 
payments. The comparatively low reduction in resource profits under input taxation 
levels required for wet weather conditions should be noted. 
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Table 7.8: Percentage Catchment changes under Setaside 
(300ha) and Input taxation 
Regulatory Standard should Not Be Exceeded Standard should Not Be Exceeded 
Target more than 8 Weeks  more than 6 Weeks  
Weather Mean Year  Wet Year Mean Year  Wet Year 
90 	%ile No 	River 
With 	or 9015 	%ile No 	River 
With 	or 
River 	Flow without without River Flow Flow River Flow Flow 
Restriction River 	Flow River Flow 
Restriction Restriction Restriction Restriction 
Restrictions  Restrictions 
Land Use  
Potatoes 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arabic 
-9.69 -9.69 -i2.i6 -9.69 -9.69 
(excluding -18.70 
Potatoes)  
Grazing 1.02 1.028 
land 
-2. 6868 -2. 
Silage land 0 -2.68 0 -2.68 
Total 
Grassland 





166.67 166.67 166.67 166.67 166.67 166.67 and 
voluntary) 
Fertiliser Use 
Potatoes -4.95 -5.68 -23.55 -6.35 -7.73 -36.25 
Arabic 
Crops 
-40.69 -48.69 -98.28 -47.22 -58.30 -99.55 (excluding 
Potatoes  
Grazing 
-1.64 8.94 -30.17 -1.64 8.94 -61.10 Grass  
Silage Grass -3.2E-09 -2.68 -2.68 -3.2E-09 -2.68 -2.68 
Total 


















-13.64 0 0 -36.82 
Profitability  
-5.69 -6.58 -16.8 -6.75 -8.19 
Farm Profit -22.27 
Resource 
-2.91 -2.98 -9.28 -3.19 -3.53 -11.34 
Profit  
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Table 7.9: Percentage Catchment changes under Setaside 
(700 ha) and Input tax 
Regulatory Standard should Not Be Exceeded more Standard should Not Be Exceeded more 
Target than 8 Weeks  than 6 Weeks  
Weather Mean Year Wet Year Mean Year Wet Year 
901h 	%ile No 	River 
With 	or 90 	%ile1  No 	River With 	or River 	Flow without I without River Flow Flow River Flow Flow 
Restricti on River 	Flow River 	Flow Restriction Restriction Restriction 	J Restriction Restrictions Restrictions 
Land Use  
Potatoes 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arabic 
(excluding -22.61 -22.61 0.00 -22.61 -22.61 -3.14 
Potatoes)  
Grazing land 0 0 1.03 0 0 22.70 
Silage land 0 0 -2.68 0 0 -2.68 
Total 
Grassland 





388.89 388.89 388.89 388.89 388.89 388.89 and 
voluntary) 
Fertiliser Use 
Potatoes -2.72 -3.24 -14.87 -4.02 -4.56 -23.74 
Arabic Crops 
(excluding -37.13 -37.69 -82.97 -43.80 -45.48 -98.62 
Potatoes 
Grazing 
3.39 0.00 -1.11 3.39 0.00 -24.86 
Grass 
Silage Grass 0.00 0.00 -2.68 0.00 0.00 -2.68 
Total 
1.91 0.00 -1.82 1.91 0.00 -14.85 Grassland 
Total 	Arabic 
Crops 
-30.65 -30.55 -66.84 -36.31 -36.99 -80.87 
Arable Crops 
+ Potatoes)  
Total 




0 0 0 0 0 0 
Units (GLU)  
Stocking 
0 0 0 0 0 -13.64 
Density  
Profitability  
Farm Profit 6.28 -6.64 -10.81 -7.25 -7.71 -15.10 
Resource 
-6.08 -7.90 -8.38 -6.24 -8.09 -11.20 Profit 
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When compared to a setaside restriction alone the mixed policy presents a major 
improvement in ensuring regulatory compliance cost-effectively. Although it does 
not present an improvement over input taxation under mean weather/river flow 
restrictions - under wet weather the setaside/input taxation policy mix even 
outperforms input taxation. 
For comparison table 7.9 lists the changes in the catchment under a NPS control 
policy which combines a setaside of 700ha with input taxation. As a comparison of 
resource profit will illustrate, the 700ha setaside policy mix outperforms 300ha 
setaside policy mix under 'wet weather' conditions but not under 'mean weather' 
conditions. 
7.4.5.2 Stocking Density Reduction and Input taxation 
The second two instrument combination policy considered involved a mix of 
stocking density reduction and input taxation. Eight different stocking density rates 
were examined (2.1, 2.0, 1.8, 1.6, 1.4, 1.2, 1.0, 0.8) together with incremental input 
taxes iteratively; out of which a stocking density reduction of 1.4 GLU/ha proved to 
be most cost-effective - the results of which are presented in table 7. 10. 
Unlike the previous mixed policy involving setaside and input taxation there is a) a 
significant increase in grassland acreage at the expense of reduced arable crop land 
b) since there are no increases in livestock numbers there is a substantial reduction in 
stocking density - over 35%, and c) the application of nitrogen to grassland is 
significantly reduced. The difference between farm profits and resource profits is due 
to the extensification premium and input tax, both of which have been detailed 
earlier. 
This mix performs significantly better than stocking density reduction alone, but not 
as good at input taxation alone, even though under some weather/river flow 
restrictions (particular at the 6 week regulatory target) it nearly equals input taxation 
in terms of cost-effectiveness. 
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Table 7.10: Percentage Catchment changes under Stocking 
Density Reduction (1.4 glu/ha) and Input Taxation 
Regulatory Standard should Not Be Exceeded Standard should Not Be Exceeded 
Target more than 8 Weeks  more than 6 Weeks  
Weather Mean Year Wet Year Mean Year Wet Year 
90th 	%ile No 	River 
With 	or9QLu1 %ile No 	River 
With 	or 
River 	Flow without without 
River Flow Flow River Flow Flow 
Restriction River 	Flow River Flow 
Restriction Restriction Restriction Restriction 
Restrictions Restrictions 
Land Use  
Potatoes 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arabic 
(excluding -8.85 -8.85 -8.85 -8.85 -8.85 -6.15 
Potatoes)  
Grazing 
78.96 78.96 79.98 78.96 78.96 61.89 
land 
Silage land 0 0 0 0.0075 0 -19.95 
Total 









Potatoes -3.15 -3.38 -22.70 4.36 -4.65 -74.22 
Arabic 
Crops 




-48.31 -53.18 -54.68 -48.31 -53.18 -64.06 
Grass  
Silage Grass 0.00 0.00 -2.68 0.00 0.00 -19.95 
Total 












Units 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -10.85 
(GLU)  
Stocking 
-36.36 -36.36 -36.36 -36.36 -36.36 -36.36 
Density  
Profitability 
Farm Profit -4.78 -5.03 -15.63 -5.69 -6.07 -42.02 
Resource 
-2.51 -2.29 -8.75 -2.69 -2.52 -17.96 
Profit  
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7.4.5.3 Setaside and Stocking Density Reduction 
A policy mix comprising of two non-economic instruments was also imposed on the 
catchment model. A setaside restriction of at least 700 ha combined with an 
incremental stocking density reduction until compliance with the two regulatory 
targets was achieved. Unfortunately such a policy mix offered only a minor 
improvement over a policy comprising of either stocking density reduction or 
setaside restrictions alone, therefore no table of catchment changes is presented. 
7.4.5.4 Three Instrument Mix: Setaside, Stocking Density Reduction and Input 
tax 
Numerous 3 instrument mixes were also considered, both comprising of an economic 
instrument (input taxation) and two non-economic NPS control policies (i.e. setaside 
and stocking density reduction). The model was run with 5 different setaside and 6 
different stocking density reduction levels along side incremental input taxation to 
decide which combinations represented an improvement in cost-effective abatement. 
A setaside land restriction of 300ha, 1.4 glu/ha stocking density reduction combined 
with input taxation was the most cost-effective combination (table 7.11). Such a 
policy resulted in at least a 57% increase in total grassland at the expense of arable 
cultivation (excluding potatoes which are not reduced). Since there is no increase in 
livestock numbers catchment stocking density is reduced. Nitrogen fertiliser 
application to all catchment activities is reduced, potatoes experience the least 
reduction, while the grazing grass the most under input tax levels required to meet 
compliance under mean weather conditions. Under wet weather taxation levels the 
most reduction is under arable cultivation. 
When compared with a single instrument policy of either a setaside reduction or a 
stocking density reduction the 3 instrument mix presents a major improvement at 
both regulatory targets under each weather/river flow restriction. However this 3 
instrument policy is only better than input taxation alone under wet weather 
conditions. The implications of this result are discussed in detailed in the following 
section. 
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Table 7.11: Percentage Catchment changes under a 3 Instrument 
Mix: Setaside (300 ha), Stocking Density Reduction 
(1.4 glu/ha) and Input taxation 
Regulatory Standard should Not Be Exceeded Standard should Not Be Exceeded 
Target more than 8 Weeks  more than 6 Weeks  
Weather Mean Year Wet Year Mean Year Wet Year 
90' 	%ile 
No 	River 
With 	or 90th %ile 
No 	River 
With 	or 
River 	Flow River without River without 
Restriction Flow 
Flow 








Land Use  
Potatoes 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arable 
(excluding -18.54 -18.54 -18.54 -18.54 -18.54 -18.54 
Potatoes)  
Grazing land 78.96 78.96 79.98 78.96 78.96 79.98 
Silage land 0.00 0.00 -2.68 0.00 0.00 -2.68 
Total 
Grassland 









Potatoes -1.65 -2.65 -13.88 -2.45 -3.54 -29.17 
Arabic Crops 
(excluding -28.05 -30.99 -81.85 -33.05 -37.12 -99.55 
Potatoes  
Grazing 
-51.57 -48.28 -51.94 -51.57 -48.28 -50.59 
Grass  
Silage Grass 0.00 0.00 -2.68 0.00 0.00 -2.68 
Total 




-23.07 -25.11 -68.20 -27.29 -30.16 -85.41 
Arable Crops 
+ Potatoes)  
Total 




0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Units (GLU) 
Stocking 
-36.36 -36.36 -36.36 -36.36 -36.36 -36.36 
Density  
Profitability  
Farm Profit -5.26 -6.00 -13.05 -5.87 -6.73 -19.60 
Resource 
4.85 -5.27 -7.38 -4.91 -5.37 -10.81 
Profit  
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7.5 Relative Efficiency of Instruments 
This section will compare the relative efficiency of all the instruments detailed above. 
Figures 7.7, 7.8 and 7.9 are diagrammatic representations of the percentage reduction in 
catchment profit under various policy measures to control pollution. To reiterate, percentage 
reductions from the relevant weather/MAF baseline were plotted as the actual baseline 
catchment profit varies in the presence of different MAF restrictions and weather conditions. 
Catchment profit was highest in a mean year with no river flow controls (f9,302,000), 
followed by the wet year (f9,095,000), and lastly the mean year with the 90%ile river flow 
restriction (8,402,000). Lack of sunshine, not water, was the limiting factor in wet weather 
conditions. 
The mixed policies are represented by dotted lines in figures 7.7, 7.8, and 7.9. Two 
levels of a) the setaside/input taxation policy mix (300ha and 700ha), and b) the 3 
instrument policy mix (1.4 glu/ha, and 1.8 glu/ha) are considered and illustrated in 
the figures. 
7.5.1 Relative Ranking Mean Year 
Both mean year figures (7.7 and 7.8) illustrate the superiority of economic 
instruments, with and without river flow controls, when compared to managerial 
approaches such as livestock density reduction or setaside (excluding any 
wildlife/biodiversity benefits). Single instrument economic approaches also fare 
better when compared to mixed instrument policies. The exception is stocking 
density reduction/input taxation mix which out performs input taxation and quotas 
marginally at the 6 week regulatory target and onwards under instrument levels 
required in mean weather conditions without any flow restrictions. In fact a 
combination of the two non-economic managerial instruments performs better than 
either managerial approach on its own. The mean year figures show a combination of 
stocking density and setaside reduction is more cost-effective at meeting ambient 
pollution standards at both the 8 and 6 week compliance level than both stocking 
density and setaside restriction alone. 
Instrument ranking in table 7.12 is similar to those of previous empirical studies. 
Uniform emission taxation is superior to other controls (Johnson et al. 1991) 
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Table 7.12: Policy Ranking Under Different River Flow Restrictions 
and Weather Conditions 
Regulatory Standard should not be Exceeded Standard should not be Exceeded 
Target more than 8 Weeks more than 6 Weeks  
Wet Year Wet Year 
 Weather Mean Year Rank Mean Year Rank
______  Rank Rank 
901h 	%ile No 	river 901h 	%ile 90th 	%ile No 	river 90th 	%ile 
River 	Flow 
Restriction 
river 	flow flow river 	flow river flow flow river 	flow 
restriction restriction restriction restriction restriction restriction 
Input Quota 3 3 6 3 4 5 
Inputtax 2 2 4 2 3 4 
Emission 
Based Policies 




8 9 9 9 8 6 
Restrictions  
Stocking 










Setaside and 5 5 3 5 6 3 
input taxation  
Setaside and 
stocking 





4 5 4 2 8 
glu/ha) + input 
tax  
* refers to the best level of setaside and stocking density for that weather and river flow scenario. 
and outperforms input taxation provided the emission function exhibits increasing 
returns to scale (Stevens 1988). An input taxation does better than a quota at all 
target levels stricter than 12 weeks (cross-over), a result which is likely if firm 
heterogeneity is present (Wu 1999; Wu and Babcock 2001); firm heterogeneity is 
represented by 3 soil types and 8 crops (2 grass and 3 potato types). Table 7.12, does 
not differentiate between emission taxation and quotas and jointly lists them as 
'emission based policies'. The table also lists some mixed instrument policies as 
'optimal', this refers to the fact that although different instrument levels (e.g. setaside 
or stocking density reduction) were considered it ranks those which performed best. 
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Targeted input or emission quotas were not considered. Stocking density reduction 
does better than setaside at lower levels of standard compliance but undergoes a 
'cross-over' at higher levels. The cost-effective difference between economic and 
pure regulatory policies increases as the policy requirements to meet the standard are 
tightened. 'Land retirement' or setaside is known to impose higher abatement costs 
since emissions are primarily a result of land management and not land use (Kampas 
and White 2002). 
The relative ranking of instruments in the mean year is by and large not affected by 
the imposition of river flow controls (compare figures 7.7 and 7.8). This is illustrated 
by considering a regulatory target which ensures the standard is not exceeded at least 
8 weeks of the year represented by the vertical line in all three figures. In comparing 
single instrument polices the ranking is fairly consistent irrespective of the standard 
compliance level with the exception of the two 'cross-overs' noted above and one 
between two mixed instrument policies. 
7.5.2 Relative Ranking Wet Year 
Although at instrument levels required to induce regulatory compliance under wet 
year conditions emission taxation remains the most cost-effective policy, the relative 
efficiency of policies changes considerably (figure 7.9). In a wet year nitrogen 
leaching rates (emissions) are considerably higher than in the mean year. The wet 
year leaching baseline is approximately 18 weeks of river nitrogen levels in excess of 
the standard, compared to 14 in the mean year. So although in a wet year considered 
there is more drainage (subsoil percolation), the nitrogen content of leached 
emissions in some weeks is enough to offset the dilution. 
A notable change is that economic controls targeting inputs i.e. input taxation and 
quota do not perform as well in wet conditions especially at high standard 
compliance levels (refer to the 6 week regulatory target - figure 9). In comparison 
setaside/setaside mix policies perform considerably better in wet weather conditions. 
The improved cost-effective abatement under setaside/setaside mix policies increases 
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the tighter the level of standard compliance (consider the difference in catchment 
profit between input taxation and setaside/setaside mix polices at 10, 8 and 6 week 
standard compliance). 
The change in policy ranking in wet conditions can be explained by the difference in 
the economic incentives offered by each instrument. While setaside removes land 
from agriculture input quotas and taxation do not. Although input taxation and quotas 
provide an incentive to decrease nitrogen use per hectare, nitrogen is still applied. 
Therefore the potential to leach in a wet year remains. 
Regulation may set an input tax based on a mean year's leaching pattern believing 
the taxation rate is sufficient to reduce NPS nitrogen pollution to the required 
standard compliance level (regulatory target) on average, but when the weather is 
wetter than expected, more nitrate is leached and compliance is not achieved. To 
illustrate, the optimal tax level to ensure standard compliance at the 8 week 
regulatory target in mean weather conditions is a tax increasing input cost to 1.4 
pounds per kg, this instrument under wet weather conditions would result in the 
standard being exceeded 13 weeks of the year. See Table 7.13 for a comparison of 
the difference in instrument levels required to achieve compliance under different 























Figure 7.7: Mean Year With No Flow Restriction 
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Figure 7.8: Mean Year With 90%ile Flow 
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Figure 7.9: Wet Year With or Without Flow 
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Table 7.13: Instrument Levels with Different River Flow Restrictions 
and Weather Conditions 
Regulatory Standard 	should 	not 	be Standard should not be Exceeded 
Target Exceeded more than 8 Weeks more than 6 Weeks 
Weather Mean Year Rank 
Wet Year 
Mean Year Rank 
Wet 	Year 
Rank  Rank 
With 	or 
90" 	%ile 
No river without 







river flow flow 
without any 
Restriction restrict! flow . 	. . 	. river 	flow 
restriction . restriction restriction 
on restriction restrictions 
S 
Emission Tax (per 
4.93 5.59 11.24 5.92 7.25 12.35 
kg of emission) 
Input Tax 
(required nitrogen 1.4 1.54 5.7 1.62 1.97 13.95 
price_(i/kg))  
Setaside (300 ha) 
+ Input Tax 0.98 1.2 4.32 1.15 1.51 7.5 
(f /kg))  
Setaside (300 ha) 
+ stocking density 
reduction (1.4 0.6 0.65 2.31 0.69 0.77 5.6 
glu/ha) + input tax 
(f/kg)  
Setaside (700 ha) 
+ stocking density 1.2 1.1 0.7 1.1 1 0.6 
reduction (glu/ha) 
Stocking density 
(1.4 -ILL/ha) + 0.77 0.87 4.12 0.91 1.05 25.6 
input tax 
Stocking density reduction re-allocates land from arable crops to grassland (less 
polluting) resulting in considerably reduced nitrogen application per hectare to 
grassland. Although still comparatively not cost-effective, stocking density reduction 
performs relatively better in a wet year than input taxation and quota (at least at the 8 
week standard compliance target). 
Although estimated emission taxation retains the highest rank, emission based 
policies are known to have high monitoring costs (Falconer 1998; M.A.F.F. 1998) 
and other aforementioned problems 85  (chapter 3), the regulator might turn to other 
policies including mixed instruments. In comparison the transaction costs associated 
115 EBPs are subject to uncertainty due to 'background nitrogen emissions', resulting from the natural 
variability of soils, variability in present crop uptake and effect of previous crop rotations (Lord 
2001 a). 
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with setaside, livestock density reduction and input taxation are arguably lower 
(Kampas and White 2002) . The cost of input taxation is in the range of 0.5 - 1% of 
total cost (OECD 2001), while it is likely that the cost of enforcing stocking density 
reduction has fallen in the aftermath of the BSE and foot and mouth crisis due to 
improved data collection. Similarly assuming setaside land is permanent, which is 
the most environmentally sensible option in terms of leaching, lowers the cost of 
monitoring considerably. 
A three instrument mix of setaside (300ha), stocking density (1.4) and input taxation 
was the second most efficient policy after emission based policies. However this 
level of the three instrument policy is not as cost-effective in the mean year where 
stocking (1.8 glu/ha)/setaside (300ha)/input taxation ensures compliance at least cost. 
Similarly the improvement from a setaside (700ha)/input tax mix in the wet year is 
not borne in a year with 'mean' weather where it results in nearly an 8% reduction in 
catchment profitability. In a 'mean' year setaside (300ha)/input tax policy ensures 
compliance with only a 3% reduction in catchment profit. Overall, considering both 
setaside levels in conjunction with an input tax the setaside (300ha)/input tax is 
superior as the setaside (700ha)/ input tax offers only marginal improvement under 
wet weather conditions, relative to its costliness in mean weather conditions. 
Stocking density reduction/input taxation mix (at both the 1.4 and 1.8 glu/ha level), 
which does well in the mean year, offered no improvement on setaside mix policies 
in the wet year and remained slightly less cost-effective than input taxation. A 
stocking density of I .8(glu/ha)/input taxation was also considered but proved 
particularly costly in the wet year (not shown in figure 9). Overall this implies that 
there is a cross-over in the relative efficiency ranking of policies between weather 
scenarios. 
Thus the policy ranking listed earlier in table 7.12 is an oversimplification of the 
regulator's problem because it compares policies based on their optimal levels in 
each weather and river flow restriction scenario. For example the three instrument 
policy was tested at both the 1.8 and 1.4 (glu/ha) stocking density restriction for all 
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weather conditions and river flow restrictions. Of the two policy levels the one which 
performs best in each weather and river flow scenarios was considered in table 7.12. 
Emissions were taxed incrementally and subtracted from the objective function (Dosi 
and Moretto 1994; Shortle and Abler 1994). The efficiency of such taxation can be 
seen by the widening gap between emission taxation (at the 6 week target) and all 
other polices from figure 7, through figure 8 to figure 9 which in effect reflects 
represents increased water availability. The efficiency of estimated emission taxation 
in the model is misleading as it assumes a) the farmer perfectly comprehends the 
regulator's modelled relationship between his management practices, application of 
nitrogen, catchment weather patterns and emissions, i.e. the bio-physical simulation 
model b) the farmer is risk neutral (Schmutzler 1996) c) farmer has the same 
expectation of weather conditions as the regulator (Shortle and Dunn 1986)86.  In 
practice models at present cannot provide emission estimates accurately enough to 
withstand legal challenges and the costs of running complex models can be 
prohibitively high (Weersink et al. 1998). Additionally there are issues with the 
political acceptability of the information required to run an estimated emission model 
(Chambers 1992). It is likely that if an emission tax is levied it will require input and 
management monitoring besides soil testing on farm fields - a very expensive 
process. 
If the regulator opts for an input based policy the farmer equates the cost of nitrogen 
application with his marginal benefit; thus his expectation of future weather nor his 
risk preference affect his nitrogen application decision. Thus it is more likely that 
farmers will behave in accordance with the regulator's desired behaviour. 
Ultimately the regulator faces the difficult decision of choosing a policy which does 
reasonably well in all weather conditions not just mean conditions. As nitrate 
loadings are subject to a high degree of variability both within and among different 
years (Halstead et al. 1991), i.e. weather is stochastic, the regulator's decision should 
96 
 The authors assume that farmer and agency have identical information structures for weather. 
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be based not only on the expected weather but also its variance 87  (Braden and 
Segerson 1993; Shortle and Abler 1997). Another important consideration is the 
required level of standard compliance (regulatory target) and regulator's risk 
aversion to the level of standard compliance being exceeded in extremely wet years. 
If the regulator is particularly risk averse and works under the precautionary 
principle he/she may set a policy level based on the worst case wet weather scenario. 
The greater the risk aversion to the standard being exceeded the more likely the 
regulator will favour policies which perform better in wet years. This might offer 
another explanation for regulators reluctance to implement economic instruments 
(Hanley et al. 1990). Given wetter winter conditions are likely to prevail in Scotland 
under climate change (Hulme and Jenkins 1998; Kerr et al. 1999; Harrison et al. 
2001) it is possible that optimal diffuse nitrogen regulation in the future will be 
similar to what is optimal in the extreme 'wet year'. 
Of course categorising weather into representative categories is a simplification for 
illustrative purposes and in reality there can be a great deal of variation between 
weather conditions. In practice the regulatory level setting will involve a lot of trial 
and error and depend on catchment specific characteristics and the wider regulatory 
objective. While the availability of realistic transaction cost estimates would result in 
better policy ranking based on social costs, the possibility of targeted policies 
(Kolstad 1987; Shortle and Horan 2001) conferring improvements needs to be 
investigated. 
7.6.1 Conclusion 
This study researched the efficient management of two agricultural externalities, i.e. 
diffuse nitrogen pollution in rivers and low river flows from surface water extraction 
for irrigation. It found that as a means to control diffuse nitrogen pollution imposing 
river flow controls were not cost-effective. However since MAF river restrictions 
contribute towards pollution mitigation they should be accounted for in the design of 
nitrogen control policies as they reduce compliance costs. 
87 i.e. the mean and variation of emission concentrations between years. 
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Secondly the study ranked policies to control diffuse nitrogen pollution in terms of 
their abatement cost under mean and wet weather conditions. The ranking of control 
measures under mean weather conditions conformed, for the most part, to the 
economic literature hierarchy. However in comparison under wet weather conditions 
the cost-effectiveness of economic instruments is significantly reduced. Control 
policies may be set based on wet weather conditions if the regulator is extremely risk 
averse to the standard being exceeded. Wet weather conditions might prevail in the 
future given climate change. 
Although the efficiency of mixed instrument policies has been examined in the 
literature (Braden and Segerson 1993; Millock and Salanie 1997; Schmutzler and 
Goulder 1997) nearly all published research considers only 2 instrument mixes of 
economic instruments alone. This study investigated four mixed instrument policy 
packages combining economic incentives and non-economic (managerial) 
approaches 1) setaside reduction and input taxation, 2) setaside and stocking density 
reduction, and 3) stocking density and input taxation 4) setaside and stocking density 
reduction with input taxation were examined. All four were considered with and 
without the 90th  percentile river flow restriction. There is no known mention of a 
three instrument mix policy in the literature. One reason for this may be that the 
introduction of an additional instrument results in additional and prohibitive 
transaction costs, while this is probably true of combining complex economic 
instruments, non-economic or managerial regulatory approaches (setaside land and 
stocking density reduction) are arguably cheaper to enforce. An argument in favour 
is the presence of IACS data collection and existing stocking density and setaside 
restrictions which are currently enforced under the AAPS and other schemes. 
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Chapter 8 
Limitations and Further Research 
8.1 Introduction 
The study limitations as well further improvements in research methodology are 
briefly presented in the initial segment of this chapter. This is followed by a 
discussion on the political economy of environmental regulation and why 
economically efficient solutions are not necessary political ones. The last section of 
the chapter is a thesis summary stating the main research objectives, originality, 
results and their practical significance. 
8.2 Research Limitations and Improvement 
An obvious limitation is the partial optimisation framework of the model. Labour and 
capital costs were not considered in modelling farmer production decisions. This can 
result in erroneous crop mix estimates and change the relative cost of alternative NPS 
nitrate control policies. In theory, labour and capital costs can be estimated, but this 
would require either detailed co-operation from actual farmers in the catchment or 
assumptions regarding estimates of labour (such as the value of family labour etc.) 
and farm capital costs. The study also ignores the accumulation of nitrate, and 
overestimates compliance costs because the model involves a static optimisation 
framework. 
The absence of transaction costs in the analysis is a considerable limitation. Arguably 
this is the most consistently overlooked issue in determining the cost-effective 
ranking of NPS nitrate control policies in the literature. Although their absence is 
recognised repeatedly in the literature, they are for the most part conveniently 
ignored casting doubt on the validity of relative instrument ranking. The need for 
realistic transaction costs (including those of targeted policies) estimates should 
definitely be a research priority. 
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Ambient taxation was modelled as a levy on positive deviations from the regulatory 
target river ambient concentration. However the results were not presented because 
strictly speaking this is not 'ambient taxation' as proposed by Segerson (see chapter 
3). A correctly specified Segerson ambient based regulatory policy involves both a 
tax and subsidy depending on whether ambient levels are positively or negatively 
deviated. However this could not be tested because the available solvers could not 
deal with mixed integer non-linear programming problems. 
Overall more realistic rotational constraints which a) incorporate all crops, not just 
the major ones, and b) allows potatoes to be grown on all soil textures, not just a 
sandy texture, will allow more robust emission estimates. Unfortunately nitrate 
leaching data on 'minor' crops were not available. Similarly if more detailed 
livestock statistics had been available it would have permitted more realistic 
instrument levels and possibly even ranking. 
The availability of detailed hydrological/geological catchment modelling would have 
meant not having to make assumptions regarding the ground water component of 
river flow and improved the reliability of model results. Regarding the transferability 
of research to other catchments it should be noted that the impact of river flow 
controls on diffuse pollution depends on catchment specific MAF restrictions, 
regulatory targets, farming's dependence on surface irrigation water, weather 
paterns, catchment hydrology and spatial aspects of extraction. In designing diffuse 
nitrogen pollution regulation in the presence of river flow restrictions the income 
distributional effects on irrigating and non-irrigating farmers will also need to be 
considered. Unfortunately the model assumed that potatoes were only grown on 
sandy soils. It would be interesting to compare the efficiency gains from river flow 
controls on potato leaching on other soil types. 
The result that mixed instruments confer benefits in practice is not surprising; the 
pervasive use of multiple instruments is well documented in the literature. 
'It is unreasonable to think that a single instrument is likely to be suited to the 
myriad of tasks involved in implementing an environmental policy.. . the use of 
multiple instruments will tend to be the rule rather than the exception.' (Hahn 1990). 
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The bio-physical model's sensitivity to certain key parameters and constraints must 
be noted. Obviously the crops included in the rotational constraints and their duration 
is very important, both in terms of profitability and nitrate emissions. The model is 
sensitive to the upper bounds on a) the potato crop (under all irrigation regimes) 
acreage, and b) dairy cows (GLU) numbers . This is primarily because both activities 
are highly profitable but also polluting. Sensitivity analysis revealed that crop price is 
a key factor influencing model predictions . A simulated crop price decrease resulted 
in significant reduction in the nitrate pollution generated - as is theoretically 
expected. However, the sensitivity analysis carried out was not extensive and only 
done for 15% and 20% decrease in the price of potatoes, spring barley and winter 
wheat. The grass utilisation coefficient, which is the proportion of grass grown 
utilised by grazing animals appears to be another important determinant of model 
results and instrument ranking. 
8.3 Political Economy of Environmental Regulation 
A positive analysis of actual agri-environmental policy choice reveals instrument use 
is not determined by economic efficiency alone. Additional criteria include equity 
and political considerations. The opposition to market based instruments by farmers 
stems from the additional costs they bear under such regulation, which may force 
them out of business in the long run (Dewees 1983). Hence it is reasonable to expect 
that affected interest groups co-ordinate their resources to lobby against the adoption 
of market based incentives (Daugbjerg 1998). 
Thus economic agents (farmers) are motivated to influence environmental policy as 
instrument choice (emission standards over emission taxes) has income distributional 
consequences (Buchanan and Tullok 1975). Emission standards serve as an entry 
barrier to new firms, thus raising the profits of existing firms - whereas taxation does 
not preclude new entry. 
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Some models of 'political internalisation' exist whereby environmental policy is the 
outcome of political self-interest and where 'political competition' is a source of the 
internalisation of economic instruments (Aidt 1998). Under the Coasian tradition, 
affected parties mobilise to protect their interests via political markets and not 
through a private transfer scheme - which is presumably more costly. A self-
interested policy maker with coercive power to implement policies trades-off the 
demands of lobby groups against the general interest of voters. If all agents have 
their interests represented by lobby groups then the political equilibrium is socially 
efficient. However in reality some groups face lower organizational cost and 
overcome the free rider problem of collective action - thereby coordinating better 
than others (Aidt 1998). 
The issue of pollution taxation versus direct regulation can be considered a 
disagreement between government and producer-interests. The government or 
regulator prefers taxation as enforcing direct control requires high enforcement costs. 
Whereas the lobby prefers direct regulation since it is cheaper and serves as a 
coordination device to create short-run monopoly rents. The dispute is resolved by 
arguing that small influential and organised producers are more efficient at lobbying 
than the larger public - which presumably supports taxation since it generates 
revenues. Thus at political equilibrium direct controls are chosen despite the 
efficiency of taxation. 
Many influential interests group have their own criteria and hence society has varied 
preferences regarding the choice of regulatory control. The revealed political 
preference function can be thought of as a weighted sum of individual interest 
groups' preference measures (Gardner 1987; Hahn 1989b) - where groups exerting 
more political clout have a higher weight. A simple preference function would 
include consumer and producer surplus, net government revenue, and environmental 
costs. If all of these are equally weighted then the political preference is for more 
efficient policies; however for both agricultural and environmental policy it is well 
known that they are not (Gardner 1987; Bromley and Hodge 1990). 
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Influential interest groups include farm organisations (land owners), chemical input 
suppliers (fertiliser manufacturers) and environmental groups (general public). Most 
environmental groups favour direct regulation over incentive based economic 
instruments. They mistrust the effectiveness of economic incentives and believe 
market based policies are simply 'rights to pollute' as they fail to stigmatise pollution 
as inherently wrong (Kelman 1983). Another reason sited for environmental groups' 
preference for direct regulation include their apparent involvement in determining 
methods and levels of abatement under command and control regulation (Bohm and 
Russell 1985). Interestingly over time polemic views on environmental taxation have 
been discarded. To illustrate, many leading environmental groups such as 
Greenpeace International are calling for extremely high progressive taxes to phase 
out nitrogen and pesticide use (Clunies-Ross 1993). 
An additional factor against the adoption of economic controls in practice is that until 
recently in some EU countries and the US, bureaucratic preferences have been 
complicated by the conflicting interests of agricultural and environmental agencies 
(Shortle and Abler 1991). Where environmental policies for agriculture are 
administrated by agricultural agencies there is an interest in maintaining the current 
system of regulation and support from farmers. In practice political acceptability is 
also determined by government budgets, administration and enforcement costs; 
higher transaction costs reduce political acceptability. 
Unfortunately, for the most part, traditionally the primary purpose of regulation is 
not to limit pollution to acceptable levels. More often than not they are used to raise 
revenue for public pollution control activities, research and development etc. Thus in 
designing and implementing agri -environmental policy a successful outcome is not 
measured by efficient achievement of pollution control alone. 
8.4 Research Summary 
This study theoretically modelled the first and second-best internalisation of two 
surface water externalities in an agricultural catchment. The two agricultural 
externalities considered were non-point source nitrogen pollution and reduced river 
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flows from surface water irrigation. It introduced the concept of complimentary 
interaction between controls which target different agricultural externalities, i.e. 
surface water NPS nitrate pollution (quality) and low river flows (quantity) 
To date, numerous aspects of diffuse nitrogen pollution as a negative production 
externality have been examined. The research also theoretically analysed the 
efficiency gains from recognising the dual nature of surftice water diffuse nitrogen 
pollution both as a positive and negative externality in a catchment where the 
regulator wishes to enforce a minimum river flow and ambient water quality 
standard. There is no known analysis of NPS control instruments which recognises 
the dual nature of nitrogen in the published literature. 
Empirically this study researched the efficient management of two agricultural 
externalities, i.e. diffuse nitrogen pollution (as a negative externality only) and low 
river flows from surface water extraction for irrigation in a Scottish catchment. It 
found that as a means to control diffuse nitrogen pollution imposing river flow 
controls were not cost-effective. However since MAF river restrictions contribute 
towards pollution mitigation they should be accounted for in the design of nitrogen 
control policies as they reduce compliance costs. 
Although the efficiency of mixed instrument policies has been examined in the 
literature nearly all published research considers only 2 instrument mixes of 
economic instruments alone. This study investigated four mixed instrument policy 
packages combining economic incentives and non-economic (managerial) 
approaches, i.e. 1) setaside reduction and input taxation, 2) setaside and stocking 
density reduction, and 3) stocking density and input taxation 4) setaside and stocking 
density reduction with input taxation. All four were considered with and without the 
90th percentile river flow restriction. 
There is no known mention of a three instrument mix policy in the literature. One 
reason for this may be that the introduction of an additional instrument results in 
additional and prohibitive transaction costs. While this is probably true of combining 
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complex economic instruments, non-economic or managerial regulatory approaches 
(setaside land and stocking density reduction) are arguably cheaper to enforce and 
are already currently enforced under other agricultural support schemes. 
The study also ranked policies to control diffuse nitrogen pollution in terms of their 
abatement cost under thy, mean and wet weather conditions. Through repeated runs, 
a continuous spectrum of instrument ranking from the baseline to different arbitrary 
regulatory targets was achieved. Continuous ranking enabled the identification of 
'cross-overs' in efficiency ranking. The ranking of control measures under mean 
weather conditions conformed, for the most part, to the economic literature 
hierarchy. However, in comparison under wet weather conditions the cost-
effectiveness of economic instruments relative to mixed instruments is significantly 
reduced. In fact certain mixed instrument control policies outperformed conventional 
input taxation and quotas. Control policies may be set based on wet weather 
conditions if the regulator is extremely averse to the regulatory target (required 
standard compliance) being exceeded. Wet weather conditions might prevail in the 
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There is an abundance of debate surrounding pigouvian taxation (e.g. entry/exit 
incentives) and related theoretical issues such as 'prices vs quantities': 
Pigouvian taxation is inefficient because the total payments in tax exceed the 
total external damages, resulting in suboptimal entry conditions (Rose-
Ackerman 1973; Schultze and dArge 1974; Collinge and Oates 1982). Put 
differently, even in a perfect scenario, an optimal pollution tax will over 
penalise as even when operating at the optimal efficiency level, where 
marginal externality cost and marginal private benefit curve cross, the 
polluter will still be paying a tax (Pezzy and Park 1998). 
Pigouvian taxation is inefficient when the marginal external cost function 
slopes upwards (Burrows 1979). 
The correction of the above inefficiency (point 1) through the use of lump-
sum transfer payments (Carlton and Loury 1980; Carlton and Loury 1986). 
Assuming the standard 'perfect competition' assumption the contribution of 
an individual firm is 'negligible', thus the marginal social costs are 
approximately constant over a single firm's emissions (Baumol and Oates 
1988). 
Within a general equilibrium framework, the fact that pigouvian taxes exceed 
total external damages is a 'normal' phenomena akin to consumer or producer 
surplus (Kohn 1985; Kohn 1994). 
The impact of pigouvian taxation on industry entry/exit conditions depends 
on the elasticity of demand. If demand is elastic then entry/exit will be 
affected, but not if demand is inelastic (Conrad and Wang 1993). 
Most analysis is simplified by a continuously increasing marginal abatement 
cost function (MAC), implying a local and global cost minimisation solution 
that coincides. Rowley et al., 1979, undertook a simulation model of point 
source discharges on the Tees, to determine whether the theoretical cost 
minimisation of pollution taxes over standards could be shown to exist and 
found that economies of scale were present. The aggregate abatement cost 
function was not strictly convex and any local maximum under a tax scheme 
was not necessarily a global maximum. As discharges along a river's length 
differ in output, age, design, technology, location, production processes, 
managerial skills etc., their MAC functions should also reflect this variability. 
Hanley and Moffat, 1993, found that MACs for direct discharges of BOD to 
the Forth Estuary in Scotland differ as much as thirty times. 
When competitive economic conditions are satisfied efficiency will not 
require any extra entry/exit conditions (Xepapadeas 1997). Some have argued 
that marginal conditions are left unaffected in the long run (Migue and 
Marceau 1993). 
Regarding the choice of price or quantity instruments, Weitzman concluded 
that the relative slopes of the relative cost and benefit curves matter and 
uncertainty regarding costs is the most important consideration. He argued 
that quantity instruments achieve a lower expected welfare loss than price 
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instruments if the marginal benefits curve is flatter than the marginal cost 
curve and vice versa (Weitzman 1974). Essentially Weitzman showed that if 
the regulator has imperfect information regarding MAC then he will be able 
to achieve the desired emission reduction using a standard but may greatly 
over or underestimate the cost of achieving it. If he knows the marginal costs 
of firms and employs an emission fee he will be uncertain of the level of 
emission reduction. 
Later work concluded that choice of instrument is contingent upon the degree 
of cost uncertainty and the relative slopes of both curves - thus a 
generalisation is not possible (Yohe 1978). This conclusion was confirmed 
for when firms are risk averse (Adar and Griffin 1976) and also in the 
presence of price distortions (Schob 1996). The effect of correlated 
uncertainty regarding both the benefit and cost curves concluded that a 
positive correlation tends to favours quantity controls, whereas negative 
correlation favours price intervention (Stavins 1996). With agricultural 
pollution such statistical dependence would be because of weather which 
influences both yield and emissions. 
In comparing the relative efficiency of effluent and input taxes the return to 
scale of the leaching function is an important factor (Stevens 1988). If the 
leaching function is characterised by increasing returns to scale, i.e. the 
degree of homogeneity is greater than I, then an effluent tax will be more 
efficient. However, if the leaching function exhibits decreasing returns to 
scale (degree of homogeneity less than I) than an input tax will be more 
efficient. Here efficiency implies reducing farmer income loss, as measured 
by money/kg of N reduced. The leaching function varies depending on site-
specific characteristics, thus both an effluent and input tax must be site-
specific to be efficient, gathering site-specific information is very costly. 
Thus if this is not done and a uniform tax is applied then there will be too 
much reduction in areas where there is little emissions and too little where 
there are considerable emissions. 
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